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Brozi Case Receives International, U.S. Attention

AU0410090995 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 1 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed Report: "Serious Accusations Against Brozi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "Brozi incident," brandished by the opposition political parties and their press as an example of abuse of political power over legal power, has attracted the attention of international experts and institutions, that is, the U.S. State Department and the Council of Europe. The reports written by the international experts about the former Cassation Court chairman clearly point out:

1. Judge Brozi's attitudes are political;

2. In running the court, Brozi did not base himself on the law, but on his own political views;

3. The overwhelming majority of the court's judges did not agree with Judge Brozi's political line, a line that disregarded the law;

4. Judge Brozi was surrounded by his relatives;

5. Judge Brozi abused the media and was used by the press and the political parties;

6. It is undeniable that Albania has achieved great progress in the field of justice.

Other conclusions of the EU say that the case is about a political struggle between legal power and political power, i.e., the legal power has been involved more with politics than the law.

In a statement on 25 September 95, the U.S. State Department considers Brozi was dismissed for political reasons and asks Albania to improve its laws ensuring the independence of the courts, so that they depend on the law and not on politics.

Opposition Backs U.S. Stand

AU0410093995 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Arben Vata: "Brozi: U.S. Stand Is Correct"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reaction from the opposition to the statment by the U.S. State Department sent to the Albanian Government on 26 September was immediate. This statement condemns the dismissal of Cassation Court Chairman Brozi and says the dismissal was done for political purposes. The statement also advises the Albanian people of U.S. concern over recent events in Albania, which are a violation of the courts' independence by the executive branch of the Albanian Government.

The protest note from the State Department to the Albanian Government was also received on Saturday [30 September] by fax at the Socialist Party offices. For this party, the statement once more expresses the U.S. Government stand on the injustice done to the legal branch.

"The protest sent recently by the State Department to the Albanian Government is evidence of U.S. Government interest in closely following events in Albania and helping to establish the legal branch here. This shows once more that the United States is against any means and forms of political force which violate democratic norms and principles," says Socialist Deputy Fehmi Avdiu to KOHA JONE.

While Deputy Avdiu considers Berisha's statements to journalists to be lies and his position on Brozi to be closely linked to the Nano case, Social Democrat Deputy Chairman Paskal Milo thinks that they were waiting for such an attitude on the part of the U.S. State Department. "We were sure that the U.S. position on violent acts against the Cassation Court would be such. Our information sources and contacts had confirmed that in Washington Berisha had drawn attention to these actions." More likely the latest stand of the U.S. State Department will restrain Berisha's press propaganda, which states that the United States stands behind Berisha's moves. This propaganda aims at justifying Berisha's anticonstitutional acts and his interference in all aspects of state power. Democratic Alliance Presidency member Prec Zogaj says that "the United States will not give the green light to the strengthening of violence against legal institutions in Albania or elsewhere. Just as under the dictatorship, Berisha is trying to make use of external ties to encourage his supporters in their activities against political adversaries." According to Zogaj, in this statement the United States expresses disapproval of Berisha's actions which are aimed at establishing the Number One over all state entities in Albania.

Still under a shadow after his dismissal, the former Cassation Court chairman did not care to comment on the U.S. statement. He said only that "the U.S. stand is correct."

The State Department statement, which condemns Brozi's unjust dismissal, shows that acts of this nature which might happen in the future will surely meet with the powerful disapproval of the United States and other European countries, because the independence of the legal system is sacred to them.

'Terrorist Act' on FYROM President Condemned

AU0410113795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, has sent a telegram to the president of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Kiro Gligorov, in which he condemns the terrorist act committed against Gligorov this morning and wishes him a rapid recovery.

Asylum Requests to Western Embassies Increasing

AU0310131395 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 1 Oct 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Western Embassies in Tirana Attacked"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After almost five years the embassies accredited in Tirana have been attacked again. Unlike the time when intellectuals, students, and workers leaped over embassies' iron fences and gates trying to escape from the iron cage of the most savage communist dictatorship, which was elaborated by the dead Hoxha and followed by Alia and his ministers, the new attack on the embassies is of another kind.

Three western embassies (so far) have received written requests for political asylum. The requests for political asylum coincide with the approval of the antigenocide law and the denunciation of crimes perpetrated during the communist dictatorship in Albania. Important former functionaries of the former secret police, former directors of this ministry, high functionaries of the Workers Party, and members of its political bureau, have presented to these embassies their requests and respective documents for political asylum, under the pretext that a dictatorship is being installed in Albania, human rights are not observed, and lastly the main document is the antigenocide law. From 1992, requests have been made to the foreign embassies in Tirana for political asylum, but their number has increased recently. The new candidates for political asylum are important names of the present party structures. Two of them are deputies, though it has not yet been confirmed that they are Moikom Zeqo and Gramoz Ruci [Socialist Party]. On the list are Hydajet Beqiri [National Unity Party chairman] and a series of journalists, former government members, prosecutors, etc.

Five years ago, many Albanians, who dealt the hardest blow to the dictatorship, received the status of political refugees. The 120 Albanians who are knocking today on the doors of the foreign embassies with many documents to show their persecution have no chance of being called political refugees from the moment Albania becomes a member of the Council of Europe.

EU Negative List Issue: Council Agrees on Actions

AU0410080995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The common position of Bulgaria's state institutions is that the removal of Bulgaria from the EU's negative visa list would represent an important support for the development of the democratic processes and economic reforms in the country. Ivaylo Trifonov, director of President Zhelev's office, made this statement following today's meeting of the Consultative Council on National Security. He added that different views were expressed on the reasons for Bulgaria remaining on the EU negative list. However, the representatives of the state institutions assumed a series of commitments aimed at persuading the EU to amend its decision during the six months remaining until the list comes into force. Ivaylo Trifonov briefed the journalists on the nature of these commitments:

[Begin recording] The president has committed himself to sending messages to the heads of state of the EU member countries. Academician Sendov, chairman of the National Assembly, announced that parliament is preparing a declaration against leaving Bulgaria on the EU negative list. A draft resolution of the European Parliament has been prepared on Bulgaria's visa treatment that asks the European Commission to apply objective public criteria, to treat all the EU associate countries in the same manner, and to implement the necessary changes as soon as possible.

A recommendation was made to the Council of Ministers to continue its active steps in relation to the EU member countries and bodies with a view to removing Bulgaria from the negative visa list in the very near future, before the list comes into force in six months time.

The representatives of the parliamentary groups also assumed commitments. They emphasized the need for consensus between the political forces on this issue.

Ministry Condemns Gligorov Assassination Attempt

AU0310152295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During our news program at 1500 hours [1300 GMT] we received the reaction of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to the assassination attempt in Skopje against Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Here is a statement from Foreign Ministry spokesman Radko Vlaykov:

[Begin Vlaykov recording] We learned with deep regret of the assassination attempt on the life of Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia. The perpetrators and instigators of this criminal act deserve the most severe condemnation and punishment.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria expresses the hope that Mr. Gligorov will be speedily restored to good health and that he will continue to fulfill his high responsibilities in connection with strengthening the independence of the Republic of Macedonia and stabilizing the situation in the Balkans. [end recording]

Zhelev Expresses 'Outrage'

AU0310144495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Report from the Press Center of the Bulgarian Presidency]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, has sent a telegram to Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. In the telegram President Zhelev expresses outrage, concern, and sympathy regarding the assassination attempt on the life of the Macedonian head of state and wishes him a speedy recovery.

President Zhelev hopes that the situation in the Republic of Macedonia will stabilize, and strongly condemns the perpetrators of the terrorist act.

Nuclear Official Views Kozloduy Plant Safety

AU0210143095 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 27 Sep 95 p 9

[Interview with Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, by Eleonora Petrova; place and date not given: "Sufficient Proof Exists That the No. 1 Reactor Unit of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant Is Reliable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petrova] Mr. Yanev, are there any good grounds for the fears of the G-7 countries that, if the No. 1 Reactor Unit of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is operated, there is a risk of violating the nuclear safety norms?

[Yanev] The No. 1 Unit of the Kozloduy Plant has been prepared for service. Its precise condition will be assessed before the end of this week by a commission from the Inspectorate for the Safe Use of Atomic Energy, which will carry out a complete survey and analysis of the unit.

The problem with the metal of the reactor body is a purely scientific one, because when the body remains for a lengthy period in a neutron field, the metal's qualities deteriorate under neutron bombardment, and this must be thoroughly analyzed. The only results that we have so far date from 1989, so that clearly it may be difficult to accept that they correspond to the present reality. For this reason, this year, specialists from Sofia University, the Nuclear Research Institute, the Institute of Metal Research of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Gidropress Company, and experts from the plant that manufactured the reactor body carried out laboratory studies and analyses employing the most varied independent methods. The results show that the body is still capable of service and may be operated for at least one more fuel season.

In principle, the question does not relate to how long the No. 1 Unit will be operated, because the operator—the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant—and the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy are the ones who have to agree how long the 440-megawatt reactor is to operate.

The uproar that has been raised is due rather to the fact that, in 1993, an agreement was signed to close down the No. 1 and No. 2 Reactor Units in 1997. The countries who are providing money to improve safety want to see to what extent Bulgaria will keep to the commitments it has assumed.

The political representatives of the governments in question expressed concern because, according to information from their experts, further tests ought to be carried out on the unit, and only then should it be started up. They are not familiar with the latest results obtained by the Bulgarian and Russian institutes, so it is natural for them to hold such an opinion. However, the results will be presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and released to all the specialists who are interested in them. I think that this question will be closed, all the more because the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy considers that such samples should be taken, and this will most likely be done during the 1996 fuel season.

Of course, for us to change our view on the unit's condition, someone will have to convince us that other methods are available that can be used to establish the condition of the metal of the reactor body. At least for the time being, however, these are the best methods known in world practice.

From the viewpoint of safety and the problems that have to be solved, the information that we have available at the moment about the state of the metal of the No. 1 reactor body is sufficient to ensure that our decisions conform to legal requirements. On the other hand, as soon as the present permit expires, which is granted for a limited period, we will demand that further analyses are carried out. We will adopt a conservative approach and will not permit the reactor to be operated for an unlimited period, so as to prevent any further embrittlement of the metal. The analyses that we have in mind include the ones recommended to us by the European experts, as well as others proposed by the Russians. According to the latter, we still have some reserves in hand, but it is better to determine precisely the reactor's true service life.

No one is entitled to state and set any deadlines for operating the reactor. The reactor may operate as long as it is in a condition to do so and has the required reserve service life, or until someone decides to shut it down. From the safety viewpoint, we will always state whether the unit can be operated in conformity with the technological regulations and the legislative requirements. Who will shut it down and when is another question. For example, no one can say how long a car can be driven. If the owner has the money and decides to buy himself a new one, he can send it to the breaker's yard, but if he has no money, he will repair the old one and run it for at least 20 years. If it has no brakes, however, he will have to take it off the road. The same logic can be applied in the present case. The required safety conditions must be observed when the unit is operated, and how long it can be operated depends on a great number of things.

[Petrova] Is there a risk that the European Union will stop the ECU 24 million of aid that it has granted to improve the safety of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant?

[Yanev] The terms are defined in the agreement that the Bulgarian Government signed with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], and they specifically state that the Nos. 1 and 2 Units of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant are to be closed down in 1997, and the Nos. 3 and 4 Units closed down in 1998, but under certain conditions, which are extremely complex. The Varna and Maritsa-Iztok Thermoelectric Power Plants and the Nos. 5 and 6 Reactor Units of the Kozloduy Plant have to be modernized; all the district heating plants around Sofia have to be converted to operate on a combined cycle; the Chaira Pumped-Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant has to come into service; and the country's energy balance has to be guaranteed. As I told the foreign ambassadors, I do not believe that the horn of plenty will pour out its bounty into the energy industry within the next two years. Even if someone puts the money on the table now, it is impossible to complete the work in two years. This work should have started four or five years ago and a lot of money should have been invested in modernizing these plants to guarantee Bulgaria's energy stability. The logic of the present agreement is not to invest in modernizing the Nos. 1-4 Reactor Units, but only to carry out the most important safety measures.

In the final analysis, what is important is to modernize the unit so that it functions safely, regardless of where the money comes from—the EBRD, National Electricity Company, or the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development. This means that we would modernize the units, not close them down. Even the modernization itself has been delayed, on the one hand, due to lack of money, and on the other, because of administrative mistakes, poor organization, and delay in carrying out the design work on the part of Energoproekt. This has given our Western partners a certain impression that Bulgaria appears almost deliberately not to want to carry out these modernization projects, which is not true. The Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy is bringing strong pressure to bear on the power plant, and they want to do the work, but everything boils down to money. For a whole year now, they have received less money than they need.

[Petrova] What may be the consequences of this?

[Yanev] No one knows what they may be, but they will depend on how we react. The consequences may be very serious, or there may be none at all. The Western countries have delivered a political demarche, which means that they tell us officially what they think about a particular question. This is not a threat. Any sovereign state can say that it will not help Bulgaria.

We stated that we will observe all the regulations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which we have already ratified. In big politics, a nuclear country like Bulgaria has to take account of world feelings. We cannot think that we will shut ourselves away in Kozloduy and do what we consider to be fit. Such a thing simply cannot happen in the nuclear field. We cannot put things right by ourselves, because we are not producers of nuclear equipment and have no self-contained fuel cycle, as is the case with Russia and the United States, for example. Bulgaria must rigorously observe the rules in the nuclear field. The IAEA has no control responsibilities, it is a body with consultative functions. This totally depends on the Bulgarian organizations.

Permit Given To Start Reactor

AU0410071195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Committee on Power Supply held a conference today on the condition of the No. 1 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency took part in the discussions.

In the meantime, the Inspectorate on the Safe Use of Atomic Energy under the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy issued a permit to the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant for the physical startup of the No. 1 Unit. At the moment, checks are being carried out on all the protective devices and interlock of the 440-megawatt reactor, after which the startup operations will commence.

Article Views NATO Expansion Study

AU0410105995 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 29 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Stanislav Drahny: "Pershings Near Jihlava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A study on the method of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance was unofficially released on 27 September. It immediately became, at least in the Czech Republic, the news of the day. Commentators on all evening television newscasts emphasized with a worried expression, above all, the fact that tactical nuclear weapons can be deployed on the territory of the new member countries.

The 30-page document was presented in Brussels yesterday to the countries participating in the Partnership for Peace. It contains the conditions for joining the alliance. One of them is willingness to deploy nuclear arms on the country's territory in case of need. "The new members must be prepared to share the tasks, risks, responsibility, advantages, and cost of common security and joint defense," the document reads verbatim.

It did not take long before a negative response was heard. The representatives of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] consider the deployment of nuclear arms on the territory of the Czech Republic absolutely unacceptable. According to them, even the Warsaw Pact did not dare to take such a step in its time. Other communists (Party of the Democratic Left) also consider the deployment of alliance nuclear weapons on our territory unacceptable. It is allegedly because people had difficulty coming to terms with this idea even under the former regime, and there is no reason that it should be otherwise now.

It is necessary to ask again and emphatically: Does the Czech Republic want to become a part of the West? Are its inhabitants aware that, along with advantages, membership implies duties and obligations? The time when most Slovaks condoned "sovereignty" but at the same time wanted to live in a common state is not yet so far that most Czechs do not remember their forbearing smile over this nonsense. Let us hope that the wish to be in NATO and at the same time not to be there will not make our citizens smart alecks in the eyes of the West.

The document makes it clear that the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new NATO member states is not on the current agenda, and Brussels would only resort to it in case of need—that means at the moment a conflict is looming. In such a scenario, the psychological significance of deployment of these weapons as close to the adversary as possible would not be negligible.

It must be observed that a conflict that would result in maneuvers of this caliber at the very outset would be fateful for the entire continent. This is true, regardless of whether or not nuclear arms are deployed in Central Europe. To make domestic-political capital out of this, as some parties are trying to do, is therefore irresponsible and most likely also unnecessary.

One can, however, understand the communists. If the presence of [Radio] Free Europe in Prague is a thin link to the West, Pershings near Jihlava are a firm bond.

Foreign Minister Receives CE Secretary General

AU0310124895 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 20 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by "tom": "Minister Zieleniec Received Council of Europe Secretary General Tarschys"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Yesterday, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec received Council of Europe Secretary General Daniel Tarschys, who visited the Czech Republic on the occasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina Month. Karel Boruvka from the Foreign Ministry Press Department told this to DENNI TELEGRAF.

On 18 September, Tarshys attended the Prague session of the Council of Europe (CE) Political Committee and, together with other participants, met with President Vaclav Havel. The subject of the talks yesterday between Secretary General Tarschys and Foreign Minister Zieleniec was the preparations for the November session of the CE Ministerial Council. Ukraine and Macedonia are to be admitted to the CE at the coming meeting, which will be chaired by Minister Zieleniec. Another topic was the question of admitting Russia to this European organization. The two politicians dealt with further measures in the matter of granting the United States observer status by the CE. The Ministerial Council consists of the member states' foreign ministers and is the supreme body, by means of which the governments directly participate in the Council's political decisions. The Czech Republic took over in May, for six months, chairmanship of the Council, which is passed from one member country to another in alphabetical order.

Klaus Denies Discussing Izetbegovic With Havel

AU0310125095 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by "mrk": "The Name Izetbegovic Was Not Mentioned During the Prime Minister's Dinner with the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The name Izetbegovic was not mentioned once during President Vaclav

Havel's dinner on 19 September with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. The prime minister reported this yesterday after the government session.

Presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek said on Tuesday that the dinner could serve to clarify the misunderstanding between the prime minister and the president in the matter of the invitation to visit Prague extended to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. The prime minister repeatedly criticized this invitation. Yesterday, he said that the disagreement was not discussed because of "innate politeness on both sides and also because nothing can be changed on the matter." He added that it was not a matter of the communication channel between the Castle and the government but, rather, of a normal difference of opinion between two people.

According to the prime minister, the Tuesday dinner also had nothing to do with the latest development in the situation within the government coalition. The proof that "things are not as hot in there as they could seem" is, according to Klaus, the fact that "not even for a second was a party tone heard" in the discussion on the state budget, which was eventually accepted unanimously. To reinforce intracoalition relations, following the successful "bicycle session" in Sumava, the government will organize a two-day session in Lednice, Moravia, at the beginning of October, when it will play a soccer match. The opposing teams will consist of economy ministers and noneconomy ministers.

Prime Minister on Relations Within Coalition

AU0410104895 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 22 Sep 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "The Cohesion of the Coalition Is Demonstrated by Its Accord Regarding the Draft State Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Martinkova] Could the coalition skirmish after the latest meeting of the representatives of the Government Four be explained by your absence at the meeting?

[Klaus] No. I would not explain it by my absence. As a matter of fact, it made me smile, as I lay at home with a fever, wondering whether the inferences of the media regarding my alleged inability to communicate and stubbornness are not somewhat exaggerated, when it took this course even without me. It must be said, however, that the unanimous agreement on the draft state budget testifies to the cohesion of the coalition and to a corresponding perception of the fundamental problems much more than do a few words after the coalition meeting last week.

[Martinkova] Let us suppose that the coalition continues in the next cabinet. Have you considered a change in the party management of individual ministries? Is it not that long-term work in one department encourages preferential treatment for members of one's own party?

[Klaus] I must say that the public's ideas of preferential treatment are really exaggerated. Really, not a word has been mentioned regarding the distribution of posts following the elections. We are too much involved in everyday business and cannot afford the luxury of letting the country run by inertia until 1 June 1996, and only thinking about the election campaign, or possibly the postelectoral filling of individual posts. That would be the worst possible thing we could do. [passage omitted]

Parliament Approves Law on Senate Establishment

AU0310212995 Prague PRAVO in Czech 28 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by "(ada, nig)": "There Will Be a Senate After All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—After more than two years of bitter disputes, the second parliament chamber can be established, because, on 27 September, coalition deputies voted against the opposition—104 out of the 162 deputies present—for the electoral law that includes a method of filling the 81 places in the Senate prescribed by the Constitution.

The law's approval means that the Chamber of Deputies will be dissolvable as of filling the Senate, so a subsequent constitutional crisis will be resolvable. The agreement on the Senate was made possible by Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party deputies who recently abandoned their own proposal for the electoral system.

Senators, as opposed to deputies, will be elected for a period of six years by the majority method—in the first round, the candidate with more than half the votes will win. If no one obtains them, the two most successful candidates will go into the second round. A simple majority will decide between them.

After 1 January 1996, the Senate's constitution will be a matter for President Vaclav Havel within whose jurisdiction, with the prime minister's agreement, announcing the date of the elections lies.

Minister Views Air Force Modernization Options

AU0310124995 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Sep 95 p 12

[Article by Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan: "Various Levels of Responsibility for the State's Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The transformation of our Air Force and, in this context, the contemplated modernization of our MiG-21 aircraft have been rewarding topics for the mass media for over a year now. Experts, politicians, and journalists have aired their views on the issue. The opinion was even expressed that the recent decision by the Defense Ministry to modernize two aircraft in the first phase, despite an emphatic recommendation from the Defense and Security Committee not to do so, and to choose a definitive option after the flight tests have been completed is tantamount to a declaration of war on the deputies.

I personally would not want to dramatize the whole issue in this fashion. I do, however, want to point out the various levels of responsibility of those who take part in such public debates or in the decisionmaking process.

We all probably agree that the existence of our own army is a manifestation of our state sovereignty and resolve to defend ourselves. We also agree that an air defense with fighter aircraft is a logical element of every effective army. The structure of the Czech Army's fighter air force in the near future is the subject of dispute. Here, however, it is necessary, at the same time, to also take into consideration the different degrees of responsibility for the defense of this state and, therefore, the different degrees of susceptibility to the cogency of the individual arguments. And it is here that we find the causes of the aforementioned disputes—or, rather, misunderstandings.

The issue of modernizing the fighter air force does not have to be so complicated, however, if we arrange the known facts into a simple equation. What facts and arguments will go into it then?

Primarily, one of the main functions of the state—to guarantee the security of its citizens. This is not only the obligation but also the right of every state, a right given by the UN Charter.

The government and the Defense Ministry respectively bear the responsibility for the Czech Republic's defense. Its principles are enshrined in the Military Strategy for the Czech Republic that has been discussed in both the government and the parliament. This strategy's cardinal principle is the state's resolve to defend itself primarily with its own forces. In the case of air defense, it is impossible to permit a so-called open sky situation above our republic—that is, unprotected airspace. This again is the responsibility of the Defense Ministry. Another argument is the necessity, if not the obligation, to ensure interoperability with NATO states, including distinguishing between domestic and foreign aircraft. Again, the Defense Ministry bears the responsibility for its fulfillment.

Of course, there may be, and are, different views on solving the two preceding tasks—covering our airspace and guaranteeing interoperability. The purchase of the new Czech-made L-159 aircraft will be a partial solution. These aircraft will not only be equipped with state-of-the-art avionics, but will also have sufficiently effective weapon systems at their disposal. One of the other solutions is the purchase of new modern-generation fighters. This option is, however, too radical with regard to the state's economic potential. Therefore, it is necessary to think about a less demanding option. This could include purchasing the aircraft that certain NATO armies withdraw from their armaments and that are more acceptable for our budget. I talk about such possibilities every time I meet the defense ministers of these countries.

Despite this, it is necessary to think realistically and responsibly. It is essential, on the one hand, to give our military pilots the time and opportunity to master the modern-generation aircraft hardware and avionics and, on the other, to guarantee the defense of our airspace. It is also essential to give our economy time to catch its breath. We should also not forget about support for the domestic aviation industry.

The controversial modernization of the MiG-21 aircraft could be a temporary solution. I say temporary because I am considering the whole issue from a much broader point of view—and not only from the point of view of time—than many have done until now. I reject categorically, however, the reports in some media that we are not considering any option other than modernizing the MiG's.

It is necessary to realize that whoever bears the maximum level of responsibility must also make decisions according to his conscience. I think that, in such a case, a decision may be made with a certain modicum of risk that it will not be accepted on all sides. If this happens, it is a matter of further discussion to try and get rid of the points of friction and reach a consensus. One thing is, however, certain. In the event of any kind of threat, it will be too late for discussion. And that is a responsibility that no one will lift from us.

Civilians Assuming Authority at Defense Ministry

AU0310123795 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "Civilians Have Begun Assuming Authority From the Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Defense Ministry has at last fulfilled one of the important conditions that enables the Republic to apply for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. That is, the old Soviet model of army management entirely ceased to apply as of this week.

A Defense Policy Section, which will take over some of the important powers and activities of the General Staff, started to operate at the Defense Ministry on 15 September and is directly subordinate to the minister.

The Defense Policy Section will, for example, devise a military strategy for the Republic and evaluate the risks and requirements necessitated by the state's defense. The General Staff has decided on these strategic issues until now. The section will also influence the Army's organizational division and the deployment of troops in the Republic. It will also coordinate the activity of other state bodies—that is, what the individual ministries or self-administrations have to do under a military threat. For example, it will be responsible for discussing with the Contingency Reserve Administration the issues associated with the amount of oil it is necessary to have constantly in supply in case of war.

The new system of Army management should also eradicate seemingly insignificant difficulties such as a too military mode of expression in drafting documents for the government. It has happened on more than one occasion that a military document has not been approved in the government simply because it was barely comprehensible.

Among other things, the new system will enable the Defense Ministry to decide on its own whether it will employ secretaries in its offices. Until now, it had to request the chief of the General Staff to appoint them.

Foreign Dissidents Begin To Operate in Prague

AU0310154295

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague TYDEN in Czech No. 37 on 11 September on pages 18-21 carries a 2,400-word article by Jaroslav Plesl and Petr Zavozda entitled "Under Surveillance Even in Exile." The authors note that, "after the fall of communism, the Czech Republic became a refuge for foreign dissidents, but their persecutors are also operating in the country." The article focuses on "representatives of three prodemocratic foreign groups from Vietnam, Iraq, and Burma."

The first of these groups, says the article, is the Vietnamese Renewal Party, VRP, organized by anticommunist exiles in the United States in 1978, with 500 members worldwide. Its coordinator for Eastern Europe is Pham Viet Hung, an exile living in Prague. In March, according to the article, Pham Viet Hung in LIDOVE NOVINY accused two employees of the Vietnamese Embassy in Prague, Pham Dinh Truyen and Ngue Van Ngon, of being "agents of the communist secret police, with the task of following Vietnamese dissidents living in Prague." Neither of the two men denied this, and Pham Viet Hung himself lost his job as a waiter in a Vietnamese restaurant "after his boss had been summoned to the embassy." Despite the "hazing by the communist secret police even in the democratic Czech Republic," a conference entitled "Experience of Democratization in Eastern Europe" was organized last week by the Czech section of the VRP for "representatives of the Vietnamese exiles from the entire world." It was also attended by VRP Chairman Tran Quoc Bao from the United States. "A delegation of Vietnamese exiles was received in Prague Castle by President Vaclav Havel, who last year refused to receive the chairman of the Vietnamese Parliament."

Majid al-Raji is a member of the Iraqi Club (IC) in the Czech Republic, the second of the foreign groups discussed in the TYDEN article. "The IC was founded in 1978, after Iraqi dictator Sadam Husayn took over power in the country in a bloody coup. The IC associates former Iraqi politicians, physicians, and lawyers, who escaped from the dictator abroad. It has some 80 members (a total of 200 Iraqis live here) in the Czech Republic." According to Majid al-Raji, the task of the IC "is to achieve a plurality democracy in Iraq." The authors report that the Iraqis have problems in the Czech Republic similar to those of the Vietnamese. "They receive threatening letters" and "are awakened in the middle of the night by anonymous phone calls." According to Majid al-Raji, "Iraqi agents operating from the Iraqi Embassy in Prague are responsible for these actions. At the same time, the Iraqi Embassy acts as if it were not aware of any opposition group in this country."

The article then continues, "Zaw Win is the chairman of the voluntary association Burma Project—Prague, the last of the exile organizations discussed here. It has 13 members in Bohemia, and its task is to solicit humanitarian assistance for the Burmese population and closely follow the situation in that country." According to Zaw Win, "the military regime must be toppled without the use of violence." Thus, the Burmese exile government in Washington uses other means. It has a radio station called "Democratic Voice of Burma," and "according to TYDEN sources, the Burmese exiles even discussed with the Czech Foreign Ministry the possibility of moving the transmitter to Prague. So far, the ministry allegedly unofficially agreed to this operation."

The article concludes by quoting Alexandr Vondra, deputy foreign minister and former dissident, as saying: "We maintain good contacts with prodemocratic dissidents from Vietnam. After all, Vietnam is one of the countries where the situation in the sphere of human rights is not very good. On the other hand, it shows a certain dynamics of development." According to him, "it is in the interest of the Czech Republic that democracy and human rights be observed at least on the level to which all countries subscribed in the framework of the United Nations."

Defense Industry Eager To Sell to Slovenia

95CH0339A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 15 Aug 95 p 4

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Slovenia Seen As Lucrative Arms Market"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech defense ministry has been scouting out arms sales opportunities in Slovenia, looking ahead to the time when the United Nations will lift its arms embargo against that country.

A part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has been subject to the embargo even though the Bosnian conflict is not on its soil. The country is expected to be a source of lucrative contracts for arms producers once it gets the go-ahead from the U.N.

Slovenia attempts to persuade the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo against the nations of former Yugoslavia have been unsuccessful. A recent vote in the U.S. Congress to lift the embargo, however, could put pressure on the U.N. to move in that direction.

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan signaled the Czech Republic's interest in equipping Slovenia's military during a trip there in late June. It was the first official visit to Slovenia by a Czech defense minister.

The Czech press quoted Holan as saying that the Czech arms industry "could equip the Slovene army."

Slovenia, a nation of 2 million that achieved its independence in 1991, is situated between Croatia, Hungary, Austria, and Italy. The Yugoslav army confiscated most of the military equipment that had been on Slovenian soil, so the country needs to equip its army from the boots up.

Today's army of some 10,000 troops ia equipped with 82 tanks, 86 armed vehicles and 124 pieces of caliber ranging from 105mm to 128mm, according to Roman Kirn, counselor for the Slovenian Embassy in the Czech Republic.

Kirn said an anti-aircraft system, helicopters and even explosives are on Slovenia's shopping list.

"The (Slovenian) Defense Ministry has a budget it would like to spend, but it cannot," Kirn said. That budget totals about 24 million DM (450 million Kc) this year, he added.

"When you have an explosive situation in your neighborhood, of course you feel insecure," said Kirn, pointing out that fighting is occurring as near as 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the Slovenian border.

"We're also facing economic damage—we can't even buy explosives for the construction of roads," he said.

Because the embargo is a sensitive issue, Czech arms producers were reluctant to comment on their interest in doing business with Slovenia. At this point, negotiations are strickly at the government level, according to one weapons maker.

The embargo is extremely strict, said Bretislav Gregr, general director of the Ministry of Industry and Trade's licensing office. "Our producers have asked us for licenses for such items as pistols for the Slovenian police, and we can't approve them," he said.

Drahomira Nova, deputy press secretary for the Czech Ministry of Defense, pointed to sales opportunities not only for new weapons but also for spare parts.

"Most of the equipment Slovenia has is from the Eastern Bloc," Nova said. "It is similar to the equipment we have, so we can offer support."

Police Thwart Attempt To Export Submachine Guns

AU0310135195 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta and Jan Gazdik: "Letecke Opravny Kbely Fell Victim to an Attempt To Illegally Export Scorpion Submachine Guns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—At the end of last week, the police arrested three foreigners who had tried to export almost 6,000 Scorpion submachine guns. The fraudulent trio had intended to get the Scorpions, worth some 40.5 million korunas, out of the Republic through the Letecke Opravny Kbely [Aircraft Repair Works] enterprise, claiming that they would transport them to the Dominican Republic.

This was not the first time a local arms manufacturer had become the target of an attempt to export arms fraudulently. As in the earlier instances, however, when the final destinations were Bolivia, Panama, and Chad in Africa, the authorities also prevented this fraudulent transaction.

Moreover, all three merchants—a Pole, an Austrian, and a Dominican living in the United States—have been arrested. At the end of the week, the investigator filed charges against them for violating the regulations on trade in military materiel. All three are in detention.

The police do not know the exact place where the arms were to be delivered. There is speculation about Bosnia and other embargoed states.

The Interior Ministry confirmed yesterday that specialists from the Unit for Organized Crime Detection began to work on the case a year ago, when a Pole living in Vienna who mediated large-scale arms deals appeared in the Republic.

The fraudsters procured a false document for the fraudulent deal, stating that the arms had been ordered by the Dominican Defense Ministry. The Czech authorities would not have issued a permit for the deal. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry discovered that the documents were false when it used diplomatic ways to verify that the Dominican Defense Ministry does not want any Scorpions.

So far, the police do not suspect any Czech of consciously participating in the attempt to export the arms. "Letecke Opravny Kbely had no idea," the Interior Ministry stated. The head of the Sales and Marketing Department of the aviation enterprise, Vaclav Renc, said that the documents presented by the merchants looked genuine. "We did not have the least reason to doubt them," Renc said and confirmed that the firm was about to launch talks with Ceska Zbrojovka Uhersky Brod regarding the manufacture of the submachine guns.

NATO Study: 'First Step' to Enlarging Alliance

AU0310135595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 Sep 95 p 7

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "First NATO Step Toward Eastward Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The public presentation of the NATO study on the possibilities and rules for the admission of new member countries from the East into this political-military alliance, reserved as yet only for the West, is the first step toward the settlement of the promissory note that NATO itself had issued after the fall of communism. While the study is extensive, it does not address the issues that really matter—who can become a new partner for the present 16 members and when. One cannot even be surprised at this when one looks at the problem realistically. First, because, by naming or preferring anyone, NATO would arouse the wrath of possible candidates from the back rows and, second, because this issue is too sensitive, particularly for Moscow. The United States and its allies are perhaps all too acutely aware that determining a timetable and the ranking of candidates for membership could negatively influence the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia.

Proceeding from this premise, it can therefore be expected that the first new members will be admitted only after the elections and, possibly, even much later. According to the study, which still has to be approved at the December meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers, this process is to proceed in parallel with the expansion of both the EU and its military arm—the Western European Union (WEU). In this way, the alliance has created for itself a sufficient time frame for possible corrective steps, depending on further developments in the former communist bloc.

One thing is certain, however. The political will to enlarge the pact has moved from the declarative plane onto paper. The United States and Germany, in particular, but also many smaller member states, have an eminent interest in expanding the so-called zone of stability and prosperity to the east. However, the invitation to join the club will have to be applied for by individual candidates, and their application will be subjected to thorough scrutiny. Two information teams will be formed for this purpose, which, as early as in two weeks, will present to the candidates for membership, at their request, what will, and can, be expected of them.

This will not be little, starting with the meeting of basic duties stemming from membership of the elite club—subordination to joint command, contribution to joint security, including the provision of one's own territory to the allied troops for joint maneuvers and the deployment of NATO forces, without ruling out in advance the stationing of nuclear weapons—down to the payment of membership dues. However, this is only one side of the coin, which the enemies of integration into the alliance will particularly emphasize. The other side is the expansion of the nuclear umbrella, which is of immense significance for guaranteeing security and, according to previous experience, invaluable. The fact is that it is not common for members of a gentlemen's club to fight among one another and, if so, then only on the verbal level.

What needs to be particularly emphasized is that, in its study, NATO painstakingly wards off the accusation that it seeks to create in Europe two zones of unequal security or to divide the continent anew. It stresses that it is interested in incorporating into the Pan-European security structure everyone who is interested in joining. That is, even Ukraine and Russia, the EU, the WEU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The study confirms, as do commentaries on it, that Moscow will have a privileged relationship with the alliance, while it will not have the right of veto with regard to the acceptance of new members.

From the viewpoint of time, NATO's enlargement will apparently be a long-term process, divided into stages. NATO has said A. One will now anxiously wait until it says B, C, D, and so forth. There is no need to be pessimistic, but one should not be overly optimistic, either. Quoting Caesar: "The dice are cast." The Rubicon has been crossed and, essentially, only two unknowns remain to be figured out—who and when. The price for everyone is more or less clear.

Comment on Internal Study on NATO Enlargement

AU0410081695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Sep 95 p 11

[Commentary by Jan Skoda: "Slovakia in the Skin of a Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The long-awaited moment has come: Since 28 September, Slovakia, along with 26 partner states, has in its hands an internal NATO study, which states in plain language what Brussels' ideas are regarding the alliance's enlargement and which requirements candidates for membership must meet. In spite of this, many doubts and speculations from the past linger on as to the course the entire process will take, the circumstances that can obstruct or even thwart it, which state will be the first to join and when, and so forth.

If we are honest with ourselves, it is we who can do the most to frustrate everything by our own insensitive policies that will not pay heed to the quite unequivocal principles of the Western society model. Whether we want it or not, we must speak about conditions and their fulfillment. There not only does not exist any third way here, but not even a second way. Provided, of course, that we really want to join NATO.

The 30-page study also states that, in accepting applications, special consideration will be given to countries that have a chance of becoming members of the EU. Both processes—integration into NATO and the EU—are "compatible and support one another," and both cases concern a "parallel and mutually complementary process." The study also answers the question why this is so: Membership in both Western organizations doubles the security structure and reinforces NATO's effectiveness.

Admission into the alliance is, first and foremost, a political decision, even if, outwardly, only soldiers appear to be involved in it. Speaking on Slovak Television, Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, chief of the Slovak Army General Staff, expressed this reality approximately as follows: If military issues only were at stake, we could join NATO next year. But because a whole range of measures are involved, Jozef Tuchyna estimates the date of our integration into the pact to be sometime at the beginning of the next millennium.

Even though all [post-1989] Slovak governments have clearly declared their political will to become integrated into transatlantic security structures, it is difficult to estimate when and how the final decision will be made. Would a referendum approve Slovakia's joining NATO? And will such a referendum be held in the first place? Would, in the event of a referendum, public opinion not be influenced by the fact that, by our membership in the alliance, we undertake to also accept nuclear weapons on our territory? And, finally, will our ideas regarding effective European security not be influenced by the relationship between NATO and our strategic supplier of raw materials—Russia?

Even after a number of intensive diplomatic negotiations in Brussels, Moscow has not changed its negative attitude toward the expansion of NATO closer to the borders of Russia. The Western argument that this will strengthen European security evidently will not convince the Russian partners because it was the predecessor of today's Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and not the military-political NATO pact that had been endowed with [the task of] building European security.

Leaving aside the preelection atmosphere in the Russian Federation, Moscow's concern could also result from the realization that spreading the nuclear umbrella over additional East European states will narrow the geopolitical space for Russian influence to assert itself. This is an effect similar to the one witnessed recently when NATO decided to shell the positions of Bosnian Serbs without prior consultations with Moscow.

"The enlargement of NATO has from the very beginning been a bad idea for solving the real security problems of Central and East Europe, and now it has even become hypocrisy," wrote the U.S. newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. "There are better ways of solving this problem," it added and noted with regret that, in the past, NATO could concentrate more on securing stable borders and on a peaceful solution to border changes in Central and East Europe.

Politicians Urged To Think Seriously About NATO

AU0310174995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Into NATO Without Slovakia, but With Slovenia Instead?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In recent days, especially in connection with the completion of the NATO internal study on enlarging the alliance and the visits by senior U.S. officials to Slovakia and other Central European countries, this issue has been discussed to an increased extent. In particular, the comments made in Bratislava by the transatlantic power's defense secretary, which, to a great extent, left open the question marks over our possible membership in the Atlantic Pact, should jog the conscience of those currently in power. They should ask themselves whether they are really doing all they can to ensure that their nice declarations become, in time, reality.

Perry's quiet criticism of the situation in Slovakia, a typical manifestation of diplomatic vocabulary, was in no way, however, just his view of our domestic scene. Clinton's administration, but not only it, has a great interest in ensuring that Slovakia is also incorporated into NATO, but it does not intend to incorporate us at any price as, for instance, happened during the Cold War in the case of Turkey, Greece, and Portugal....

Until recently, obviously, certain Slovak politicians tried to make political capital out of the fact that the position of a small state in the heart of Europe is irreplaceable for the enlargement of the pact. After all, it is a neighbor of the other three applicants and borders directly on Ukraine, with which Russia and the West have contradictory plans. The incorporation of Hungary, in particular, in the event of the unstable situation in Slovakia, was cast into a bad light and, therefore, Budapest and, under the pressure of events, also Bratislava tried to show their future partners that they are capable of resolving mutual disagreements by political means. But this is still very little because something more is also necessary for admission into the club...

Following the gradual calming down of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, especially the certain stabilization on Croatia's Adriatic coast, and when the strategic threat to Slovenia from the south was lifted, NATO and U.S. experts drew up the alternative option of affiliating Hungary without Slovakia. Namely, Slovenia borders directly on Italy, a NATO member, and Hungary, so the principle of territorial connection, so important for the military planners and suppliers, would not be violated.

That would be the southern arm of enlargement. The northern one would be made up of Poland and the Czech lands, while Slovakia could be left out. Maybe this would be temporary, but maybe it would be longer if it were incapable of fulfilling the requisite conditions. These are not so much of a military nature as of a politico-economic and psychological one. The sooner the responsible politicians in Slovakia realize this, the better. Not for themselves, but, first and foremost, for the fate of this small state, which may play at being the new Switzerland...but only in staff games.

The soldiers evidently are more aware of this than some of the politicians, which is a pity. It is also surprising that the issue of membership in NATO has still not been dealt with in parliament, although its deputies work in various forums for cooperation with NATO. After all, this is a fundamental matter that concerns not only the state's political and military security. Just from reading the list of NATO and EU members, a definite harmony—with a few exceptions—is obvious.

Plowing a little (yet our own) furrow has certain advantages, but far more disadvantages. Moscow will not have the right of veto, unless some of our politicians were to give it this themselves. This would mean, however, our remaining in a possible zone of instability and economic adversity. And, I guess, no realistically thinking politician in Slovakia wants this.

SKOI: Nation Drifting Under Russian Influence

AU0310122395 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by "isa": "SKOI: Slovakia Is Drifting Under Russia's Power of Influence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute [SKOI], the cardinal issue today is the nature of the Slovak Republic. In a statement issued on the occasion of 1,000 days of the Slovak Republic's independence, SKOI states that, thanks to the consistent economic transformation in the CSFR after 1989, Slovakia's macroeconomic situation began to improve in 1994. This improvement is not to be felt at the microeconomic level and in a growing standard of living, however, which, according to Jan Langos [SKOI chairman], is a consequence of the bad policies pursued by the two Meciar governments. Jan Langos mentioned, among other issues, the abolition of coupon privatization, the pilfering of state property by political parties, antidemocratic measures in the legal sphere, intimidation of church representatives, and negative attitude toward public service media. He said that, owing to its internal policies, Slovakia is moving further away from its declared aim, admission into NATO and the EU, and drifting under Russia's power influence. In this connection, Jan Langos said that, while the Czech Republic has just concluded with the United States an agreement on the protection of military secrets, the Slovak Republic concluded in February an agreement with Russia on the protection of Russian cryptographic technology. According to Langos, these agreements clearly demonstrate where each of the two countries is heading. In connection with the submission of the amendment to the law on large-scale privatization, which abolishes the coupon-privatization method, to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, SKOI representatives uphold the view that the government should halt activities in this area until the Constitutional Court issues its ruling. The fact that the government and the National Property Fund continue to act will result in chaos, in their opinion.

Regarding the "war declared by Ivan Lexa [Slovak Information Service director] on the police," Jan Langos said that political pressures result in police work being paralyzed, which poses a direct threat to the citizens' safety.

President's Son Freed on $100,000 Bail

AU0210173395 Paris AFP in English 1717 GMT 2 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Oct 2 (AFP)—The son of Slovak President, Michal Kovac, was freed from prison here on a one-million schilling ($100,000) bail a month after he was detained on suspicion of fraud, a court official said Monday [2 October].

Michal Kovac, a 34-year-old businessman, was kidnapped in Slovakia in late August and taken to Austria, where police later arrested him.

German authorities filed an international arrest warrant against Kovac for suspected fraud.

Not Permitted To Leave Austria

AU0210195395 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 1830 GMT 2 Oct 95

[Report by Peter Fritz]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] This afternoon [2 October], Michal Kovac Jr. left Vienna's Landesgericht Prison and was picked up by an official car of his father, the Slovak state president. His lawyer posted bail of 1 million schillings. Kovac had to leave his passport at the court and promise not to leave Austria. [passage omitted]

Tells Story of Abduction

AU0210222395 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 2 Oct 95

[Interview with Michal Kovac Jr., son of Slovak President Michal Kovac, by Franz Normann, and statement by Kovac's lawyer, Elmar Kresbach, in Vienna on 2 October—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Normann] Shortly before 1700, the doors of Vienna's Landesgericht Prison opened for Michal Kovac. The interest of the media was great. Even though he is a free man for the time being, he cannot feel absolutely free. The decision on whether he will be extradited to Germany will be made within the next few weeks. Of particular interest, because it has been accompanied by numerous rumors, was his abduction to Hainburg in late August. The interview with Kovac was conducted in the presence of his lawyer.

[Kovac] Yes, I do remember that, at about 1100, I left my home by car. After about 1 km, I was stopped by a red Seat car. I felt that something was not right because the man in the passenger seat was wearing a military uniform and indicated [word indistinct] stop. Then I tried to pass the car, but there was another car. So I had to stop. The man in the passenger seat jumped out of the car and, with a gun in his hand, shouted: Get out, police! He was wearing a yellow arm band that said police. I refused to get out and I was...

[Normann] ...dragged out.

[Kovac] Dragged out, yes, and they threw me into the red Seat. They put a blue hood over my face and brutally beat me, applying electroshocks to my genitals. Then I was forced to drink a bottle of whisky, and then another—but that tasted different from the first one. After that I became unconscious and cannot remember anything else.

[Normann] Is there anything that could indicate that secret police people planned your abduction or even carried it out? Is there anything that struck your attention?

[Kovac] What struck my attention was that the group was very well organized. The people looked like a special squad, and I noticed that they had those radios, and I am sure that not just anyone can buy such radios. They were special police radios or I do not know what.

[Normann] Mr. Kovac, we do not want to talk about guilty or not guilty. Still, is there anything in your life that you would do differently today?

[Kresbach] I would ask you to leave the answer to this question open because it will be up to independent courts to decide on it, particularly because, within the framework of the legal regulations, the Austrian judicial authorities have acted very fairly and also with a certain human understanding in this most difficult case.

[Normann] President Kovac also arrived in Vienna later tonight but refused to be filmed.

Lawyer Speaks About Extradition

AU0310184295 Paris AFP in English 1750 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava, Oct 4 (AFP)—The son of Slovakian President Michal Kovac will probably not be extradited to Germany, where he is wanted for questioning for alleged fraud, but will be questioned by a German prosecutor in Austria, his lawyer said here Tuesday [3 October].

Michal Kovac Jr., 34, was released from an Austrian prison Monday after spending a month in jail. He had ended up in Austrian police custody in mysterious circumstances in August after being drugged and abducted in Slovakia by an unknown group.

A Munich prosecutor had issued an international warrant for Kovac's arrest.

Kovac was released on bail of one million schillings ($100,000) and ordered to surrender his passport. According to the Austrian [as received] daily NOVY CAS Tuesday, a "high-ranking (Austrian) politician" raised the bail money.

Kovac's lawyer Jan Havlat said that German justice officials had been prepared to interrogate Kovac in August, but were unable to do so because of his abduction.

District Chairmen Call For President's Resignation

AU0310200495 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Sep 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "District Office Chairmen Demand President's Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—At a working meeting held in Banska Bystrica yesterday, the chairmen of Slovak Republic district offices issued a statement on the political stands of Michal Kovac, president of the Slovak Republic. They write, among other things:

"The president's proclaimed accommodating attitude toward parliament and the government remains only on the political level favorably inclined toward the opposition. [sentence as published] The domestic and foreign political activities of Mr. Michal Kovac as president of the Republic have been aimed not at the provision of positive information about Slovakia but at belittling the evolving principles of the Slovak Republic's democratic development.

"Unfortunately, even we, the chairmen of district offices, are made to feel at our level the negative consequences of Mr. Michal Kovac's ill-considered stands. His deeds sharply conflict with his statements. All steps of the Slovak Government are being indiscriminately and programmatically disparaged and challenged.

"Mr. Michal Kovac has been repeatedly trying to isolate and artificially detach the Government of the Slovak Republic, which emerged from democratic elections, from the citizens. This is also borne out by Michal Kovac's other activities in the districts of our Republic.

"We perceive the resignation of Mr. Michal Kovac from the post of president of the Slovak Republic as an accommodating act that would facilitate the development and calm the political situation."

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 30 September on page 2, in response to a reader's request, publishes the names of 30 district office chairmen who "endorsed" the above statement.]

Kinkel Meets Goncz, Thanks Hungary for Support

LD0310174795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It can be considered as a symbolic gesture that German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's first official visit to Hungary took place on the fifth anniversary of the two German states' unification. This afternoon Kinkel met President Arpad Goncz and also held a press briefing. Gyorgy Bernat reports.

[Kinkel in German fading into Hungarian report] The loan agreement should express and—for it took place before the Day of German Unity—naturally expresses that we, Germans, would like to say thank you to the Hungarian Government and nation and would like to help them, Klaus Kinkel recalled the gratitude—now embodied in 1 billion German marks [German-Hungarian loan agreement signed on 2 October]—for the fact that the Hungarian Government opened the east-west road for East German refugees in September 1989.

Kinkel met the press after talks with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs on, among other things, Hungary's integration efforts and German support for them.

At the talks a Hungarian proposal for a schedule [for EU accession] was raised. Kinkel, however, did not mention the proposal at the briefing.

He, however, appreciated Hungary's role in the chairmanship of the OSCE and expressed his hope that soon there would be peace in the former Yugoslavia, or at least the sides concerned would not stand up from the negotiating table until they reached a solution.

The German foreign minister repeated that Russia had no right of veto in decisions on NATO admissions, but Moscow could not be left out from the establishment of Europe's security structure either.

Kovacs Views NATO Expansion, Ties to Neighbors

LD0310203995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gyorgy Bernat reports on the German and the Hungarian foreign ministers' news conference in Budapest:

[Bernat] [Passage omitted] Answering a Russian journalist's question, who asked whether Russia's security will be firmer if NATO appears at the Russian borders, if, as they say, NATO's expansion does not pose a threat to anyone, [Hungarian] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said the following:

[Begin Kovacs recording] In connection with NATO's expansion, the minister [German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel] and I drew up a European security architecture. The minister applied a functional approach, according to which this security architecture would have political, economic, security, and cultural pillars. I applied an institutional approach, according to which NATO and the EU, that is an enlarged NATO and EU, would be one pillar; the OSCE another; the third would be special agreements, such as the Partnership for Peace, between NATO and the countries to remain outside it, above all Russia and Ukraine; the fourth would be regional cooperation; and bilateral agreements, such as the Hungarian-Slovak agreement, would make up the fifth pillar.

I am of the view that such an expansion concept would indeed contribute to Russia's security, because it would increase stability in Russia's neighborhood, and that would be favorable for Russia. [end recording]

[Bernat] It was mentioned at the Hungarian-German foreign ministerial talks, too, that only those countries can join the EU and NATO which will not bring minority problems into the organizations and are fostering good relations with their neighbors.

[Begin Kovacs recording] I told the minister that I was convinced that the EU and NATO, the international community, were of course interested in well balanced relations and developing ties between Hungary and its neighbors. The basic treaty with Slovakia is a kind of proof of this. However, the essence, of course, is not the conclusion of the basic treaty, and it is not the only proof of developing ties. We signed the basic treaty with Slovakia and we of course know that it is just the first step on a long path, and we do not believe that it has solved everything overnight. So far we have not managed to finalize a basic treaty with Romania, but in spite of that we are making progress in several concrete areas and cooperation is strengthening. [end recording]

Support for NATO Membership Drops 'Considerably'

AU0310212295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 2 Oct 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report on results of opinion poll on NATO membership carried out by the Marketing Centrum National Market Research Institute: "The Number of People Who Support Hungary's NATO Membership Dropped Considerably"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war in Yugoslavia provides a particular timeliness to the debates on Hungary's security, and one of the key points of these debates is the issue of joining NATO. Staffers of the Marketing Centrum National Market Research Institute collected the people's opinions about this.

According to the opinion of 45 percent of the people, strict neutrality would serve Hungary's security best. This opinion is mostly characteristic of people living in county seats. Some 22 percent—mainly people under 45, general school graduates, and Budapest inhabitants—think that security means joining NATO. Only every 10th person, mainly village inhabitants, would trust a defense guarantee provided by the big powers, and only 5 percent of the people think that the East European countries should create a defense alliance. Three-quarters of the people surveyed were able to identify NATO as the military organization of the Western countries. The number of people who think that Hungary will not be accepted into NATO in the coming years almost doubled in the past three months and reached 30 percent. At the same time, 40 percent of the people still hope for NATO membership and, although it dropped somehow, the number of people who are uncertain is still high (30 percent). Among those who hope for NATO membership, the percentage of village inhabitants is considerably higher than that of big city dwellers (46 percent and 34 percent respectively). This is interesting because, three months ago, 48 percent of big city dwellers still thought that Hungary would be accepted into NATO. There are considerable differences also according to the education level: while only 36 percent of people who graduated eight classes think that Hungary would not be accepted into the NATO, 43 percent of university graduates think the same.

The same number of people share their opinion on whether they regard as necessary to hold a referendum on Hungary's NATO membership: 42 percent of both supporters and opposers. A referendum is supported mainly by younger people: 49 percent of people under 30, and only 37 percent of people over 60. The people who oppose a referendum mostly come from among better educated strata of the society, with 38 percent of people who graduated secondary schools, and 57 percent of people with university degrees. People who would like to have a referendum mostly oppose Hungary's NATO membership.

People's opinions about joining NATO have changed in the past three months: today, 38 percent of the people surveyed support our NATO membership, and 30 percent oppose this. Three months ago, 43 percent of the people were unable to evaluate this question; this percentage dropped to 32 percent today. Most people among those with newly expressed opinions belong to the camp of opposers. Only 11 percent of the people opposed our NATO membership in June this year, and this percentage has increased almost threefold in the meantime. Hungary's NATO membership is mostly supported by men and younger people (44 percent of people under 45, and only 26 percent of people above 60). The evaluation of this issue changed primarily among the university graduates: three months ago, 68 percent of these people supported our NATO membership, as opposed to only 53 percent now. In the case of people without a university diploma, there has been no change in the proportion of people supporting our NATO membership, and it stays at 36 percent. Most people who oppose our NATO membership favor neutrality (78 percent). This change in evaluating the issue of NATO membership is probably connected with the role played by NATO in Bosnia.

The researchers formulated a few arguments against joining NATO and asked the people about the extent to which they agree with these arguments. Most people agreed with the inadequate preparedness of the Hungarian Army and the financial surplus expenses incurred in this process of joining NATO. Some 43 percent of the people agreed that Russia would regard such a step as a provocation (although the highest uncertainty was registered at this question, namely 30 percent). Only one-quarter of the people surveyed thought that Hungary was not threatened by any danger, so there is no need to join NATO.

Presidency Discusses Course of Peace Negotiations

AU0310200995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The course of the current peace negotiations with the U.S. mediators was the topic of discussion at today's session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was presided over by President Alija Izetbegovic.

The members of the Presidency extended support to the state's negotiating team and exchanged views on the continuation of negotiations, especially on the conditions for a cease-fire, certain issues concerning the future constitutional setup of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, setting up of joint state organs, and conditions for democratic elections.

The Presidency considers as very constructive and favorable the Bugojno agreement on the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and the Mostar initiative on the more consistent and faster implementation of the agreement on Mostar.

The Presidency demands that the decisions of the arbiter of the Federation be carried out without delay and that the removal of obstacles in setting up of the Federation be approached more energetically and boldly.

At the proposal of the Ministry of Justice, the Presidency has adopted a decision on the dismissal, election, and appointment of a number of persons working in the judiciary.

The Presidency also discussed other matters from the sphere of competence of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Silajdzic: Army 'Should Continue the Liberation'

AU0310144195 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 2 Oct 95 p 10

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Erich Rathfelder and Hajo Funke in Sarajevo on 29 September: "Bosnia Should Not Be Just a Name"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Despite all the peace efforts, the war seems to have entered a hot phase again. Since Wednesday, the Serbs have been firing grenades and rockets on the central Bosnian towns of Zenica and Travnik, and Bosnian Government troops are continuing their attacks in western Bosnia. Should the peace process be considered a failure?

[Silajdzic] The Serbs are seeking ways to stop the peace process. Attacks on civilians are their response to the peace efforts.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] But the Bosnian Serb leadership has more reason to be satisfied with the New York proposals than your government.

[Silajdzic] There is a great difference between what the Bosnian Serb leadership says and what it does. In fact, it hopes that the international community will revert to the old concept of neutrality. It fears the prospect that we are growing increasingly stronger while it is becoming increasingly weaker. In Serbia itself, more and more people are deciding not to risk any further destruction just because of the Bosnian Serb fascist sects, and the international community wants a solution that is a result of energetic domestic action.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] So it looks as if the Serbs are not so dissatisfied as it seems. The New York agreement confirms the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its existing borders on the one hand, but on the other hand it permits the existence of "entities," which means nothing less than a Serb state on Bosnian soil.

[Silajdzic] This plan provides only a framework. The next thing to do is give it substance and work out the details. Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue not just as a name, but as a sovereign country. It will continue to have the institutions that determine sovereignty, in other words the parliament, the presidency, and the government.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] But what can one do to make the "Serb fascist sects," as you call them, accept this framework?

[Silajdzic] That is why we have insisted on the principle of direct elections, for these form the essence of the democracy that we want to preserve. The Belgrade regime has rejected the proposal. We want free elections by secret ballot and under international observation. Then people will not want to wage war any more. Only the die-hard fascist sects will want war, because they need it. With war, they achieve power and prosperity. Without war, they are nothing. Direct and free elections are envisage in the statement attached to the New York framework agreement. Of course, the expression "free and democratic elections" creates a problem, for exactly the same expression was used in elections during the communist era that provided 99-percent majority votes. There must be direct elections by secret ballot. We insist on clear procedures.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Is that not a trifle naive?

[Silajdzic] Judge for yourself. The establishment of democratic procedures begins with elections. We must learn to accept civic movements and promote direct democracy. In future, decisionmaking processes must be more transparent. That is an important matter for my country's future.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Hopes for the future are one thing, but the reality of the continuing war is something else altogether.

[Silajdzic] We are still having problems that can only be solved by military means. As long as the peace plan is not in force, our army has the task of reconquering every square centimeter of our country. It is a legitimate army, and we are a legitimate government. Our army should continue the liberation of our country until an agreement has been concluded. For the past 30 months, the Serb terrorists have rejected every single peace plan, including the latest one. "Coercive diplomacy" [previous two words in English] is an interesting expression, but diplomacy cannot always be associated with coercion.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Do the Americans support this position?

[Silajdzic] I never asked them.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] In the reconquered town of Jajce, there have been problems with the Croats from western Herzegovina. Is a conflict with the Croatian extremists not preprogrammed?

[Silajdzic] You said that, not me.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] How is the relief of Sarajevo and Gorazde proceeding?

[Silajdzic] Sarajevo is still under siege. The access routes are meant to be controlled by international troops, but under no circumstances by Serb troops. That also applies to the road link with Gorazde. Once that happens, Sarajevo will only partly blocked, not completely blocked, as is the case right now. This is a medieval method of siege, carried out with 20th century resources.

The lesson of fascism was: Never again. But instead, we in Sarajevo have been exposed to this monstrous hybrid of Stalinism and fascism. For three and a half years, the West has played the indifferent function of observer. Instead of acting, the West has developed high tech observation methods.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Whatever the case, Bosnia-Herzegovina is now to be integrated with the West by means of the New York draft agreement.

[Silajdzic] Yes. Perhaps some people have noticed that Bosnia-Herzegovina is of central importance for the preservation of Western values. Bosnia has developed into a microcosm of our world. Bosnia symbolizes the failure of a reconciliation between Islam and the West. People in Lahore talk of Bosnia the way they talk about the problem of Kashmir in their own country. They probably do not even know where Bosnia is.

That shows how much Bosnia has developed into a symbol, for Bosnia is a transit point for the world's problems. If no reconciliation between Islam and the West occurs in Bosnia, where else can it occur? If a defense of democracy fails in Bosnia, where can it succeed? If democracy cannot be achieved in Bosnia, it will not be achieved anywhere else in eastern Europe. If multicultural life is impossible here, how can we expect a solution to Europe's problems regarding nationalism?

Bosnia is a case of bad timing. Events here are occurring between two separate eras. Before, the world consisted of the East-West confrontation. But today, we are in a transformation stage without any clearly defined and recognized international system for resolving disputes. It is high time for international solutions to conflicts to triumph over lawlessness.

Bosnian Serb Leader Assesses Peace Prospects

LD0310183395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1728 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 3 Oct (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, the vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, has said that the Geneva and New York agreements have brought about the best prospects for peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia so far.

According to Koljevic, the prospects for peace are much better than before because the greatest world power, the United States, is interested in peace in former Yugoslavia.

Koljevic told Serb radio that preliminary preparations for a peace conference on former Yugoslavia had demonstrated that the Muslims were the party least interested in peace; and the international community and the United States were beginning to loose their sympathies for the Muslim side.

Buha: Plan Grants Sovereignty, Border Controls

AU0310183295 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As far as the future union is concerned, there is no other sovereignty apart from the sovereignty of the Serb Republic [Serb-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the sovereignty of the Muslim-Croat Federation, Dr. Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Serb Republic and member of the negotiation team of the Serb Republic and the FRY for the peaceful resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, told Srpski Radio.

This is evident in the fact, said minister Buha, that the bodies of the Serb Republic will have sovereignty on the territory of the Serb Republic, which includes the control of the borders of the republic, and the same goes for the Muslim-Croat Federation. As far as integrality is concerned, Bosnia will be integral consisting of two or three parts [as heard], said minister Buha, and added:

[Begin recording] I have already said that the first part of the document—the Geneva one—has as its starting point the principle of state sovereignty, that is, state sovereignties. On the one hand there is the Serb Republic, and on the other is the Federation and they form a relationship that will result in an union, confederation, union of states, united states, [word indistinct]—these are possible names for what will be formed.

The third element is the element of confederal law, that is, of special, parallel connections with the neighboring states. As far as we are concerned, the connection will be made with the FRY, and as far as the Federation is concerned, it will be with Croatia.

Finally, the fourth element is that of the reciprocity concerning the obligations of both states towards refugees, those who left their homes.

As far as the second part of the document—the New York one—is concerned, in it the topic of joint institutions appears. These institutions are the presidency and the parliament. The Serb Republic did not exist before the war in the form in which it exists today, which means that it was not made official and it was not recognized. With these documents, the above was achieved, which is, naturally, the difference that is of such great importance that it is impossible to discuss any analogy with the previous situation.

As far as the presidency and the parliament are concerned, I must say that their activity will exclusively concern foreign policy. Decisions will be made through a consensus, and if not, then in a roundabout way, by veto [end recording].

Karadzic Briefs Troop Trainees on Peace Talks

LD0410112095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0950 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 4 Oct (SRNA)—Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic paid a visit to the training center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Banja Luka last night and briefed its members on the efforts made hitherto for the creation of a Serb state west of the Drina.

In his address to students and teachers of the training center, Karadzic recalled that the result of the Serb people's struggle so far are the official confirmation of the Serb Republic, the recognition of its constitution, parliament, and government.

"We shall have our separate army, police, currency, and foreign trade—these four elements make the Serb Republic a state with the former Bosnia-Herzegovina only remaining a geographic notion," President Karadzic said.

President Karadzic denied all rumors that the Contact Group plan offered the Serbs everything that is being offered in the latest peace talks.

"All these critics keep forgetting that the Contact Group maps envisaged the ceding of the Una, Sana, and Vrbas river valleys, with the Posavina corridor being only five km wide. Now it is certain that all these areas will remain within the Serb Republic," Karadzic stressed.

Referring to the media campaign and certain parties in Serbia now triumphing over the fact that the international community is ready to negotiate with Serbia which, according to them, has urged a peaceful solution right from the outset, the Serb Republic president said these are falsehoods and mere deceptions.

"They do not know that the international community wishes to cooperate with Serbia not because of their policy of capitulation, but rather because of our heroic struggle," Karadzic stressed.

"The unfortunate Republic of Serb Krajina, which is almost all under occupation and whose disappearance must not be recognized, made a great contribution to the survival of the Serb Republic and Serbia, and at the same time the Serb Republic has made a great contribution to the survival of Serbia," Karadzic stressed.

In conclusion, the Serb Republic president said that the Serbs west of the Drina can be proud of having checked a huge anti-Serb surge, thus saving Serbia.

Serb Official Comments on Territory Issues

LD0310203395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2016 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 3 Oct (SRNA)—Dr. Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of the Bosnian Serb Republic, today expressed the hope that the United States is sincere in its efforts to achieve peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina so that an agreement on a global cease-fire might be signed in Washington by 20 October.

"If the United States, above all for its own internal reasons, has decided to put an end to the war, they will do this, regardless of the airs being put on by the Muslim side," Buha said in a statement to Serb radio.

Speaking about the demarcation lines in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Buha stressed that the Serb criteria and territorial priorities on this question met with understanding by international factors.

"No definitive proposal on the demarcation of the borders exists in the framework of the U.S. initiative and all the maps that have appeared in the media over the past few days have a propaganda function and serve to confuse," the Serb Republic foreign minister pointed out.

According to him, there is a proposal that the western border of the Serb Republic should run along the Una River, north of the Sava, that the corridor should be extended to equal the international air space zone of between 18 and 21 kilometers, that the eastern part of the republic should be a contiguous piece of territory, and that Sarajevo should be divided into two cities.

The Bosnian Serb foreign minister added that the republic should, in the southeast, have an outlet to the sea, while the Neretva would form the border in Herzegovina.

Buha stressed that in no session of the negotiations had there ever been any discussion of the exchange of Banja Luka for Tuzla and that this was a propaganda lie pure and simple.

"Without Banja Luka there is no Serb Republic, and there has not been, nor will there be, any speculation on this," he stressed.

The minister of foreign affairs of the Serb Republic concluded that "in the final settlement each side must gain and lose equally if one wants to see a just and lasting peace."

Serb Assembly Speaker on Muslim Offensive

LD0310164395 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian
1500 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Momcilo Krajisnik, the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS] assembly speaker, met Antoine Pedauye, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mission head, in Pale today. Our colleague Zorica Rulj has just returned from the meeting.

[Rulj] RS Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik had talks with UNPROFOR Mission Head Antoine Pedauye in Pale today. Hadizici Municipal President Ratko Radic attended the meeting. The talks focused on the issue of the freedom of movement in the Gorazde and Sarajevo areas. They also touched on the issue of how to improve chances for a peace agreement to be signed. Here is what Momcilo Krajisnik said about the talks:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] [Words indistinct] that was on the agenda and that has stirred passions in Sarajevo itself was dealt with at great length [words indistinct]. We noted that we were prepared to conduct full and open talks and to allow the freedom of movement, but there are certain issues that may pose problems, that could be an incident, and that the incident could cause large-scale military operations and even a war in Sarajevo itself.

Speaking about Sarajevo, we have pointed out that the Muslims have today launched an offensive from Sarajevo in the direction of Trnovo and that this is seriously threatening peace in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We had very similar views about all issues. Mr. Pedauye said that he was ready to do everything to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Sarajevo, to give his contribution to the freedom of movement, and to the prevention of conflicts that can lead to what we do not want to see in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Serbs Request To Move Guns Into Exclusion Zone

AU0310182795 Paris AFP in English
1727 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Government forces launched a major attack south of Sarajevo Tuesday [3 October] and violated a pledge not to fire their big guns from within the city's exclusion zone, a move which drew sharp condemnation from UN officials and heightened fears the city's uneasy peace could unravel.

Hundreds of explosions were recorded south of the Bosnian capital, sources close to the UN mission in the city said Tuesday. Government officials refused to comment on the report but Bosnian Serb media said tension had risen "along the entire front" in Bosnia.

The UN sources said they believed government forces were trying to cut a key Bosnian Serb-held road leading out of the capital following a gradual build-up of thousands of troops near Krupac, a disputed town 10 kilometers (six miles) south of Sarajevo.

UN peacekeepers observed four government heavy weapons firing onto Bosnian Serb positions from within Sarajevo's UN-declared 20 kilometer (12.5 mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone, a UN official said.

Last month, the Bosnian Government pledged not to use its guns within the zone while intense NATO air strikes successfully pressured the Serbs to withdraw some 250 of their heavy guns from the area last month.

"This is a scandalous act, the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) will protest this at the highest level," UN spokeswoman Myriam Sochacki said Tuesday.

UN officials, speaking anonymously, said the guns were either "heavy artillery or heavy mortars" and "well within the exclusion zone and fired in support of the government action south of the city."

The incident has serious consequences for the uneasy peace established around Sarajevo since the Serbs withdrew their heavy guns.

The Bosnian Serbs have complained they feel vulnerable to attack whilst denuded of their trump card in maintaining the siege of Sarajevo, their superiority in heavy weaponry.

UN officials said the UN command in the capital had received a request from the Serbs to bring their weapons back inside the exclusion zone "for self-defence." The request was refused, the senior official said.

Momcilo Krajisnik, number two in the Bosian Serb leadership, told Serb official radio: "Today's Moslem offensive on Trnovo seriously jeopardises peace in Sarajevo and Bosnia."

The exclusion zone ruling is enforced by the threat of strikes by NATO warplanes and the multinational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), positioned on Mount Igman, overlooking the city.

"Political pressure is being applied to stop this but we do not exclude the use of the RRF to target the offending weapons if they continue firing," a senior UN official said.

The RRF has in the past been used to destroy Serb guns targetting the city.

"The Serbs were give assurances that there forces and people would not be attacked if they pulled their guns outside of the exclusion zone. This is very serious and the government is way out of line on this," a western diplomat said.

Krupac lies along a key Bosnian Serb-held road skirting the Treskavica mountain range running through south to Trnovo and onto Foca, both Moslem majority towns before the war.

An attempt to cut this road in June ultimately failed when superior fire power from the Bosnian Serbs forced government troops back to old lines.

The attack came after Bosnian Serb forces retook high ground lost last month to an offensive by government and allied Croat troops in the northwest of the country.

The Serbs recaptured positions overlooking one town recently captured by government troops and came within artillery range of another but the fighting had subsided by Tuesday, UN officials said.

Sochacki said Bosnian Serb troops were within one kilometer (mile) of Otoca and about 10 kilometers (six miles) from Bosanska Krupa, a town lying next to the strategic river Una. Both towns were shelled on Monday, she added.

The opening of a new front, however, is bound to be a blow to efforts by the US peace envoy Richard Holbrooke, to secure a countrywide ceasefire through shuttle diplomacy between the Balkan capitals.

"He is bound to take a dim view of this," a western diplomat commented adding, "most of the resistance he is experiencing in getting the cease-fire is here in Sarajevo. It will all go very wrong for them (Bosnian Government) if they do not tread carefully."

Holbrooke was in Belgrade Tuesday after meeting government officials in Sarajevo on Monday for brief consultations over the ceasefire and fleshing out an American peace proposal for post-war Bosnia.

He was holding similar talks in Belgrade Tuesday with Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic, who is negotiating on behalf of Bosnia's Serbs.

Commentary: Serbs Should Trust Leadership

AU2709095095 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 95 p 1

[Commentary by Nenad Novakovic: "Maps From Fantasy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no need to lie to the people. There are maps about territorial demarcation in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is not known either who made them, or when, where, or with what purpose they were made. Anyway, the good news is that they exist because the architects outside the Serb Republic have realized that there cannot be any kind of unitary Bosnia. They have understood that certain things must be changed. The bad news is that nobody has said the maps are about reckoning without the host. Actually, the cartographers have made desired, rather than possible divisions. Moreover, such maps have been made without the active participation of any legal representatives of the state or military bodies of the Serb Republic, and it seems also of any officials of international institutions as well.

Why are the maps coming to light right now? The Croatian propaganda machinery has deliberately launched a well-designed campaign in the war against the Serbs in the Serbian republic. First, they started with the unserious cartographic attempt of Franjo Tudjman, drawn on a table napkin. Tudjman's informers and sycophants literally understood that any sport of the president must be materialized. They started with maps according to which, conditionally said, the entire region of Banja Luka is supposed to be given to the republic of Croatia. Such ideas caused justifiable disappointment and apprehension among the citizens of the Serb Republic, especially since that was synchronized with the pogrom of the Serbian people in the republic of serbian Krajina. At the same time, in the Serb Republic the issue was not taken seriously, but nobody was able to anticipate possible consequences.

Given the NATO air strikes that destroyed much of the infrastructure of electronic media in the Serb Republic, the propaganda staff in Croatia assessed that now, simultaneously with initial military successes on the ground, which came rather accidentally and unexpectedly for them, one should start a resolute action to expel the Serbs from their centuries-old land. They intensified the signal of the first and second channels of Croatian Television, as well as the radio signal, that can be heard in Banja Luka without problems and with stereo reception at eight positions on the tuning dial even if you have the worst radio in the world. At the same time, the transmitters of the Serbian radio and local radio stations were either destroyed, or their range was reduced to an insignificant factor in comparison with the range of the stations covering the territory of the Serb Republic from Croatia. So the deadly propaganda campaign started, with various maps or drawings. Simultaneously with such electronic bombardment of the Serb Republic's citizens by most diverse lies and propaganda tricks, wrapped in attractive covers, the maps of the partition of former Bosnia-Herzegovina were printed and disseminated through Hungary to Vojvodina. Which was not accidental at all. A great number of Serbian refugees from this part of the Serb Republic who live in Vojvodina have many relatives or friends in Drvar, Petrovac, Glamoc, Kljuc...and who, having learned about those maps, rushed to rescue them. The initial successes of the Croatian Army on the front and intense propaganda sufficed to make the people take to irrational flight and give up the cities.

The well-deliberated and expert-led propaganda against the Serbs in the Serb Republic was spread from Zagreb in the first place, and then also from Sarajevo, causing confusion in the region of Banja Luka, that, looking back at it, was groundless, but was not prevented by anybody. The maps clearly exist, but those drawn upon by propagandists in Zagreb and Sarajevo are not binding upon anybody, least upon the Serbian people, because they exist for their own sake.

If there is anybody who has a right to propose maps, based on the most rational principle, the ethnic one, then it is the Serbs. The leadership of the Serb Republic is also proposing maps, but such that do not put the Serbian people at disadvantage, but rather recommending just demarcation and guaranteeing a lasting peace. If the forced percentages in the partition of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be necessarily observed, the leadership will certainly and in a timely manner inform the people in the regions allotted to the other side, and suggest civilized moving or guarantees that, if they stay in the region, all their human and other rights will be guaranteed.

Our people must and should have trust in their military and political leadership, as well as in their army that will defend them and by pursuing a wise policy lead them to peace and their own state. Propaganda and fabrications spread by the enemy are just ancillary means to help them accomplish their goal as easily as possible. In fact, we should just ask the people: Has there been anything good so far coming from or proposed to the Serbian people by the Croatian and the Muslim side in this war, so they would urge us now to accept cohabitation, a division favorable for us, or anything else? Only the credulous may believe in this. I hope we are not of that kind.

Commentary Calls Peace Plan 'Rather Stupid'

AU0310172495 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Miodrag Vukmanovic: "Fantasy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign ministers of the FRY, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed in New York on the future constitutional organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The publicity given to this event has seemed disproportionate to the significance of the "paper," as the official name of the document that was signed following some tough arm-twisting and further clarifications by Christopher, Holbrooke, and the Contact Group representatives. This can, on the one hand, be explained by Washington's determination (President Clinton himself announced the agreement as a foreign policy success) not to allow the collapse of its peace initiative at any cost and, on the other hand, by the amount of emotion that was made available to the New York media. Their interpretation of the agreement suggested that the Serb side apparently got what it had been after all along, the equality of its "entity" within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not long ago the Serb side used to refer to its entity as an independent state. The fact that Minister Milutinovic had to swallow the terms "integral state" within "its present international borders" was confirmed not only by the words of the U.S. secretary of state but also by the fact that the constitutional solution envisages that the presidential council and the parliament as central bodies be elected at free general elections. The fact that both "entities" will enjoy wide autonomy is perfectly natural and the establishment of a mechanism to prevent outvoting on ethnic grounds in the central bodies is something that is taken for granted in the civilized world.

The agreement on the constitutional organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although incomplete and imprecise, could be said to represent a certain step forward in the peace process if the preconditions existed for its implementation. In New York, however, regardless of the technicalities of the agenda, there was no agreement on a cease-fire, no agreement on the territorial delineation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina entities, no agreement on the return of the refugees, or any other elements of peace without which the talk of free elections and international monitors was only diplomatic fantasizing. No one has said yet whose army will guard the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina or whether there will be an army along the borders between its entities. And if there are to be bodies of central authority (who needs a parliament without a government?), under whose authority will the army be? The preservation of an integral state with two or three mainly ethnic armies with the kind of brotherly tradition that is currently being exhibited in Bosnia is a rather stupid solution, rather like having a goat guard a cabbage. The question of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina revolves around the factor known as the army, but it appears that everyone is afraid to address that particular issue. If there is to be one army, does that perhaps mean that Dudakovic [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps commander] will be stationed as garrison commander in Bijeljina, while Novakovic [one-time Krajina Serb military chief] will be garrison commander in Zenica? NATO may have some plans for the pacification of the region, but where does one place the army whose top commanders have been accused of war crimes? Might Milosevic provide it with temporary accommodation?

In view of these uncertainties, it is hard to rejoice at the agreement on the constitutional organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather at the details of the agreement, particularly if one takes into account that Croatia is unlikely to sign any partial peace solution that leaves the issue of eastern Slavonia and Baranja open. If the United States and its allies are not prepared to eliminate the army of the Bosnian Serbs as the political factor crucial to the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and then apply the same method to the other Bosnia-Herzegovina armies—the latest peace project, despite Holbrooke's persistence, will suffer the fate of all the previous ones.

Who Represents Whom

The difficulty of the task that faced the ministerial trio in New York could best be illustrated by the structure of the negotiating teams. Minister Milutinovic represents a state that has not been internationally recognized [FRY] and half of another state [Bosnia-Herzegovina] that has been internationally recognized. Minister Sacirbegovic represents a state that has been internationally recognized, but that state does not have sovereignty over about half its territory. That half is represented by the minister of the first state that has not been internationally recognized. Minister Granic represents a state that has been internationally recognized but does not have sovereignty over part of its territory. That part is represented by the country that has not been internationally recognized. Also the state that is represented by Minister Granic has confederal ties with half the country that has been internationally recognized but has no control over the other half of its territory. By the way, the three countries do not recognize one another. Only someone with an innate sense of humor could expect a solution to come out of this mess that would "satisfy all sides to the conflict."

Bildt: Talks Entering 'Difficult Territory'

*AU0310182995 Paris AFP in English
1748 GMT 3 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Oct 3 (AFP)—European mediator for the former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt Tuesday [3 October] warned progress towards peace in Bosnia would be jeopardised unless there was an immediate ceasefire.

"We are close to that (moment), where it's difficult to continue the political process if you don't get a cessation of hostilities," the co-president of the international conference on ex-Yugoslavia told reporters in Geneva.

He denied the peace process was deadlocked, but he admitted it was "entering some difficult territory."

The agreement reached in New York on constituional principles was encountering "major problems of interpretation," he added.

But Bildt said he has seen "greater possibilities of some kind of settlement" than at any time before, and that he saw "ground for cautious optimism."

The warring factions reached agreement last month on the main principles of a peace agreement and Bosnian territory is now divided virtually equally between the Moslem-Croat Federation and Serbs—the proportions envisaged by the international peace plan, Bildt said.

The United States' commitment to the peace process was unprecedented, he added, saying Washington had often contented itself with taking up a place "on the sidelines" to criticise the Europeans.

Ganic, Zubak Discuss Federation Issues

LD0310202295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Herzeg-Bosnia Federation President Zubak and Bosnian Vice President Ganic met in Fojnica. After their first official meeting following Ganic's return from treatment, the Federation vice president and president made the following short statements for Bosnia-Herzegovina TV:

[Begin Zubak recording] Both of us have a very difficult and responsible task to work jointly on the federation project. I am personally very glad that Mr. Granic [as heard] has recovered and I have had a very good collocutor in him. I hope that we shall manage together to kick-start this process from the point at which we are, and that it will move much more swiftly, efficiently, and in the interest of both nations. [end recording]

[Begin Ganic recording] I would just like to add that we have discussed all problems and that we have agreed to speed up the process, to implement the arbiter's decision, to create cantons as soon as possible, and to analyze the agreement that Mr. Zubak and I signed in Bonn, or more precisely, in Petersburg, to see which points of the agreement have been implemented and which have not and maybe again—since there is an initiative to resume that meeting in Bonn—to simply realize everything that has been agreed. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

Name 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' Questioned

LD0310205195 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] To begin with we have a statement by Kresmir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation:

[Correspondent] Although there is a certain lag in the development of the institutions of authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, relations between Croats and Bosniak Muslims are on an upward trend and trust between them is being restored, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, said in an interview for the Sarajevo paper DNEVNI AVAZ.

Repeating that the Croat people favor the preservation of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, something that is not at all controversial, Zubak maintained that the internal system contained in the name of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is unacceptable, because the authorities are organized and decisions made on the principle of one person one vote.

Commenting on events on the fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Zubak said military operations were ended ahead of schedule to allow the Serbs to become involved in the peace process. If this fails to produce results and does not end in a cease-fire, offensive operations by the federal forces will be resumed, and one of the military targets could be Banja Luka, Zubak said.

Commentary Views Croat Role in Bosnia, Federation

AU0310130695 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 23 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Zija Dizdarevic: "The 'Republic' Against the Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirmed that there was an armed incident between the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army during the latest "joint" action for the liberation of western and central Bosnia. Prlic assessed the number of killed in that conflict as "inconsequential." It remains unclear what an "inconsequential" death is like.

Another, anonymous, official of Bosnia-Herzegovina also spoke about a conflict between the two armies, this time in the vicinity of Jajce. In any case, that, just like some other events, confirms that the tensions between the Bosnian and the Croat side have increased of late.

Language Invasion

On the territories that come under the control of the HVO, authorities under the name of the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" are instantly established. Of course, it is good that the HVO has chased the chetniks away and abolished their illegal authorities in many towns and places. However, instead of the legal federal authorities, they have introduced the illegal authorities of the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia."

All that is accompanied by a euphoric campaign of Croatian media, particularly Croatian television. Everything under the control of the HVO is given the adjective

"Croat." They particularly stress the "Croat" character of Jajce. They talk about it as the ancient residence not of Bosnian, but of Croatian kings. So that the inflamed Ante Ivankovic [Zagreb HTV Television correspondent] invites the expellees to return—but only the Croats.

Bosnians and Herzegovinians, regardless of their nationality, cannot remain indifferent to this, no matter whether they are civilians or soldiers. The way things go, they might even start talking about a "Croat Srbinje." Indeed, things have reached the level of dangerous absurdities.

The "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," as its authors claim, was formed with the intention of organizing the liberating struggle of the Croats and their life under wartime conditions. However, the practice has shown that in fact it was the projection of Greater-Croatian aspirations towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. The "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" is, in all crucial aspects, practically integrated with Croatia.

The (con)federation should have been a political sublimation of the failed attempt of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. That is at least how Croat nationalists interpret it. Their dissatisfaction has grown since the possibility of confederal ties between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia is no longer talked about much. Nervousness is growing in the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" as a peaceful solution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem approaches.

In his interview for OSLOBODJENJE, Ivan Bender [assembly chairman of "Herzeg-Bosnia"] rejected decisively any possibility of the elimination of "Herzeg-Bosnia." He also conditioned the implementation of the federation on confederal ties with Croatia. That is a permanent blackmail that reveals why the implementation of the federation is going so slowly.

Usurpation of Sovereignty

Bosnia-Herzegovina needs a political and military alliance with Croatia. The cooperation of the two states has given good results lately. However, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in a less convenient position in that alliance, so it has to endure things it would otherwise not endure. Yet, the involvement of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina has to have political and military limits. Of course, this does not imply an armed conflict. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina to solve all the misunderstandings with Croatia with the help of international mediation. But tolerating the military and political self-will of Croatia actually means accepting the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts.

However, to have either trust or mistrust takes two. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] persistently ignores the parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, obstructs the work of the government of the republic and the federation, and practically does not accept Sarajevo as the capital of the republic and the federation. Answering the question of correspondent Edina Kamenica about her visit to Neum, Bender "warmly" recommended her not to go. What have the Bosniaks done to harm Neum and the people of Neum? Nothing, of course. By the way, Neum was not built by Grude or by Zagreb, but, in the first place, by Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, and the pensioners of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Alija Izetbegovic recently tested the good will of Croatia in relation to the Bosniaks. In his letter to Tudjman, 24 hours after they had talked in Zagreb, Izetbegovic asked Tudjman to ensure the Bosniaks, like the Ruthenians and Ukrainians and other minorities in Croatia, at least one seat in the parliament. His answer is still unknown.

Close to the Final Act

The obstruction to the restoration of mutual trust and the establishment of a permanent, tolerant and constructive dialogue lies in the fact that the political relations have become the monopoly of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the HDZ. A much broader democratic ambience is needed for the improvement of the atmosphere between nations.

In the latest Zagreb agreement, the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak, was given the task of proposing solutions for the integration of the functions of the republic and those of the federation. That is an important political act. Particularly since a few days ago, in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic insisted on the invulnerability of the central republic institutions until there are new elections and the establishment of new authorities. How can it be achieved that the federation does not "eat up" the republic, or that the republic does not "swallow" the federation? If a healthy political compromise is reached on this topic, we will enter the next phase more peacefully.

It seems that we are close to the final act in the military and political sense, and that should bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Political and military conflicts with the Croat side must not happen. But, at the same time, the Croats must be constantly warned that insistence on the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," in the military and political sense, means the usurpation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the negation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that only complicates the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including that of the Croats within it.

Agreement on Serb-Held Eastern Croatia Viewed

LD0310171895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Dispatch by correspondent Zoltan Kabok from Erdut]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Talks between the Croatian state delegation and representatives of the local Serbs ended today in the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation] base in Erdut with an agreement on the basic principles for negotiations on the achievement of an agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Also present were the initiators of the talks—Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador in the Republic of Croatia.

According to the basic principles, a transitional phase will be established for the above-mentioned area, and the UN Security Council will establish interim authorities. The implementation of the agreement will be guaranteed and supervised by international forces, and during the transitional phase the whole area will be demilitarized.

The interim authorities, in addition to facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, will also create the conditions for the establishment of Croatian public services. The basic principles also envisage the setting up an interim police force that will be made up of Croats, Serbs, and other ethnic groups that live, or have lived, in this area.

The government will respect all internationally respected human rights and basic freedoms at all levels in the Republic of Croatia, and all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, and those who have the right to Croatian citizenship, and all displaced persons and refugees, will have the right to return freely and live in safety.

All people will have the right to the restoration of all the property that was confiscated from them illegally or that they were forced to abandon.

Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, read out a joint statement in his own name and that of Galbraith in which he assessed the meeting as historic and noted that they were seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations, but in the context of the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia.

We have been negotiating for three years now without any result, Hrvoje Sarinic, the leader of the Croatian state delegation, said at the end of the talks, and he stressed that the process had to take place within a limited time scale, and an agreement will have to be reached by 30 November at the latest, or in other words by the time of the expiry of UNCRO's mandate. [passage omitted]

Sarinic Rules Out Eastern Slavonia Autonomy

LD0310190295

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 3 October carries remarks made by Hrvoje Sarinic, head of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's office and chief negotiator at the UN-sponsored talks in Erdut in Serb-held eastern Croatia, to journalists after the talks.

Sarinic says:

"What is important is Point 11 [of the agreement; see ref], because Point 11 clearly stipulates that when the transitional phase and the interim administration end, elections will be held for local administrative bodies [in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem]. What does this mean? This means that everything that has been said about some kind of autonomy—there is no question of this. The local administrative bodies will—in proportional terms, of course—give power to those who represent a given area. In other words, where there are more Serbs there will be more Serbs in those administrative bodies. But there is no question of any referendum or any autonomy."

New York Document: 'Barren Compromises'

AU0310171795 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Oct 95 p 2

[Commentary by Bruno Lopandic: "Baranja for Banja Luka?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the New York meeting between Croatian, Bosnian, and "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" foreign ministers, everyone went home after having signed a document on the basic principles that did not succeed in securing the basic point—the integrity and statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, what was "achieved" was a general, and diplomatically said, balanced text, elastic enough to allow all sides to interpret it in various ways. Initial reactions among the negotiators, and in the media, are completely divided: from total disappointment to claims that a step forward has been achieved. Can we talk of a step forward?

The outline and general stipulations (the mere fact that the document was signed seems to be a step forward) do not contain the crucial sentence that would give firm guarantees of Bosnia-Herzegovina's indivisibility and integrity. Since this is missing, what remains for Sacirbegovic is to console himself that this issue will be solved later, which is what Holbrooke allegedly personally told the Bosnian diplomatic head. The text of the fundamental principles for Bosnia-Herzegovina states that freedom of movement, media, and speech needs to be secured and that expelled persons are to be allowed to return home or be adequately compensated. Once conditions for this are created, free elections will take place. Based on the elections, two-thirds of deputies from the federation and one-third from the "Serb Republic" will be elected to the assembly. All decisions in the assembly will be passed by majority vote, providing such a majority comprises at least one-third of deputies from each ethnic group. The Presidency will also have to pass all decisions by majority vote, but if one-third or more Presidency members disagree with the decision of the other members, the controversial question will be taken to the assembly of the relevant ethnic group. If the assembly rejects the controversial decision by a two-third majority, it will not go into force.

Right of Veto

Even a superficial review of several significant stipulations implies that the two "entities" will function with extreme difficulty or not at all. What would democratic elections look like? Whose forces and under whose command will defend the internationally recognized borders? How will the Presidency, the assembly, and the entire administration "start functioning" if one ethnic group will always have the right to veto any decision. The real problems actually started in Geneva when the international factors for the first time legalized the "Serb Republic."

New York is just a continuation of what was sealed in Geneva. Because of the right of veto, it is difficult to imagine that the Federation and the "Serb Republic" would be able to reach a joint stance on currency, defense, and foreign affairs. The text of the fundamental principles includes a stipulation according to which each of the two entities must honor international obligations, if these obligations do not pertain to financial obligations that one entity could commit to without the agreement of the other. This article in no way contributes to the maintenance of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, when it comes to financial obligations, each entity has actually been granted the rights of a sovereign state!

To all this we need to add the unsolved issue of the maps. Officially, the warring sides should solve this through a mutual agreement. Unofficially, the international negotiators are relying on an assessment reached in a series of negotiations with Milosevic, that the Serbian leader would be ready to completely relinquish western Bosnia. Diplomatic sources are convinced that "Milosevic is only interested in the area along the Drina River." In this way, he would save his own skin by creating in the end a little-big Serbia because the international legitimacy of the "Serb Republic" has been secured at the Geneva meeting.

Barren Compromises

However, the story does not end here. Reliable sources claim that Milosevic is hoping that on account of giving in on western Bosnia he will get the international negotiators to launch a debate on Baranja. Namely, of the still occupied Croatian territory, Milosevic only has interest in Baranja. That this is so is confirmed by intelligence reports according to which the Serbs have organized the strongest defenses exclusively in Baranja! Well aware of his position and of Croatia's strength, Milosevic will try to grab what he still believes is possible.

All in all, the comprehensive U.S. peace package has brought Bosnia a compromise for the sake of compromise, and not because of a firm goal, least of all a firm guarantee of Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity. The game of barren compromises, played out in New York, has resulted in a paper which, in comparison to the past, means something, but certainly not anything that would interest victims of Greater Serbian aggression. As far as the Croatian occupied territory is concerned, Croatia has clearly stated its position many times.

UN Confirms Massacre of Serbs in Krajina

AU0310144395 Paris AFP in English
1358 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 3 (AFP)—United Nations police have found evidence to support reports of a recent massacre in the Krajina region, which Croatian troops retook in August from rebel Serbs, a UN spokesman said Tuesday.

UN civilian police who travelled to the village of Varivode, 25 kilometers (15 miles) south of the former Serb stronghold Knin, found eight houses spattered in blood and a lengthy trail of blood, said UN spokesman Chris Gunness.

"In another (home) bloodstains were found on the wall along with fragments of hair and skin. From these fragments we believe that someone was shot standing in the entrance," said Gunness.

In Knin, the police found the graves marked with the names of nine people who had been visited recently by UN military observers (UNMOs) on the 11th of September and "were alive and well," he said.

The United Nations has estimated that between 3,755 and 4,155 people remained in Croatia's devastated Krajina from a population of about 185,000.

Those who remained generally did so because they were too poor or too old to join the refugee columns who made the arduous trek to Serbia.

Despite Croatian assurances that the rights of its Serbs would be respected, uniformed men continue to terrorize Serbs in the Krajina.

"There is this rather macabre evidence of rubber gloves covered in blood being found in the village and that perhaps suggests that some sort of investigation has taken place," Gunness told reporters.

A woman in her 70s and 80s was believed to have witnessed at least some of the killings, said Gunness. "She might well be vulnerable to retaliation," he added.

Menacingly, local authorities turned away a man trying to visit Varivode on September 28, the day of the killings.

"A man (was) trying...to take bread to some people in the village and he was told he couldn't go to the village because there had been an accident and the people there no longer required the bread," said Gunness.

Tudjman's Denial of Crimes in Krajina Disputed

95BA0361A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 95 pp 10-11

[Interview with Petar Mrkalj, executive director of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, by Vjeran Grkovic; place and date not given: "It Is Burning, It Is Burning, Good Doctor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Grkovic] Following a three-day visit to Knin, representatives of the International Helsinki Federation (IHF), in collaboration with your organization, notified the domestic public and world public in Zagreb and Vienna of data concerning the state of human rights in the areas liberated in Operation "Storm."

Your data are being disputed because they differ from the official data of the Croatian authorities, and the fact that you went to the region of Knin is taken as an argument that the government has nothing to hide, that is, that there was no large-scale violation of human rights such as you allege.

[Mrkalj] We did not seek a permit for Knin, but on 8 August we did seek permits for Vojnic, Vrginmost, and Topusko, and we have not so far received them. Besides, a week ago no other news was reaching the public aside from official information, and it seemed that this military victory achieved by the HV [Croatian Army] and police in Operation "Storm," which really was a splendid one, was not blemished in any way. However, that is not the case. During our three-day stay we visited many surrounding villages in addition to Knin, we talked to the Serbs who had remained in them as well as with those in the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Organization] camp. We also talked with Petar Pasic, government commissioner for Knin, and my colleague Drago Pilsel talked to the head of the Knin Defense Office; IHF representatives talked to General Cermak, and then also with the commander of the former UNCRO Sector South and with representatives of the UN Human Rights Center. We by and large talked with all those who were accessible to us, we listened, we took notes, and in the end we saw quite a bit of that in the field. It is a fact that the liberation was followed by systematic looting in some regions, and then also torching, not only of houses, but also of other structures in the villages. In Kistanje, for example, which is located some 20 km from Knin, all the houses were torched, and then the school and post office as well. Only the Orthodox Church remained.

Widespread Cases

[Grkovic] Did you get the impression that this was spontaneous, as we have been hearing, or systematic destruction and torching approved from higher up?

[Mrkalj] The chief of the Knin Defense Office showed our colleague Pilsel daily orders saying that it was forbidden to plunder, to torch houses, and to kill people. In formal terms, it cannot be said that preventive measures were not taken, but I personally maintain that the verbal approval was just the opposite. How otherwise to explain the case of Kistanje; would it not have been logical to preserve the post office and the school if they really intended for Kistanje or the other places that experienced the same fate to be inhabited by displaced Croats, or if they were counting on a return of the refugee Serbs? This could not be a case of random torching. I myself saw that Kistanje was systematically torched, house by house. Perhaps no one gave the order, but no one prevented it either.

[Grkovic] Your assertions are supported by the statements of Petar Pasic, government commissioner for Knin, and Sime Prtenjaca, zupan of Zadar. Nevertheless, government authorities, from Franjo Tudjman on down, are stubbornly denying that there was even the slightest excess following completion of the war operations.

[Mrkalj] President Tudjman also denied the existence of evictions. There was a time when I could think that President Tudjman perhaps did not have accurate information, that his associates were regulating what he knew, but the evictions in their time and now the looting and torching have been done on such a scale that that is simply unlikely. I think that President Tudjman knows exactly what has been happening, but he either does not want to prevent it or this is not in his interest because of certain other political options.

[Grkovic] What information did you get in Knin from official representatives of Croatian authority?

[Mrkalj] Mr. Petar Pasic told us that these were isolated cases and that he did not have detailed information. He also said that the houses were torched under certain emotional pressure, and then later he said that the Serbian houses were torched not by professional units of the Croatian Army, but by the militia. We were told the same thing by the head of the Knin Defense Office, who said that there were four or five suspects who did that, and that he does not have precise proof that could result in an investigation or charges being brought against them. As soon as that is possible, it will be done, he said. This is cynical, and those "four or five" are exceptionally productive people if in a few days they managed to torch several thousand houses.

A Field in Smoke

[Grkovic] According to figures of the HHO [Croatian Helsinki Committee], what region had the most torching?

[Mrkalj] Kistanje, Kricke, Ivosevci, Raducic....Black smoke was rising high in the air from several villages we were unable to enter; as we were returning, villages were also burning in Kninsko Polje, and that was visible to anyone. We have figures from the United Nations that indicate most of the houses were torched in the area of Srb, more than 70 percent in the region of Donji Labac and Kaldrm. Then in the north of the area of Slunj, the villages of Trzic, Primislje, Cemernica, and Celemusnica near Vrginmost. Back on the 23d of this month economic facilities were burned there. Between 75 and 80 percent of the houses, more than 4,000, were torched or destroyed in the region we toured.

[Grkovic] What did you learn about Serbian civilians and soldiers killed after the war operations?

[Mrkalj] The figures on those killed are still coming in and are being processed. Colleagues in the IHF have received from Gen. Cermak the figure of 82 people killed. However, we have a list of 242 people, 107 of them civilians. There were 156 soldiers and policemen, and none of them have been identified. They were in Kosovo, on the Gracac-Otric, Gracac-Post Office, Road in Zagar, Zagrovic, Komazeci, at the city graveyard in Knin, in Srb, in the woods near Srb, in Gornje Biljane, in Bruvno, in Mazin, in Podgrad, in the Golubic Garrison, in Kovacic, in Licko Petrovo Selo, in Frkasic, in Ivosevci, in Udbina, in Cista Mala, in Kricke, in Licki Cerovac, in the Orthodox cemetery in Korenica, in Knin, and some also died in the Knin hospital.

[Grkovic] Where did these figures come from?

[Mrkalj] These figures were noted down by the people who picked up the corpses; we obtained them from UNCRO.

Fear of the Home Guards

[Grkovic] The United Nations has everything documented, with photographs....

[Mrkalj] Yes. I should also add that there are indications of the existence of a mass grave on the territory of the former Slunj Opcina, and also that at least 80 people were killed in the region of Glina.

[Grkovic] Are these civilians or members of the Krajina paramilitary organization?

[Mrkalj] These were civilians. They were killed by artillery shells as they fled toward Dvor na Uni, some of them were killed by the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was on Croatian territory during the war operations. We also have the figure that at least 10 civilians were killed in Veljun, between Slunj and Karlovac. The corpse of an old man who was decapitated and had lost both arms was found in the village Josevci near Glina, and the remains of at least four persons who had been burned were found in a hayloft in the village Bijeli Klanac near Krnjak on the Karlovac-Plitvice Road between Veljun and Krnjak. That report has been verified by the Karlovac police. It is known that two of the people were Desanka and Cvijo Matijevic, man and wife. The body of a 10-year-old child was found in disintegrating condition on the highway in Bijeli Klanac; witnesses say that he was torn apart by dogs.

[Grkovic] Aside from UNCRO, your centers, and associates in the field, what other sources of information does the HHO have?

[Mrkalj] Today, a man came to us and gave us a list of 11 names. These are people who remained in Mala Trepca near Vrginmost, and a man from those areas went to look at his area after the liberation. He told us that looting was still taking place in the villages, and those 11 people on the list were mainly elderly; he judged that it would be safer if someone knew that they are alive and that they have stayed in their village. I will show you the letter from a witness in Glina who reports to us that on 19 August everything was in order until the Home Guards arrived.

Since that time, there has been repeated looting and abuse of the remaining Serbs. We get a great deal of information in this way, and then we process it. In the field, we have been gathering information from people directly. In the UNCRO camp in Knin, we asked people to tell us what happened, and in this way we learned that the professional soldiers, they mentioned the lads from Varazdin most frequently, helped them, brought them to the camp, many of them saved them from lynching, and they say that they did not loot, did not torch, and did not murder civilians. Their example motivated several people in the camp to go back to their homes, but they very quickly returned to the camp after having been badly beaten. Of the approximately 630 who were interviewed in the UNCRO camp in Knin, there are now only some 15 who want to remain, while before the interest was considerably greater. We have been repeating to them what the Croatian Government is offering them, but their question has been whether we can give them a guarantee.

A Crime Is a Crime

[Grkovic] Because of the data you are making public, the HHO has been accused not only of "a lack of elementary patriotism," but also of slandering the state and of doing damage to the Republic of Croatia.

[Mrkalj] We are only calling attention to the facts, to cases which must be investigated, which does not mean that we are accusing Croatia, but as far as damage is concerned, falsehoods and coverups will do far more. Everyone knows how the Martic regime in Knin was set up, and it was clear from the beginning that that regime, which trampled all human rights, could not survive. That regime committed murders, systematically torched and destroyed everything that was Croatian, but do we have to do the same thing, do we have to torch and murder? We should have shown by the opposite example that the Martic regime was surviving on lies and deceptions, on demagogy. As a citizen of Croatia, it pains me that such things are happening following a military operation that was carried out brilliantly. Justifying misdeeds with arguments such as "but what did they do to us," or seeking justification in "emotional pressure" can only salve the conscience "conveniently," but murder is murder, theft is theft. There should have been supervision, and the Croatian image should have been preserved untarnished. Everything that happened could have been prevented. Why destroy those houses when they could have been lived in by displaced Croats whose houses were destroyed or Croats driven out of Banjaluka and Vojvodina; why have those people been living in gymnasiums or collection centers when they could have been given much more decent living conditions at least temporarily?

[Grkovic] You had occasion to sense at least some of the mood of the international public concerning the current events in Croatia. What is the range of that mood?

[Mrkalj] From approval of the liberation and reintegration of the occupied areas to stern condemnation and bitterness concerning events in the newly liberated territories. Croatia, they say, should not have allowed pillaging. That is the view of the HHO, and we vigorously protest the dissent to the level displayed by the rebel authority and quasistate, which in 1991 came into power with bloodshed, looting, and torching. The reputation should have been preserved in complete purity, which was not done. At this point, no attempt should be made to defend misdeeds, but the fact should be faced, they have to be acknowledged and prevented from recurring.

Croatian EU Membership Issue 'Dropped'

MS0310102195 London THE GUARDIAN in English 3 Oct 95 p 11

[Report by John Palmer, incorporating interview with EU peace negotiator Carl Bildt: "Croatians to be Kept Out of EU"; on 2 Oct]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Luxembourg—Croatia will not be offered privileged links leading to membership of the European Union, following evidence of Croatian atrocities against Serb civilians in the Krajina region of Croatia.

Atrocity reports by the EU's peace monitors in Croatia were made public yesterday as foreign ministers in Luxembourg discussed their economic and political strategy for the future of the Balkans after a peace settlement in Bosnia.

"There had been talk in some quarters of putting Croatia-like Slovenia on a faster track to eventual EU membership," the EU peace negotiator, Carl Bildt, told the Guardian last night. "But this has now been dropped." The Austrian and German government have in the past championed the Croatian cause.

The monitors have described the role of Croatian forces in the killing of civilians and the destruction of villages.

"We have received detailed reports which do indeed contain some very alarming material and supporting evidence," an EU official said last night.

The EU wants to see the countries in the region help to implement the peace agreement, and then move to progressively more ambitious stages of economic and political cooperation.

Only Slovenia is being considered for full membership, because of its economic strength and its record of democracy and human rights. The rest of former Yugoslavia—Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro—together with Albania, would be encouraged to form a distinctive economic and political grouping.

Mihanovic: Tudjman Should Be Lifelong President

AU0410104595 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 95 pp 3-5

[Interview with Dr. Nedjeljko Mihanovic, Chairman of the House of Representatives, by Branko Madunic; place and date not given: "I Am in Favor of Dr. Franjo Tudjman's Becoming President for Life of the Republic of Croatia and That Root Orthography Be Introduced for Public Use"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Madunic] There are certain ideas emerging that President Tudjman should be given a lifelong mandate, in recognition of his accomplishments in the creation of Croatian policy during the gaining of state independence and the Liberation War. How do you comment on these suggestions?

[Mihanovic] Personally, I support such a proposal. Over the last five years, Dr. Tudjman, as the creator of the whole policy of the independence and the liberation of Croatia, has proved himself to be an exceptionally great statesman. In the contemporary world, objectively speaking, there is no greater statesman, starting from Clinton, Kohl, Major... No, in Europe and in the world I cannot see a man of such quality as our President. For it is easy to govern an established country, a smooth-running administration, but to create a state out of nothing, when all the foreign policy factors of stubborn logic of the big powers are against it, then one has to have the skill of a statesman. I see no one in Croatia who could so successfully run the present Croatian policy in this knot of complicated international interests, causes, and circumstances.

We must emphasize that Dr. Tudjman is the first sovereign politician and constructor of Croatian policy, after King Zvonimir, who has played the historical role of the creator of the Croatian state in its full sovereignty and statehood. With the inspiration of a Garibaldi and a Bismarck, he has carried out his political strategy in this liberation movement in the most realistic and successful way. By his realism and clarity of political logic, by his views, programs, signposts, and daring moves, Dr. Tudjman has apparently shown the full intensity of the characteristics of political sense and the features of an exceptionally talented individual.

West, West!

[Madunic] At the beginning you said that you had been making decisions on everything in a sovereign way, as well as on the dissolving of the Croatian Parliament. Why was the Parliament dissolved at this political point?

[Mihanovic] The HSP [Croatian Party of Rights] was the only party to help the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] during the time of parliamentary crisis. Apart from the HSP, everything else appears as one united party, which is absurd. I do not understand, for instance, this: There are eleven parliamentary parties, and nine of them agree in opinion. There are also certain reasons for dissolving Parliament. In the end we expect the new parties after the elections to have more distinct political profiles and to be more open to cooperation with the HDZ, which, of course, will win in the elections. [passage omitted]

Parliament Controller

[Madunic] Why was it not you, as Chairman of the House of Representatives, who appeared on Croatian Television and explained to the public the reasons for dissolving Parliament, but Vladimir Seks, Vice Chairman, instead?

[Mihanovic] Since the motion to dissolve the House of Representatives had come from the Club of HDZ Deputies, it was more logical for the Chairman of the Club of Deputies to do it than the Chairman of the Parliament.

[Madunic] In the second convocation of the Parliament, after the parliamentary crisis, you succeeded Mr. Stipe Mesic. Can you make a comparison between your own and Stipe Mesic's guiding of the Parliament?

[Mihanovic] I would characterize Mr. Mesic like this: While he was under President Tudjman's advisory influence, he behaved well. As soon as megalomaniac vanity started to grow within him, to become an individual in politics, soloist in state business, he started to lose himself in utter confusion. Moreover, when he started to oppose the sovereign leader of the Croatian state, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, he lost himself completely on the catafalque of his own illusions. It is a fact that his policy was conducted on the level of a superficial, small-town policy, with some jocular, witty tricks.

[Madunic] There are complaints that the HDZ wants to seize possession of the brilliant military victories of the Croatian Army...

[Mihanovic] Those are offenses addressed to us by the opposition, because they have no other election program. I think they cannot win anything from the electorate with those empty phrases.

If the opposition had a program, they would not trick us with cheap and waspish nonsense.

We have everything under control. If it is impossible to attain it in a peaceful way, we are prepared to intervene to liberate the occupied territories of Croatia during the very course of the election campaign. After all, I think that those objections on a political basis are groundless.

[Madunic] Dr. Sokol has drawn up the Election Law. Some people say that he made the first election law for the communists to win, but—the HDZ won, and now he is making the election law for the HDZ, so there could be a surprise like the first time...

[Mihanovic] There is no surprise. It is known who will win. Doubtless, it is going to be the HDZ that with full responsibility fights for the development of the Croatian economy and to provide for the material well-being of our citizens. However, the election law is good, particularly the clause that excludes the marginal, regional, isolationist parties, functioning in the spirit of petty bourgeois ideals. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Tudjman's Creating Royalist State

AU0310201295 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 95 pp 6-7

[Commentary by Darko Hudelist: "Will The Republic of Croatia Soon Be Declared a Banovina and Dr. Tudjman a Croatian Ban?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It has become a public secret that the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], which will most certainly win the forthcoming elections, has been considering significant changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

The GLOBUS editorial staff has found out from several independent sources that the draft of the new Constitution has already been put together (allegedly by Smiljko Sokol) and that the most important news in it will be the abolition of the republic and the introduction of the banovina [Principality] of Croatia! This means that Dr. Tudjman will no longer be president of the Republic of Croatia, but will be inaugurated as the Croatian ban [prince].

Since there is no reason to doubt the credibility of this information, it is obvious that the speculations of some of the Croatian political public about Dr. Tudjman introducing a purely presidential system immediately after the elections, within which he will have the right of veto on any parliamentary decision, will be confirmed, though in quite a shocking way. [passage omitted]

It is important to point out that the probable change into a banovina will not be a merely formal and legal act, but a thorough change into a completely new (though, in fact very, very old) type of power. This will be a much larger and more important change than the change of power in 1990, when the Communist Party of Croatia, which lost the elections, had to let the HDZ take over.

This also means that the repercussions of this change on the political and overall social life in Croatia will be considerably greater than the changes caused by the change of power in 1990.

The statements that Dr. Tudjman is keeping the idea secret not only from the broad public, but the HDZ itself, since it is not certain whether he would be given undivided support by the party, seem to confirm that the transformation of the Republic of Croatia into the banovina of Croatia would be a highly precarious move.

The Rejection of the Principles of the Division of Power

[Passage omitted] The essence of the idea behind abolishing the republic and introducing the banovina of Croatia is to win absolute power and authority.

First of all, with the declaration of the banovina the two-chamber parliament would be automatically abolished and the Chamber of Counties' right of veto would be transferred to the newly inaugurated ban. At the same time, Dr. Tudjman would, as ban, unite in himself all the rights and authorities of the current president of the republic and the prime minister, just as Governor Subasic was in the Banat of Croatia during the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [between the two world wars].

It is therefore to be concluded that, with the declaration of the banovina, the principles of the division of power, as one of the key postulates of Western democracy, would be rejected in Croatia. [passage omitted]

Dr. Tudjman is aware that the introduction of a purely presidential system, with a one-chamber (this time formally marginalized and degraded) parliament and the leading state figure encompassing both the president of the republic and the prime minister, would not be a very popular measure among Croats, which is the reason, it is claimed, why he played the card of the banovina of Croatia, wishing to use this historical mask, which Croats are emotionally tied to, to introduce what he wants the most, a purely presidential system.

That everything in Croatia is prepared for the introduction of a purely presidential system could be concluded from the recent TV appearance of Vladimir Seks, who, indeed, did not directly mention the institution of ban, but did, in the most explicit way so far, support a strong and powerful central power, evidently concentrated in the hand of one person. Having said that Croatia is faced with many serious foreign political and domestic political problems, he emphasized that it was necessary to establish a powerful centralized state that would be able to deal with all the problems that have accumulated.

The Ban Above the Ban's Authority?

One of the most important changes will most probably be the abolishing of the function of prime minister, since Ban Tudjman will encompass this high position in addition to his former one, that of the president of the republic. Indeed, the present Croatian prime minister, Valentic, has most often played the role of the president's obedient subject, having no real authority, but there was at least a possibility in theory of him opposing the president. [passage omitted]

It is not impossible that the institution of podban [lesser ban] will also exist within the structure of the future ban authority, as was customary in the earlier, historical, state forms of the banovina type. However, if there is a podban, he will not play any significant political role. [passage omitted]

Model: The Constitution of the United States of America?

This form of political rule is very much redolent of the U.S. presidential system, in which the president has great authority and, in fact, the function of a king of sorts, but without the succession of power. The draft of the new Croatian Constitution was probably made after the model of the Constitution of the United States, among others, which will be made very prominent in the promotion of its characteristics. However, the question is to what extent, if at all, the political situation in Croatia may be compared to the situation in the United States. [passage omitted]

A Kingdom Emerging?

It is possible that, after the passing of the new Constitution, Croatia will, as a newly established banovina, become some sort of an electoral kingdom. Namely, since there is no king to succeed the future Croatian ban, Tudjman, the question rightfully arises as to whether the introduction of the banovina institution is in fact not the introduction of a monarchical system, that is, the transition towards a kingdom? [passage omitted]

Possible Members of New Parliament Viewed

AU0310135095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by Aleksa Crnjakovic: "Who Goes to the Parliament and Who to the New Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday [20 September], exactly on the day when the House of Representatives was dissolved, I met one real HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] fighter from those first days, the man who in those hard times formed the first branch of the future winning party, which at that time was called the party of dangerous intentions; we realized how changeable political fortune is, and how uncertain the political career. In those times it seemed to us that the first really democratic preelection campaign, whose witnesses or participants we were, was simply unimaginable without that charming, somewhat conceited, and self-assured politician, who could decorate his political thoughts with poetic or philosophic quotation in a flash, in beautiful Croatian language. That ambitious, hard HDZ man, who was rather a skillful speaker than a political operative, did not manage to survive the collision of two political vanities, and very soon he sank into political anonymity, although he had even been a minister for a time. He was one of the first HDZ renegades.

In these preelection days we have to remember those people who were courageous when that was needed, vehement when that quality seemed to be a big fault, who sat in the first democratic parliament, and those who thought they were irreplaceable, and those who destroyed but did not know how to rebuild.

Some to Retirement, Some Became Legends, and Some to Marko's Square

Looking at around 100 representatives of the second convocation of the House of Representatives on its last day, we tried to guess how many of them will go into political anonymity, where they once came from, and how many will become legends; there will be some like that as well—for example Savka Dabcevic Kucar or Srecko Bijelic. And although it seems that the representatives have forever parted from their colleagues with whom they fought fights for three full years, a good chronicler will conclude that for many of them the dissolution of the House of Representatives is but a somewhat longer pause, and that the real words should have been: "See you later!"

Namely, it is quite sure that many representatives will return again, probably even around 40 percent of them. Most of them will come from the HDZ. It is estimated that the HDZ will this time take 24 places from electoral units, and around 40 to 45 places from the state list.

That means that many well-known faces, like Vladimir Seks, Zarko Domljan, Luka Babic, Franjo Greguric, Andrija Hebrang, Djuro Perica, Ivan Milas, Janko Bobetko, Ivan Rabuzin (if he wants to), Vera Stanic, Marino Golob, Franjo Kajfez, Nedjeljko Mihanovic, Zlatko Canjuga, Katarina Fucek, Nedjeljko Matic, Anton Kovacev, Ivan Majdak, and many others will enter the parliament as the first violins of the HDZ, and then be appointed ministers, like it was, for example, in the case of Mate Granic, Gojko Susak, Ivica Mudrinic, Jure Radic, Ivan Jarnjak, Ivica Kostovic, Niko Bulic, who will probably keep their present domains. In the new government there will also be some new or recently appointed ministers, like Davor Stern, or Bozo Biskupic (whom some already see as the minister of culture).

Some people have grown so much stronger politically that they simply cannot be eliminated from politics, which has become their destiny, not only their occupation. Their new boss, i.e. the prime minister, will maybe be Branko Miksa, who has allegedly refused that hot chair; maybe, or most probably, it will be Zlatko Malesa, or some new name—maybe one of the bankers: Katicic, Lukovic....?

In the parliament there will also be some new people, maybe Josip Generalic and Ksenija Urlicic, and some old people in new clothes, like Damir Zoric. It will be a pity if some places are again given to directors of big public or private companies, directors of banks, newspapers, or television stations, simply because the interests of those two places are so opposite that it is impossible to avoid being partial.

Where Will Mesic and Manolic Go?

The man who was the last president of Yugoslavia and the first prime minister of the new Croatian state and the president of the parliament, Stipe Mesic, will maybe no longer be in a position to be active in politics, if his party does not survive the elections or if his candidacy is not supported by the coalition of parties. The man who, in the first years of the Croatian state, had decisive influence on many political processes, particularly concerning the cadres, Josip Manolic, will maybe also be leaving. There will be some more losers in the elections. We will be sorry for some of them, because they used to amuse us; as for others—it is better for them to forget politics.

Although the opposition parties have grown somewhat weaker before the elections, it is quite sure that most of them will win the right to enter the parliament. The leader of the Croatian Party of Rights [HSP], Anto Djapic, even claims that his candidates have better chances than ever, and he expects to get even 15 places in the parliament. He may be exaggerating, but we will definitely see him in the lobbies of the parliament again. The liberals will keep their second place, and we will again discuss with Drazen Budisa, Gotovac, Vilfan, Rados, Fizulic, who will take the leading places on the state list of the liberals.

President Tudjman will probably issue writs for elections elections already on Friday [29 Sep], which practically starts the campaign. The president wastes no time indeed, and, in the same way in which he hurried with the "Flash" and "Storm" operations, he hurries with the elections. According to law, the first session of the parliament must be held 20 days after the elections at the latest, so that we can expect a new meeting with old and new representatives already in the second or third week of November. We suppose that there will be no irregularities in the elections, so there will be no need to repeat the elections in some electoral units.

Mihanovic—For the Second Time?

Just as the state president issues writs for the elections, he also convenes the first session. Then the representatives choose from among themselves the representative who takes over the leading of the session until the new president [of the parliament] is elected, who, according to the constitution, is the second highest official in the state; he is nominated by the ruling party, and elected by all the representatives in a public voting.

There are already some rumors that Mihanovic will be given the honor to preside over the parliament for the second time! Many will not be satisfied with that proposal, but it is the majority who decides. We have to remember last year's secret opinion poll of the members of HDZ clubs, held in Prekrizje, when Stipe Mesic was removed. Three names were offered then: Mihanovic, who got 30 votes, Greguric with 19, and Segota with 14! Although the president of the parliament is in fact chosen by the president of the republic, the choice will also depend on the balance of power in this year's parliament.

Opposition Parties' Electoral Agreement Viewed

AU2909134495 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Sep 95 p 7

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "How 28 Constituencies Have Been Divided by the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The parliamentary opposition parties have agreed at the beginning of the week on how to divide the 28 constituencies on the territory of Croatia from which 28 representatives will be elected on 29 October to the Chamber of Representatives according to a simple majority system.

The opposition parties have concluded that they can win in many of the 28 constituencies only under the condition of having a single candidate running against the candidate of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]. To be more precise, if the HDZ expects 40 percent of the votes in one constituency, and several other parties expect 10, 15, or 20 percent, the HDZ candidate will be the winner since the votes for the opposition will be dispersed. Therefore, the opposition parties have decided to put forward only one candidate from only one party. Other opposition parties will withdraw their candidates and support the joint candidate.

VJESNIK has learned from reliable sources how the opposition has agreed to divide the 28 constituencies. The Croatian Social-Liberal Party [HSLS] will represent the opposition in nine constituencies, which are designated under numbers 2, 4, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, and 26. The Croatian Peasants Party will put forward candidates on behalf of the opposition in seven constituencies: 1, 6, 7, 11, 17, 19, and 28. The Social Democratic Party [SDP] of Croatia will put forward candidates in three constituencies: 3, 12, and 27. The Croatian Independent Democrats were given three constituencies (10, 13, 25), the Croatian People's Party two (16,18), and the Istrian Democratic Congress two (8, 21).

Opposition parties, more specifically the HSLS and the SDP, could not agree on which of them should put forward a candidate in constituency number 9 (part of Rijeka). This is why the opposition will most probably put forward the candidates of both the HSLS and the SDP.

Political observers take the view that the opposition parties' intention to mainly put forward one candidate against the HDZ does not mean that they will win everywhere. In many constituencies, the HDZ has a chance of winning more than half the votes. In the constituencies in which it does not have this majority, the opposition's election chances have been increased.

However, fewer than one quarter of representatives in the Chamber of Representatives is elected in the 28 constituencies. The chamber will have a total of 127 (128) representatives. About two thirds of them will be elected through the proportional representation election system, through the state lists of candidates put forward by individual parties. This part of the elections will enable all parties that get more than the 5 percent of the vote needed to be present in the assembly and to get the number of seats that is proportionate to the percentage of votes they received on the entire territory of the country.

Constituencies

Considering that listing the names of all towns and villages in every constituency would take too much space, we have limited ourselves to mentioning only some of the more important and well-known places.

Constituency numbers:

1—Krizevci and Vrbovec;

2—Zapresic and part of Croatian Zagorje;

3—Petrinja and Sisak;

4—Ivanic-Grad, Kutina, and Novska;

5—Karlovac, Duga Resa, and Samobor;

6—Varazdin;

7—Bjelovar and Koprivnica;

8—Part of Rijeka and east Istria;

9—Part of Rijeka, Gorski Kotar, and Novi Vinodolski;

10—Gospic, Otocac, and Rab;

11—Pozega and Virovitica;

12—Slavonski Brod and Nova Gradiska;

13—Zadar, islands, and Benkovac;

14—Part of Osijek and Beli Manastir;

15—Part of Osijek, Djakovo, and Valpovo;

16—Sibenik, Drnis, and Vodice;

17—Vinkovci, Vukovar, and Zupanja;

18—Part of Split, Kastela, and Vrlika;

19—Part of Split, Hvar, Omotski Omis, and Vis;

20—Part of Split, Bacvice, and Trstenik;

21—Western Istria;

22—Dubrovnik, Metkovic, and Korcula;

23—Cakovec;

24—Zagreb south of the Sava River, and Jarun;

25—Northwest Zagreb;

26—Zagreb (center, Trnje, and part of Sljeme);

27—Zagreb (Maksmir, part of Sljeme, and Zitnjak);

28—Zagreb (Dubrava, Sesvete, and the surrounding area).

Disintegration of Multiparty System Predicted

95BA0370A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Sep 95 p 10

[Article by Professor Mirjana Kasapovic: "Important Constitutional Amendments on the Horizon: Will the President of the Republic Be Elected for Life With Unlimited Powers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties the citizens of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to establish political parties and associations, it seemed that there would never be an end or limit to it. Within that "100-party life," only a few parties had a parliamentary future; most remained on the fringes of the political life of their respective countries, limited to titillating or horrifying the public.

While in the Czech Republic, for example, Vaclav Havel was building the Citizens' Forum in order to bring down the communist regime by legal means, some Czechs were reviving the Party of Moderate Progress within the framework of the law: At the heart of its program were dadaism and the tradition of the party of the same name established in 1910 by Jaroslav Hasek, creator of Svejk.

Others amused themselves by establishing the Party of Permanent Opposition for Democracy, the Party of the Czech Province, or the Independent Erotic Initiative.

And all of them should perhaps have been a part of the Czech Society for a Cheerier Present, which had exceedingly good reasons for existing.

Another President for Life?

And while mostly short-lived recreational political parties were flooding Central Europe, obscure political associations were arising much more frequently on the fringes of political life in Eastern Europe. The most representative among them is perhaps Fire of the Romanesque or Romanian Cradle—just imagine what kind of gloomy ideologies and organizations like to play symbolically with cradles!—a mixture of fascism and communism, which did not conceal its hatred for Hungarians, Germans, and Gypsies, advocating even that they be driven out of the country. Made up of physicians, engineers, lawyers, and members of the Army, police, and secret service, it was transformed in 1990 into the Alliance for Unity of Romania, and in the elections it got no fewer than nine seats in the parliament.

Of what is this epiphenomenon of political parties reminiscent? Judging by current trends in the development of party life in our country, epiphenomena of this kind could quickly become surrogates for political pluralism.

The incumbent Croatian Democratic Union, the HDZ, no longer even makes it a secret that it will use every available means to engender in Croatia a parliamentary system having a dominant party and no alternative policy. That means that the HDZ will see to it that in the next elections it gets a two-thirds majority of the seats in the house of representatives of the parliament, so that it can adopt all policy decisions independently, including decisions to amend the Constitution and constitutional law on the rights of ethnic minorities.

It is clear even now that the constitutional law we have had on the rights of ethnic minorities will not be long-lived, because the Serbs in Croatia have become a small ethnic community which does not inhabit a compact region in which institutions of territorial and political autonomy might be established.

The HDZ will probably find Article 95 of the Constitution "most ready" for amendment; it provides that no one may be president of the Republic more than twice.

True, the possibility of multiple elections of the same individual to that office is better in formal terms than legalizing the institution of the "nonhereditary monarch" in the person of a president for life, although in content there need not be any great difference between them. The only other thing equal to them in importance is deciding the Bosnian or Herzegovinian question, and so decisions on the possible confederation and the Croatian-Bosnian Federation could be made by a qualified two-thirds majority in the Assembly, not by a plebiscite.

The strategic solution of the Serbian and Bosnian question and consolidating the personalized presidential type of government are more than sufficient reasons for the incumbent party and president of the state to do everything to permit them to make decisions on this with complete independence.

On behalf of an overwhelming victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections, they are resorting to three principal means, not bothering themselves too much about the moral aspects and long-term political consequences of their actions: instrumentalization of the victories of the Croatian Army in the spring and summer of this year, unsparing destruction of the opposition parliamentary parties, and amendment of the election law.

The early parliamentary elections are themselves irrefutable proof that the victories of the Croatian Army are being used for the political objectives of the incumbent party.

While before "Operation Storm" the highest officials of the HDZ—from the prime minister on down—said to a man that there is no reason whatsoever for early elections, the military victory completely changed their option.

It is true that they have been trying to justify the early elections on certain grounds: the need to reestablish local government and elect parliamentary representatives of citizens in the liberated areas, but they are not to the point.

Government in the opcinas, cities, and zupanijas is established by local and (partial) zupanija elections, not a parliamentary election. The representativeness of the parliamentary deputies would in fact be extremely questionable: A majority of the liberated areas have been left virtually without their electorate, and the Croatian displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia, who are now settling there, are not on Croatian voter lists.

The real purpose of the early elections is for the HDZ to capitalize as soon as possible on the most recent military triumph and to take power once again.

This relationship between war and politics is already becoming a tradition of the HDZ. The election to the Zupanija Chamber of the Assembly in February 1992 was preceded by "Operation Maslenica," and the unstable situation in the party before the Second General Conference in October 1993 was preceded by the military operation in the Medak Pocket.

The Strategy Against the Opposition

But the previous and present cases differ in that the military actions at that time were timed to precede a certain political event, but now the political event is being "staged" after the military operation, which was not so limited and predictable as the previous ones.

The contours of the strategy conceived by the HDZ to weaken and shatter the opposition parliamentary parties became clear back in 1992, and as time has passed they have become more and more recognizable. The strategy has been founded basically on two lines of action: "pacification" of entire opposition parties by installing leaderships that are close and subject to the HDZ—and that have turned the entire party—or at least the main body of it—into a satellite of the incumbent party, which in future would merge with it.

This line of action was first used with the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS] by means of what is called the Kasinska Group. After that attempt failed, thanks largely to the political experience of the president of the HSS at that time, Drago Stipac, the Kasinska Group and its distinguished deputies (Stojanovic, Madjor, etc.) ended up in the HDZ.

A second attempt was concentrated at installing Ivica Vrkic at the head of the Croatian People's Party [HNS]. Because that attempt was also unsuccessful, Vrkic and the pro-HDZ wing of the HNS passed over to the HDZ. Ivica Vrkic is today advocating most aggressively the proposition that transfers of politicians and deputies from opposition parties to the incumbent party and from the incumbent party to opposition parties is actually one and the same thing. One really needs to have a thick skin to assert anything like that. Vrkic has in any case proved that he does, when at one time he ignored the public letter of Branimir Glavas, zupan of Osijek, in which he was revealed with brutal frankness to be a petty informer on his own former party and on the entire opposition.

Finally, that strategy also had a success: When Dobroslav Paraga was moved aside and Ante Djapic took the leadership, the Croatian Rights Party [HSP] was also basically "pacified." Djapic is today ready for an election and postelection coalition with the HDZ, and it is not out of the question that the HSP will rather quickly grow together with the HDZ.

The second line of action: Opposition parties are also being destabilized and weakened by the "purchasing" of their individual deputies and politicians. This is resorted to when it is judged that the political opponent is serious, i.e., a party on which a leadership cannot be imposed and whose main body is not close to the policy of the HDZ. It is no accident, then, that this strategy has been used against the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and the IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly].

The main reason for the large-scale switch to the HDZ has been openly stated by Damir Zoric. In his assessment, the HDZ will remain in power in Croatia for decades, and with that prospect the purpose of oppositionist activity comes down to procedural grumbling in the parliament.

Why Is the HDZ Still Insecure?

For the present, it seems, the HDZ itself foresees long-term self-destructive consequences of its own strategy. As it transforms itself into a large party representing the entire nation, it is at the same time becoming a coalition of all possible political currents and directions. The external unity of such a party can be maintained only by unquestioned arbitration of the supreme authority such as that now represented by the president of the party and the state; without him, the party would simply "crack."

Finally, because nothing would be left to chance, the incumbent party will assuredly also amend the election law. Had there not been the military triumph, without which the chances of the HDZ in the election were incomparably less and more unpredictable, the legislature would certainly have legislated proportional elections.

Because the self-awareness and election prospects of the incumbent party have risen since "Operation Storm," it is more likely that the segmented election model will basically be kept, but with significant changes.

The most important change might be in the numerical relationship between the parliamentary mandates obtained through competition of the party slates and individuals, in that a larger number of seats would be allocated to the slates.

The HDZ would thus like to reduce the present risk in majority elections to the absolute minimum, which is a telling expression of the incumbent party's peculiar insecurity: If it were as secure in its political superiority as it seems, it would not avoid direct confrontation, even with the united opposition in a majority election.

Another change will certainly be to increase the prohibitive clause to qualify for participation in the distribution of seats from the former 3 percent to a likely 5 percent.

Nor is it precluded that there might be a differentiated prohibitive clause for parties and coalitions in which coalitions of two or more parties would have to have a higher percentage of the vote in order to be able to participate in the distribution of seats. That would eliminate all small parties from the parliament, and the party with the strongest vote would stand to gain.

Even the resigned and embittered current opposition deputies in the parliament and their parties could begin very soon to adopt the practice of entertaining and providing disruptions on the fringes of political life—as is now being done by Sosic, Bakovic, Schwartz, and others.

Commentary Warns of UDBA, Totalitarian Revival

AU2809125295 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Sanja Modric: "Coup a la Croat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As soon as we were hoping that UDBA [State Security Administration—former Yugoslavia] had precipitated from Croatian territories into the lumber room of history, its smell is back at our heels. There is just superficial makeup upon its face, the beast has been reincarnated under the Croatian name, but it puffs, hisses, feigns and threatens just like the former one—there can be no mistake.

Even those small, silent ants among us whose simple lives had in the times of UDBA gone on without political interests, enthusiasm, or expectations, so that they were interesting to nobody, except as a little stone among thousands of others, so that nobody had ever touched them, even they have learned how to infallibly recognize UDBA methodology and stylistics. When people began to regain democratic consciousness in these areas, our newspapers were teeming with the harrowing autobiographies of politically persecuted sufferers in the former system, with the unquenchable passion with which the colorful press over the world feeds on the divorce proceedings of the megastars, crimes of passion and news on sex-organ transplants.

Unquestioning Obedience

Based upon all those sad confessions—of Dobroslav Paraga, Drazen Budisa, Marko Veselica, Adem Demaqi, Zvonimir Markovic, Djuro Perica, Vlado Gotovac, and many others within the radius of the former state—the law of the successful accomplishment of a task following the UDBA recipe becomes more than transparent. The preamble to it says: "Create unquestioning obedience and do not allow any possible secondary questions"; the introductory paragraph says: "Break resistance with all available means, but choose the gentlest one first, and go on to the strongest, the fatal one"; and the first amendment: "Award the one who cooperates successfully."

The people who, according to the order of the strongest association, were mentioned in this text, are living evidence that there is still something that the available machinery cannot crush. However, there is much more evidence of the opposite, that is, that people are weak, fragile objects, most often totally unlike worthy literary heroes, who, for that very reason, have been beatified for centuries in elevated epic forms. Their stories have not been told in the newspaper, but those are the ones upon whom UDBA primer has already been used, those who have readily swapped their loyalty for a small gift, blessed peace and a smile from the mighty one. One swapped it for an apartment, another for a better salary, a summer-house building site in a better position on the coast...Others did not need such things, but they wanted to travel (with their wives) to distant countries in other continents, or their child needed an operation by Christian Barnard, or they just craved power, or they were weak when threatened, or they 'broke' in prison. Nothing that is human is strange to me, and it is also an old saying: Naturalia non sunt turpia. But UDBA was a monstrous metaphor of the totalitarian regime; and we are in a democracy, aren't we? In one mostly deserted Serb village in the liberated area, there is a dead cow laid in the center. The cow's udders have been cut off, its eyes gauged, and it has been ripped up all along its ribs. Does this message need to be explained to anybody and to whom has it been sent?

One would have to be really stupid to think that democracy is a perfect state of affairs, where human failings have been uprooted by a beautifully written edict. But the democratic system is not based upon them, it does not misuse them as miserable instruments for political gain and to profit its own interests, it does not use them as chips in darkened gambling dens in suspicious houses on the outskirts of town. That is the simple difference in substance.

The Ghost of UDBA Again

Meanwhile, the present preelection euphoria in our country, not for the first time reveals that the ghost of UDBA can be heard here again. It is perhaps only harmless recidivism, the last twitch of an unrelenting disease, or were the verses of the old hit song prophetical when they said, in a serious harlequin way, that "UDBA is our destiny"? Because the obedient are wanted again, the servants are produced again, again a finger is raised and again somebody says: Hush! The opposition—by carrot or stick, depending on which is more efficient—is being either lured or driven into the sheepfold of the ruling ones, HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] responses are everywhere, only an upright tombstone would not be burned. Naturalia non sunt turpia [Natural things are not disgraceful].

To one man, Zeljko Kalinovic, independent representative in the Osijek Municipal Council, and a serious diabetic, a secret HDZ courier offers a kidney transplant abroad, if he raises his hand to topple the municipal government of the liberals who won the elections in Osijek. The HDZ blackmails people with their jobs, offers jobs in diplomacy, threatens to make public extramarital romantic digressions, rustles with bundles of very cheap shares, even threatens physical injury. Just for one signature, someone who had for five years been a nobody in one's own party, is being brought before the TV cameras in the best air time to drown his sorrows with a stupid sentence: "I have always been for Croatia!"

Like in a Bizarre Dream

Yesterday, the liberals made public LISICA [Fox], a secret conspiracy plan by their moles, so-called liberal populists, who turned overnight to the HDZ. The plan is a masterpiece, the real UDBA would be ashamed before the creators of this plan. In one place, for instance, the "fox" explains the method by which it will take over power in the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party], which will be "supported by the HDZ." And it continues, saying: "It will be achieved through rewards, blackmailing, promises, bribery, agitation, advertising, interests, force, suggestion, attraction and distraction of attention, compensation, campaign of low blows, labeling, and so on."

It is incredible! Like in a bizarre dream of a dinner with Ludlum, Le Carre, a Sigurimi colonel, James Bond, officers of McCarthyism, and Rankovic. Again.

Vlado Gotovac has recently sounded the alarm: Totalitarianism never starts by establishing itself immediately and completely...At the beginning it always looks ridiculous and impossible. At the beginning people always think of it this way: Come on, those people are funny, incapable, semiprimitive, uneducated, ridiculous, Tartars, good-for-nothings. In the end it turns out that they are very dangerous people.

Gotovac's knowledge of the subject is unquestionably detailed and—firsthand. As long as the eyes are still not closed, and the ears plugged, Croatia needs caution. Because there will be no sense in any further analysis after the event—nor would we, in the end, have any opportunity to read it.

Gligorov 'Stable' After Assassination Attempt

LD0410093995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0843 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 4 Oct (TANJUG)—According to the latest official report issued by the council of doctors at the emergency unit of the Medical Faculty in Skopje, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], President Kiro Gligorov's medical condition is unchanged.

The council of doctors has said that an operation carried out last night removed the consequences of the injuries and that vital functions have remained stable.

Quoting unidentified medical sources, the state radio in Skopje this morning broadcast a report saying that "several complex and delicate operations, predominantly in connection with the cortex and internal bleeding, were carried out last night."

"A combined team of doctors from the Skopje Medical Faculty in cooperation with experts from abroad established serious vision damage and bodily injuries," the radio added.

Quoting the same sources, the state radio says that "Gligorov's medical condition will be in a delicate phase over the next few days, and new operations are likely." [passage omitted]

Blood Clots, Metal Removed

AU0410114995 Paris AFP in English 1132 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 4 (AFP)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov was kept in intensive care Wednesday but doctors refused to comment on his condition after he sustained serious brain injuries in a failed assassination attempt in the capital Skopje.

Gligorov's doctors had late Tuesday issued a statement saying that the 78-year-old president was in a serious but "stable" condition after being injured in the car bomb attack Tuesday when his driver was killed and a bodyguard and three bystanders were injured.

The medical bulletin issued Tuesday said Gligorov's vital functions were "intact" after the attack.

A source in the medical team, who asked not to be named, said the president of the impoverished former Yugoslav republic underwent six hours of surgery during which doctors removed several pieces of metal and two blood clots from his brain.

Gligorov was being cared for in the intensive care unit and doctors would need to wait for several days before being able to comment more fully on his condition, the source said.

As well as brain injuries, the president suffered a serious injury to his right eye which he risks losing the use of, the source said.

The attack on Gligorov, which has not yet been claimed, came at a critical time with the president of the four-year-old republic at the center of moves to establish normal relations with neighbouring Greece and Serbia.

Greek and Macedonian officials had just met in Athens for the first time in four years when the attack occurred. The talks were broken off to allow senior Macedonian foreign ministry official Ljupco Arsovski to telephone the capital, Skopje for advice. He was told to carry on.

Greece imposed an economic embargo on Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] four years ago in a dispute over its name, which is the same as a northern Greek province. Serbia has never officially recognised the republic's secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Early suspicions over the attack have centered on extremists from the large Albanian minority, who are calling for autonomy in the west of the country, or extreme Macedonian nationalists who accuse Gligorov of being too accommodating to Greece and the rump Yugoslavia.

Reaction to Attack on President Gligorov

Radio Gives Report

AU0310174695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian at 1330 GMT on 3 October carries several reports on domestic and foreign reaction to the attempted assassination of President Kiro Gligorov.

The Russian ambassador in Skopje gives an official statement in which he says that his country is "highly distressed" over the incident.

French Ambassador Patrick Crissman gives a recorded statement in which he stresses the "excitement" of his nation because of the incident.

The Slovene ambassador is cited as saying "this incident is an attack that caused bitterness among Slovene circles."

The head of the OSCE mission in Skopje then issues a statement on the incident: "The OSCE mission in Skopje received with horror the terrible news about the attack against the life of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov. All of us in the OSCE hope that the president is recovering. We are certainly disturbed to the utmost by this tragic event in which the life of at least one person was lost. These are precisely those forces against which Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], also the whole international public, must fight and oppose in the future if a peaceful future is desired for the Balkans. All we can say now is that we hope that the president will recover and continue his extraordinary duty in the stabilization of the country that he has hitherto always done for the benefit of all the people living in it."

Hristos Matis, OBSERVER Radio-Television correspondent, gives a recorded report on the reactions in Greece. He says that "media in Greece have covered the attempt against President Gligorov very urgently and in extraordinary news. They all say that Gligorov has survived the attempt but pieces of information are very confusing. Some mass media even sent their journalists to Skopje." He also reports that "Ljupco Arsovski, head of the Macedonian delegation in Athens, did not make any comment after he was informed about the attempt. The negotiations in Athens started half an hour ago after the information on the attempt, but there is no information about the course of the negotiations. Some Greek media connect the attempt with recent threats against Mr. Gligorov because of the signing of the Interim Accord with Greece. In Greece it was reported that Gligorov was accused of treason by some extremists, while some Greek extremists made the same accusations against the Greek Government because of the mentioned accord signed in New York."

The report then cites the VMRO-DPMNE, saying it "condemns most strongly the incident and assesses it is an act for the destabilization of Macedonia and of the whole Balkans."

The Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia is also cited as condemning the attack against Gligorov.

Cabinet Issues Statement

AU0310163395 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Report by studio announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] The President's Cabinet issued a statement an hour ago. An assassination was attempted at 0945 [0845 GMT] against Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], today in which the president was injured in the head and was hospitalized in the Town Surgical Hospital. According to the report of the medical staff in the Medical University "Kiril i Metodij" in Skopje it is necessary to undertake surgical intervention. The statement stresses that in the incident the driver Aleksandar Spirovski was murdered, while security worker Ilco Teovski was injured and is in hospital. According to the first investigations, the attempt took place in front of the Hotel Bristol on Makedonija St. Just after the attempt all necessary measures were undertaken and the investigation is under way. The statement released from the Cabinet of the President of Macedonia says that official information on the event is expected, as well as a medical bulletin from the competent bodies.

Speaker Denounces Act

LD0310222095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2106 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 3 Oct (TANJUG)—Regarding today's assassination attempt on head of state Kiro Gligorov, Stojan Andov, the assembly speaker of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], this evening made a special statement for the press denouncing "this perfidious action."

Having confirmed what was said in the official statements about the assassination attempt and about medical care given to the wounded president, Andov said that this act was tantamount to an attack on Macedonia's independence and peaceful stand.

"This heinous action is aimed directly against the peaceful life, interests, and well-being of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and it is being condemned by everyone in the country, and at the same time, our citizens are voicing the hope and desire that President Gligorov will recover as soon as possible," Andov said.

He said "all necessary security measures have been undertaken and there is no reason for concern or fear."

The assembly speaker stressed that "there is no force that can make our country deviate from its independent and peaceloving course." He also promised that the attackers will be found and put on trial.

Andov called on the FYROM citizens to stay calm, be wise, and preserve the country's reputation at these difficult times. [passage omitted]

Interior Ministry Speaks

AU0310203495 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Statement by Interior Ministry on bomb attack against President Kiro Gligorov in Skopje on 3 October]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At about 0945 [0845 GMT] in Makedonija St., unknown persons made an assassination attempt against President Gligorov, who was immediately transported to the City Hospital and is now in the State Clinic. Aleksandar Spirkovski was killed in the incident, while five other people were injured. Border crossings have been put under strict control and every officer is being brought in to help with these controls. Witnesses are being called to the investigations and detailed studies are being carried out at the scene of the event, in addition to all other measures undertaken to identify the perpetrators. Special units have also been brought in.

The attorney general and a team of Interior Ministry experts are carrying out the investigations. The car with the bomb was parked across the road from Hotel Bristol. It was a Citroen Ami 8 with Kumanovo license plates and 20 kg of explosives in the back. There was sand in the car and the explosion was most probably set off by remote control. The president was in the front seat of his car next to the driver. Several people suspected of involvement in the assassination attempt have been arrested. All the hospitals are being searched to find people who may have been injured. U.S. assistance has been sought to help in the detailed investigation, as well as assistance from other friendly countries.

The Interior Ministry will keep the public regularly informed.

Opposition Condemns Attack

AU0310160695 Paris AFP in English 1541 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 3 (AFP)—The main opposition party of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] condemned the attempted assasination of President Kiro Gligorov Tuesday [3 October] and canceled a protest demonstration scheduled for the following day.

The ultranationalist VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity] had called upon the residents of the capital to protest Wednesday [4 October] against concessions made by the government in negotiations on normalizing relations with neighboring Greece.

The party objects to a proposal, to be voted Thursday in parliament, which would remove a controversial symbol from the national flag as demanded by Greece.

Speaking on television, the party leader, Ljupco Georgijevski, condemned the car-bomb attack against Gligorov as an "act of terrorism" and said he hoped the culprits would be arrested quickly and punished.

"This is an attack against the highest office of the state, and each one of us now lives in insecurity," he said.

Gligorov, 78, suffered a skull fracture and a concussion, and was reported in serious condition following surgery. State television said his life was not in danger.

Parties: 'Unprecedented Act'

AU0410114495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Telephone report by Ibadete Hajrullahu from Skopje]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The assassination attempt was condemned by all Macedonian and Albanian parties. Thus, the Party for Democratic Prosperity, the People's Democratic Party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians, and many other political subjects in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] reacted to this, assessing it as an unprecedented act in these areas and an attempt to assassinate the democratic processes and a pro-European orientation.

Gligorov Comment After Talks in Belgrade

AU0310183995 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Oct 95 pp 2-3

[Report by D. Culev: "Mutual Recognition—Precondition for Good Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiro Gligorov, the president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], paid an official visit to Belgrade yesterday at the invitation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Upon his return late in the afternoon, President Gligorov informed journalists about his discussions with the Serbian President.

"We had a long and useful discussion," said President Gligorov in his statement yesterday. "I reiterated the position and the interest of the Republic of Macedonia for development of goodneighborly relations for which it is first of all necessary to accomplish a mutual recognition and establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. We jointly concluded that a full normalization of relations between the two countries is in the interest of stability in the south of the Balkans, particularly after the signing of the Macedonian-Greek accord.

"We also jointly concluded that after the lifting of the UN sanctions against FRY there will be conditions for development of normal economic relations and cooperation between the two countries, as well as in the region at large, by which the present economic cooperation among the Balkan countries will be greatly promoted," President Gligorov said.

"We also discussed the development of the events in the region at large, and I reiterated our support for the U.S. peaceful initiative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. I also expressed my belief that the orientation of the Balkan countries toward the European integrations is the best alternative for the future and stability of the Balkans," President Gligorov pointed out.

When the journalists asked the reason for this invitation, bearing in mind that the last meeting with Milosevic took place two years ago, Gligorov replied: "If we follow the events, I think that this meeting is a logical step after everything that is now taking place in relation to the solution of the war in Bosnia and the territories of former Yugoslavia. After we had signed the accord with Greece and after there are opened possibilities for a peace agreement and for the solution of the Bosnian problem, it is logical to expect a solution of the problem between the Republic of Macedonia and FRY, that is, we can now expect mutual recognition to follow."

Asked whether a concrete agreement was reached in the discussions with Milosevic concerning the future mutual recognition of Macedonia and Serbia, President Gligorov replied that in the first half of next month we can expect a mutual recognition of the two states and an establishment of full diplomatic relations. Asked whether there had been any discussions about a possible union of Macedonia and Serbia, Gligorov replied that it was not at all a subject of the discussions, that is, that the economic union with Serbia, as well as with the other neighbors, is a must.

Presidential Candidates on NATO, Nuclear Arms

WS0310154295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Debate at the Radio News Agency: Candidates, NATO, and Nuclear Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Kaczynski and Pietrzak were most explicit in supporting Polish entry into NATO. Kuron, Kwasniewski, Markiewicz, Gronkiewicz-Waltz also say "yes," but add: "Do not vex Russia." Korwin-Mikke is skeptical, Lepper is against. Only Kaczynski and Kwasniewski gave clear-cut answers to a question on the deployment of nuclear arms on the territory of Poland.*

Yesterday's debate was the first in a series of biweekly sessions to be held with presidential candidates at the Radio News Agency. Eight of the 18 candidates showed up.

Only Janusz Korwin-Mikke raised his hand when someone asked which of the candidates believe civilian control over the Polish Armed Forces exists. As it turned out, he did so as a joke: "As far as I know, the president is a civilian, and even Mieczyslaw Wachowski [former head of the Presidential Office] is a civilian, so we do have civilian control over the Armed Forces," he said.

None of the candidates gave a straightforward answer to the question of whether they would keep Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, in place once they were elected. Only Lech Kaczynski said: "I hear General Wilecki is considered to be a very good line officer...."

The main questions of the debate were how Poland's security could be guaranteed and whether Poland should consent to the deployment of NATO nuclear arms.

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz: "We should demand NATO membership, but we should not wave our sword at Russia."

She evaded the question on nuclear arms.

Lech Kaczynski: "There is no alternative to the march toward NATO. Poland will not agree to membership in the Russian sphere of influence."

"The idea of deploying nuclear arms in Poland is not optimal, but we should accept it if it were a precondition for NATO membership. This is better than the reformed NATO concept of accepting Poland together with Russia or partial membership."

Janusz Korwin-Mikke: "Taking into consideration the opinion of a state against which NATO is targeted is absurd." Some of the NATO members take Russia's opinions into consideration; thus the candidate is not sure whether all NATO members are responsible and, consequently, whether it is worthwhile to enter any agreements with them.

The candidate did not answer the question on nuclear arms.

Jacek Kuron: "Generally speaking, we should go toward NATO. This is a top priority of Polish politics. Under no circumstances, however, should we join NATO by way of taking part in an anti-Russian pact. NATO needs us more than we need NATO."

"The West is not expecting us to deploy nuclear arms in Poland. If it were a necessary condition, we would have to consider it seriously."

Aleksander Kwasniewski: "Our security must be based on NATO. It is naive to think a new security structure can be established. It is very important that the European security system is not targeted against Russia. Democratic trends in Russia have to be supported."

"If signing the NATO membership agreement requires the deployment of nuclear arms, we will have to agree."

Andrzej Lepper: "No illusions, Poland will not enter NATO. NATO needs us so it can sell us its demobilized weaponry."

The candidate did not answer the question on nuclear arms.

Marek Markiewicz: "Naturally, NATO is a top priority. The myth that our entry into NATO will deepen Russia's isolation has to be destroyed."

"The fact that the media have currently picked up the issue of nuclear arms proves that the political elites were ineffective in pointing out all of the consequences of our joining NATO."

Jan Pietrzak: "If the opportunity of tearing Poland away from the East appears, we must take it. We must enter NATO to have strong armed forces."

The candidate did not answer the question on nuclear arms.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the Union of Real Politics was the only one to respect the time limit for each answer. The least disciplined were Jacek Kuron and Marek Markiewicz. Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz arrived late.

Gronkiewicz-Waltz Interviewed on Platform

WS0410110095 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 29 Sep 95 pp 1, 10-11

[Interview with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the National Bank of Poland and a candidate for president, by Anna Poppek and Jerzy Klosinski; place and date not given: "I Will Not Be Another Walesa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You are right behind Kwasniewski in preelection popularity rankings. Statistics show that both you and he will be supported primarily by young people, under 29 years old. How are you going to "buy" this electorate?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am not going to "buy" anyone. I will conduct my campaign honestly, without promising the people the moon. I do want, however, to explain which reforms should be implemented in Poland to provide assistance to all citizens. I will say openly that I am counting on young people for support. Recently, for example, I have spoke with representatives of the Independent Association of University Students. On behalf of their organization, they committed themselves to supporting me in the elections.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Young people, who are often frustrated by unemployment and by the uncertain situation on the labor market, hear promises from Kwasniewski that he will guarantee them an easy start in professional life, higher wages, etc. What are you going to propose to attract some of this electorate?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Kwasniewski's declarations are quite general. The leader of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has not specified what goal he wants to achieve. Now, to many people my slogans are not only equally attractive, but also realistic and concrete.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] The charge that many people are leveling at you is that your platform is vague and lacks specifics, which might make it possible for you to back out from many promises if you won the election. As a result, as far as the number of unkept promises is concerned, you might become a female Walesa.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I will never be another Walesa. One of the reasons for this is that, despite criticism, my platform is very clear. In this regard I am head and shoulders above the other candidates. It boils down to three basic points: curbing the price increase, decreasing the taxes plus a reform of the pension system and mass enfranchisement, and, finally, continuing the self-governmental reform, whose main element would be giving more powers to self-governments. This part of my program will be discussed in greater detail in a special leaflet. Let me add that it has been worked out not as an empty promise, but as a realistic plan.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You believe, then, that, in the areas that you have just listed, the activities of the state have so far been inefficient?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It will not be possible to squeeze anything more out of the budget as it looks now. If someone says otherwise, he simply tells a lie. Despite a certain economic growth, we are facing the halting of transformations. The fiscal policy is becoming increasingly aggressive. The state is striving to accumulate financial reserves by raising taxes and lifting tax breaks. Thus, reforms are indispensable, such as, for example, a pension reform that, after all, does not concern only the people who receive these benefits. It also involves employers and employees, including those in the public sector, as well as university students and teachers, who complain that the education sector is financially neglected. Right now they cannot count on additional money because 20 percent of next year's budget will be burdened by pension rises. Thus, a reform in this area is indispensable; a competitive pension fund should be set up that would break the monopoly of the state, and, as a result, these funds would make money to maintain themselves. Switzerland, for instance, set up a social insurance system a few dozen years ago that was based on employee participation: Employees sit on the Supervisory Board along with representatives of employers and see to it that money makes money. In our country, the budget will continue to provide money for the "old" senior citizens for some time. In recent years, none of the governments, even the solidarity ones, have decided to begin a reform in this area.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What proves the impreciseness of your platform is the fact that your candidacy has been approved by circles that differ from each other quite a lot, such as trade unionists and entrepreneurs.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I have become familiar with the platforms of such clear-cut candidates as Kwasniewski and Olszewski. The former presents some vague and conflicting views on Poland's integration with NATO and fails to explain what the reforms he is promising will involve. Olszewski's platform is very vague as well. Compared to them, my platform looks like a detailed plan.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] If you win the election, how are you going to implement the main points of your platform? Because you are perceived as a supporter of the right wing, you probably realize that your legislative initiatives may be consistently torpedoed by the present parliament.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am going to act without extending the law because this is detrimental to the state. Of course, it would be best if I could count on a parliamentary majority for support. I think that I will have this support after the next election, in a year and a half at the most, because I believe that we will win that election. In addition, there are legal methods of dissolving the parliament, such as a nonconstructive vote of no-confidence and earlier elections. Such as the breakup of the coalition.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] In one of your latest interviews, you admitted that you were counting on the coalition of the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] to break up and on the peasants to endorse your candidacy in the election.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Indeed, we have already held initial talks. It was, to be sure, before the party submitted Pawlak's candidacy. However, if Kwasniewski and I are elected to the second round, it is very likely that the PSL will decide to endorse me.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What if you fail to find a parliamentary ally and you have nothing more than the right of legislative initiative, which will be ignored by the coalition that is operating well? The coalition may be slightly changed, but it will always be a coalition against you.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Then I will consistently point out that it is not doing anything. This will be enough to attract a considerable part of the Solidarity center right and to unite it in the next parliamentary elections.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Currently, however, Gronkiewicz-Waltz is a very controversial person in the right wing. Some politicians claim that your candidacy has led to the breakup of the independence-patriotic camp. How, then, are you going to unite it?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I believe that these opinions are not very widespread. I am certainly criticized by the camp that supports the candidacy of [former] Prime Minister Olszewski; only from this direction do I see attacks on me. However, most of the groupings of the former St. Catherine's Covenant support my candidacy. At this point, it is worth recalling the gesture made by Professor Strzembosz, who has backed out of the race and backed me.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] However, one cannot underestimate the animosity of the center right supporting Jan Olszewski. Are there any chances for talks, negotiations, or is this impossible?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] There is a certain openness on my part; however, I will not conceal the fact that the experience I acquired at the times of the [St. Catherine's] Covenant were not very pleasant. If I am accused of keeping *nomenklatura* officials in banks or of making changes in the banking system too slowly, then I have the right to ask, for example, who appointed Mr. Modzelewski to the post of deputy finance minister. I have never made such unwise personnel decisions. I believe that it is a good thing that the offices of bank presidents are increasingly often assumed by professionals, linked neither to the Polish United Workers Party nor to Solidarity.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Still, it is not only Olszewski who says you have not done much to change cadres in banks. Do you think this low efficiency in the area of personnel policies, regarding primarily the severing of the ties of the former Polish People's Republic apparatus, will not recur if you become president? Then you will have to deal with ties at an even higher level. Will you be able to oppose them?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] In banks, which are under the finance minister, one might sporadically find people of the classical *nomenklatura*, people who were bank presidents or board members. Indeed, sometimes one might even find a branch office director who held such functions before. However, it is false to say that no personnel changes have been made during my term of office.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] But we are talking about Poland, not about banks. In interviews you often declare that you are in favor of file-checking—that is, clearing the state structures of people of the former system.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Replacement of cadres is possible, but it should be carried out on the principle of professionalism; for example, posts should be given to graduates of the Civil Administration School, and the process of constant fluctuation of cadres should be controlled.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] However, how do you intend to carry out the file-checking process from the legal point of view?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I agree that we need an appropriate law because everyone, including Prime Minister Olszewski, has so far been proposing an informal file-checking. This is an obvious misunderstanding that could easily turn into some kind of witch hunt. On the one hand, such a law should clearly specify who was or is a secret collaborator, whereas, on the other hand, it should establish institutions of appeal. This is because everyone must have the right to defend himself and verify whether a given document really bears his signature. After all, we know that there was a time when Stakhanovites included on those lists people who did not know anything about this! I believe that file-checking should also include the Office of State Protection. The heads of all institutions should have the possibility of checking their employees' records—particularly the records of those who hold high offices. In addition, secret collaborators should not be offered high posts, with the exception of special cases, such as arms-industry plants. This law would also call such people to account for their activities, as well as offer them a chance to defend themselves.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] We gather that you would launch such a legislative initiative?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I certainly would, but we would have to work some more on the details.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] This law would alter a certain agreement that came into force in Poland after the "roundtable." Would you really like to change this status quo, agreed upon in Magdalenka, whose guarantor is Walesa on the one hand and the SLD and part of the Freedom Union on the other?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I did not take part either in the "roundtable" talks or in the "Night Shift." I do not accept this configuration.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Do you think it does not exist?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Frankly, I do not know. Lech Kaczyski claims that there was no [meeting at] Magdalenka. When I watched Jecek Kurski's film, I got the impression that this accord was valid even in 1992. However, I have no proof to back this up. Therefore, I would not really like to plan a radical battle with a group that may not exist. Aside from that, I believe that over the past six years a lot has changed in Poland, an entire new set of characters has entered the political scene. As a professional, I will stimulate this process of change. I will provide conditions for a normal life, I will choose the future.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] And you will not call the people of the former system to account for their activities?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I will call those whose offenses can be proved, such as Humer and Judge Nurowska.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] In 1992, when you assumed the office of the NBP [National Bank of Poland] head, you promised to clarify such big affairs as Art-B?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It was the president, not I, who spoke about "leaving only socks" on offenders.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] We can quote one of the statements you made at that time.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I did what I could. It was thanks to my efforts that a lawsuit against Bagsik and Gasiorowski could be instituted in Israel. There would have been no lawsuit if I had not granted guarantees for nearly $4 million. Now decisions will be made by the Israeli court of law and the Polish prosecutor's office.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Let us return to the problem of appointing new people to offices in the state structure. Who are you counting on to support you in the implementation of this process? Lech Falandysz used to speak about "the bank president's team of knights," made up of such people as Suchocka, Bielecki, Olechowski, Religa, and Rokita. Will the circles linked to those people work with you as your indirect staff?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Lech Falandysz said this without really meaning it. I could accept only some of these people. I am counting, however, on the Self-Governmental League, which is supporting me. It consists of people who are operating in the state-citizen or self-government-citizen relations and who know how to take advantage of those relations.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] However, you are now talking about lower level structures. Whom would you appoint to high offices in your entourage, in the President's Chancellery, for example?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The Chancellery should be politically neutral. However, as president I must have my own loyal people. Competent people designated by parties that are supporting me should certainly work in my chancellery.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What about Solidarity?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It has not really decided whom to support yet. [TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What will your relations with Solidarity be if the union does not officially support your candidacy?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I was active on the Solidarity University Commission at the Faculty of Law until 1992. Currently, as an employer, I maintain contacts with two trade unions active within the NBP. I have thus become acquainted with two different standpoints. I do not understand all those who are attacking the trade unions—for example, Korwin-Mikke. Trade unions are, after all, an accomplishment of the 19th and 20th centuries, a natural political subject the world over, playing a more or less important role. I would like to resort to Solidarity's power in administering the state in the future, to cooperate with the union as president. That is why I will do everything to win the support of the union to some extent, although it is rather difficult, and I think it will bear fruit only a few years from now.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You must admit, however, that Solidarity is not a typical trade union, which is due to its tradition and current activities: It is the only grouping to have developed drafts of such laws as the Constitution, mass enfranchisement, and social security. It also has a very dynamic regional structure and is widely represented in all of the industrial branches. Having such a potential to offer it will not lend support to a candidate who refuses to issue a declaration. Would you be prepared to enter such an agreement with Solidarity?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Everything depends on the provisions of that agreement.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Let us assume you had to promise to support Solidarity's legal initiatives, the Constitution included, and present their drafts to parliament.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] If the agreement pertains to the basic provisions of those drafts, I will be able to sign it.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You are probably acquainted with the draft project on mass enfranchisement developed by Solidarity under the supervision of Professor Adam Biela. Your earlier statements indicate that coupon enfranchisement as it was carried out in the Czech Republic is somewhat different from the Solidarity solutions.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] There are no major differences. My experts have ongoing contacts with Solidarity representatives. The trade union, however, has not developed the details. For the time being, we are debating basic questions.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] But Solidarity has already specified the principles, stating, for example, that mass enfranchisement is to include not only state-owned companies but also banks, real property, land, apartments. Do you agree with such a broad definition of the enfranchisement property?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] As far as apartments are concerned, it should be considered whether property that has been granted to the self-governments can be taken away. As for banks, I do not see any major problems.

I wish to repeat that I generally agree with Solidarity's solutions, but the details must be worked out. Perhaps the enfranchisement project could be combined with the draft law on social security? My experts are currently working on such a concept.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Will you take any steps to prevent the passing of the draft constitution prepared by the National Assembly, which does not comply with our national tradition and fails to serve the interests of the majority of our citizens?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I hope it will be rejected in the referendum. I will be able to veto it legally if the referendum is not held.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Which provisions of this draft do you most strongly disapprove of?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The lack of regulations of the relationship between the state and the church. The lack of a paragraph on the protection of life from conception to death. There is also no provision defining the fundamental principles of tradition, culture, and faith.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Do you agree it is absolutely necessary to establish the institution of the state treasury? [as published]

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am open to the idea, although I do claim that the institution as such will not shield social funds against corruption.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] To what extent do you approve of the current scope of real presidential prerogatives? Will you continue to wield power over the so-called presidential ministries?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The Solidarity draft provides for the elimination of such power, and I am willing to accept that. I think such a solution will generate less conflicts. I do believe, however, that the scope of presidential powers could be extended so as to allow for limiting the activities of the government—for example, to deprive it of the right to veto legislative initiatives or to dissolve the parliament under specific circumstances. I wish to add that, naturally, I am against the projects of widening presidential powers as suggested by the Confederation for an Independent Poland. I do not want to be a "super president."

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Let us go on to the most important issues, to the Polish raison d'etre. Do you think our sovereignty is threatened? The question is particularly sensitive now, after the recent threats issued by Yeltsin and the Russian Duma.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I believe such a threat does exist. There is no need to panic, however. Fear only causes an unnecessary "clanging of the sword." We must consistently strive to enter NATO.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] How would you react to those threats today if you were president?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I would not issue any outright statements. NATO has already done so. At most, just like President Walesa, I would state that we are a sovereign state and decide for ourselves what bloc or organization to join.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What would you do in the face of an imminent threat to our sovereignty?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I would call an assembly of the National Defense Committee. Such decisions should be made collectively.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Are you not afraid that Russia may dominate our region anew, that a CEMA-II might emerge?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I think such concepts are developing in Russia, particularly because the reforms there are not proceeding swiftly enough. We must, however, remain cold-blooded. I managed this in the face of numerous panic attacks in the banking sector that were very severe, and I am capable of coping in difficult times.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What will you do to accelerate our entry into NATO?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] First of all we must be credible. We should not manifest any civilian attempts at curbing control over the Armed Forces. We must naturally and gradually withdraw the old cadres, training new ones appropriately.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] As president and a person affiliated with Solidarity, would you react to the retributions against unionists in Belarus?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] At this stage, this rather rests with Solidarity itself. If outright crimes were committed, I would naturally issue an adequate statement.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] From what you say it seems you would rather opt for a balance between East and West.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Not exactly; joining NATO implies membership in a specific military bloc.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] A continuation of Walesa's policy?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The president came up with the concept of NATO-II. I find it completely alien.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Will you attempt to replace [przetwierzyc] some of the Polish diplomatic cadres?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I will do everything I can. I have proof of my skills: When I sent Bielecki to London charges were brought against me that he was a man "from my camp." I was even questioned by the Sejm. It turned out, however, that he was excellent at representing our interests.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Will you dismiss Ambassador [to Russia] Ciosek?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] He has been in Moscow for five years. I thus think the time of his diplomatic rotation has come.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Does that mean you would transfer him to a different diplomatic post?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] No, I did not say that.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Do you have any concept for ratifying the Concordat?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] There is no other way but to change the constitution of the parliament. The current one will never ratify it.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Which of the Polish presidents, starting with Gabriel Narutowicz, do you most identify with? Which one of them would you consider an example throughout your term?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Poland has not had much luck with presidents. Maybe President Wojciechowski, although he was not a very strong personality. Perhaps Moscicki, even though he did turn out to be a figurehead. There is no model. Our history should have a president with enough stamina and charisma to bring the transformations initiated in 1989 to an end. If Kwasniewski wins, history textbooks will say that the past five years were a meaningless episode.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Do you thus intend to become the first Polish "iron" president?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Yes.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] One last question: Where will you get the means to finance your presidential campaign?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Those will be the means of the political parties that support me.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] In a recent interview, you stated that your campaign would be financed by businessmen.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Possibly, once my candidature is officially registered. Polls carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center show me to occupy second position on lists of popularity among businessmen—behind Kwasniewski. If it thus turns out that I have gathered 100,000 signatures of support, they might decide to invest in me.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] This support is very surprising considering you declare yourself to be a staunch rightist candidate. Frankly speaking, rightist multimillionaires are very scarce.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I believe that I am supported primarily by people from beyond any camps. As NBP president, I have introduced a stability of sorts; therefore they can trust that I will guarantee social tranquility in Poland as well.

Reaction to Report on Polish-Russian Relations

WS0310151595 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Anna Kacperska and "SAR": "Concern for Russia or for Poland?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Longin] *Pastusiak refuses to reveal the name of the author of the text on Polish-Russian relations. "He is an expert on the topic, but I do not know him. I do not know his views. He is not a member of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. He travels to Russia quite often, he trades, he is a businessman," says an SLD deputy. "[Polish Ambassador to Moscow] Ciosek is the author of the letter," claims Kuron. Ciosek denies it.* [passage omitted]

Pastusiak stated that "this was an ordinary letter from a voter." He added that he does not identify with the opinions voiced in the letter. "This is not an SLD letter! Let us not add fuel to the fire," he appealed and went on to explain: "I thought it was interesting enough to present to my colleagues. We receive many similar letters, often controversial, and we follow the very good practice of sharing them if they refer to general issues."

He explained captioning the letter as "confidential": "It was intended for the deputies and should not have gone beyond their circle, to the embassies."

SLD Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski concluded: "Confidential my foot. How can anything circulated in 200 copies be confidential?"

Pastusiak fiercely attacked GAZETA WYBORCZA for a commentary in which fears were expressed that the SLD might be implementing a double policy: one open, for the benefit of the West; the second confidential, carried out by "the old comrades." Pastusiak called this "journalistic gangsterism." "I will say for the thousandth time that the SLD does not have a double policy—only one. The strategic objective is full integration with euro-atlantic structures, the EU, the Western European Union, and NATO."

The deputy chairman of the SLD club, just like the author of the letter, believes that the current dialogue with Russia is not satisfactory. "It is carried out at the level of ministerial departments, and it should be higher. Chancellors, prime ministers from the world over go to Russia. Dialogue between Russia and the West is taking place above our heads, and those who are absent are never right."

SLD Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski did not take a stand on the anonymous report. He said he has not had time to read it yet. "What? You did not even look at it?" asked Pastusiak, disappointed.

Aleksander Kwasniewski dismissed the letter as insignificant. "My views are completely different from the author's. This also goes for the SLD and Pastusiak."

Pastusiak advised checking whether other members of the [Sejm] Foreign Affairs Commission received copies of the letter. ZYCIE WARSZAWY asked Bronislaw Geremek (Freedom Union—UW), chairman of the Commission, this question. "I have received nothing of the sort. If I had, I would have answered, telling the author that his reasoning is wrong and harmful to Poland. Of course, I would not publicize such a letter so widely. Whenever I receive a letter that deserves to go into the wastebasket, I always throw it in the wastebasket instead of passing it on."

Geremek claims that, if the deputy chairman of the club passed the letter on to his colleagues, he must consider it important. "This is a disturbing political fact, especially because the document reveals a longing for servility to Moscow reminiscent of the time of the Polish People's Republic. The UW chairman claims that this could mean that the club's words do not match its actions."

He is outraged over the reference to Katyn: "What can you think of someone who writes that the Katyn issue was excessively publicized? That sentence is simply ignoble."

Another opposition deputy who asked to remain anonymous told us that anyone who signs his name to an anonymous letter and passes it on takes full responsibility for the views it contains and, in fact, shares them. "Maybe he wrote it himself," the deputy quipped.

At a meeting held in Krakow last night, Kuron said that the anonymous author of the letter is Stanislaw Ciosek, the Polish ambassador to Russia.

Talking to ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Ciosek staunchly denied it. "I feel very disappointed that Mr. Kuron, whom I have known and respected for a long time, said that."

Large Military, Defense Budget Criticized

95EP0156A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish 18 Jun 95 No 25, pp 11-13

[Article by Krystyna Bartkowiak under the rubric "The Armament Industry": "An Army Without Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Early this year, the Sejm acknowledged in a special law that before the end of 1997 the budget of the Ministry of National Defense should reach the level of 3 percent of the GDP. In the last five years, the state has allocated between 2.2 and 2.5 percent of the GDP for defense purposes. In real terms, since 1986 the army has been spending less and less money for procurement; in some years, such expenditures fell by as much as a dozen or so percentage points. This trend which is unfavorable from the defense point of view will most likely be curtailed this year. In comparable prices, this year's budget will be only 1 percent smaller than last year's and will amount to about 65 trillion old zlotys. However, this does not mean that the process of degradation in the armed forces will be curtailed. In the early 21st century, the Polish army is most likely to be relatively weaker still than it is now. However, the cause of this should be sought not only in the limited economic potential of the state but also in an irrational defense policy which takes no account of such potential.

As recently as 1989, when the Warsaw Pact existed, the Polish army numbered about 412,000 soldiers. Limits on conventional forces in Europe set in Vienna ordain that Poland may maintain ground forces and the air force with a strength of no more than 234,000 soldiers. The Vienna level has now been achieved in the main after five years of cuts and a reduction in the duration of basic military service to 1.5 years. However, in the opinion of many strategists, economists, and politicians, including [former] Deputy Minister of Defense Jerzy Milewski, the Polish armed forces are still too large, 40,000 to 60,000 soldiers too large.

The army will spend about 20 percent of its 65-trillion budget for this year for social security, primarily retirement benefits and annuities. Wages, meals, maintenance of military facilities, etc., will absorb as much as 40 trillion zlotys. Therefore, these will be outlays which do not directly influence the defense capability of the state. Seven trillion zlotys will remain for training, exercises, etc., and only 5.8 trillion zlotys—for the procurement of new equipment, investment, and developmental research, i.e. the things on which the modern character of the army hinges. The larger the army the more personnel expenditures absorb.

In December 1991, the National Security Bureau developed the concept for a new organization of the armed forces which made it possible to reduce the strength of the army to between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers without impairing the defense capability of the country. The draft assumed substantial cutbacks in the bureaucratic superstructure of the army and the elimination of inefficient structures combined with a simultaneous increase in the strength of line units. However, it ran into crushing criticism of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces which has been pushing for a draft of an army 250,000 strong (including the Navy). Meanwhile, according to demographic projections, and factoring in a reduction in the length of basic military service to one year and a 50-percent share of career personnel in the army, Poland will realistically be able to assign no more than 220,000 individuals to defend itself after the year 2000. Therefore, it is plainly wasteful to cling tooth and nail to the Vienna limits now, in a period of relatively small external threats.

In the opinion of [Deputy] Minister Milewski, the obstinacy of some generals and politicians who measure the status of the country's defense primarily by the number of soldiers, brings about a profound degradation of the Polish defense system. There is no opportunity to fundamentally modernize weaponry and improve the quality of training. For several years now, the army has been systematically discharging insufficiently trained soldiers to the reserves early because of financial difficulties. The weapons in service with the army are still obsolete and depreciated to a considerable degree. Out of 2,200 tanks, the quite modern T-72 vehicles (which, however, are not on par with the best) account for just somewhat over 30 percent. More than 40 percent of Polish tanks have exceeded the so-called target norm by more than one-half, and about 5 percent have already achieved it. After adjustment to the quota set in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe-1 we will be left with about 780 T-72 tanks; the rest consists of the obsolete T-55M and T-55 which are being replaced slowly, at the rate of several dozen vehicles a year, with the quite modern Twardy's made in Labedy. About 45 percent of the armored fighting vehicles have exceeded their service life set at 25 to 30 years by more than one-half. Even after the number of fighting vehicles is reduced to the Vienna limits, almost 30 percent of the obsolete so-called SKOT's will remain anyway. The ratios are still worse for other categories of armaments. For example, only about 30 percent of our artillery systems are modern, only 11 percent of antitank systems, and 30 percent of air defense systems. Modern planes accounts for 15 percent, and helicopters—for 10 percent. The army has only negligible quantities of adequately modern communications, radio, and electronic reconnaissance gear. For example, about 70-96 percent of radar and communications equipment, 85 percent of air defense missiles, 82 percent of towed artillery, 50 percent of tanks and motor vehicles, 60 percent of combat planes, and all military transport aircraft are already past the midpoint of their service life. The Navy is weak and hardly modern.

Given the current system of funding the army, five to seven years from now we will be left, for example, with only about 30 combat helicopters (30 percent of the Vienna quota), 1,230 tanks (70 percent of the quota), and 1,600 fighting vehicles (74 percent of the quota).

This year, the army will buy from the domestic industry materiel and equipment worth about 3.7 trillion zlotys. This does not ensure either the full profitability of most enterprises manufacturing products for the army or arresting the degradation of the army. Military planners believe that only the doubling of the procurement budget over 10 to 15 years can curtail the decay of the army. This kind of money would also let the armament industry get on its feet. Therefore, the solution is very simple but...impossible to implement. Nobody knows where those extra trillions are to be found.

Optimists maintain that, if the national product grows by 5.2 percent annually until 2000 in keeping with the Strategy for Poland, the army will receive the 3 percent of the GDP it wants as early as 1998, in accordance with the desires of the parliament. In an optimistic scenario, the army will have about 77 trillion old zlotys at its disposal as soon as in one or perhaps two years.

The army is not cheap. In 1994 prices, the maintenance of one mechanized infantry division costs about 1.76 trillion zlotys annually. The cost of maintaining career servicemen, soldiers in basic military service, and civilian employees accounts for more than one-third of these outlays. Training a division costs about 346 billion old zlotys, a mechanized infantry battalion 48.4 billion zlotys, and a tank battalion 59.6 billion zlotys.

One hour of movement of the T-72 tank costs about 770,000 old zlotys. One kilometer of movement of the T-55AM tank on training grounds costs 400,000 old zlotys, of the BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicle 318,000 zlotys, of the Gozdzik self-propelled howitzer 140,000 zlotys, of the BRDM-2 fighting vehicle 30,000 zlotys, and of the SKOT 35,000 zlotys. The air force is incomparably more expensive. One flight hour of the MiG-29 fighter plane costs almost 150 million old zlotys, of the MiG-23 plane 87 million zlotys, and of the SU-22 53 million zlotys. A properly trained pilot should spend a few hundred hours in the air annually; for considerations of economy, Polish pilots make one-third of the flights their NATO colleagues do. One hour of operation of a missile destroyer costs about 100 million old zlotys, and that of a submarine 10 million zlotys. The above costs do not include the depreciation of materiel.

To appreciate the scale of needs of the army, it would suffice to grasp that, for example, the annual maintenance cost of just one T-72 tank which includes servicing, repairs, and upkeep comes to about 713 million old zlotys (a battalion has 31 such tanks); for an infantry fighting vehicle (31 in a battalion) the cost comes to 241 million zlotyss. The maintenance of the Gozdzik self-propelled howitzer costs 69 million old zlotys. The army pays almost as much annually to maintain each cross-country truck in working order. The operation of missile weapons is very expensive: The Kuna missile launcher costs 74 million old zlotys a year; the BM-21 launcher 33 million old zlotys, the KUB launcher 950 million old zlotys, and the Malyutka antitank guided missile launcher 143 million zlotys. The operation of each assault rifle claims 200,000 old zlotys (there are certainly as many of those as there are soldiers in basic service, i.e. 150,000, not counting reserve stocks).

In addition, the army shoulders the tremendous expense of maintaining real estate which goes into trillions of old zlotys. On the average, this costs just one division about 95 billion old zlotys. The army also contributes to the maintenance of so-called production capacity of enterprises for the period of endangerment and war. This year, it will cost about 126 billion old zlotys.

Despite a fight against military bureaucracy which was announced long ago, this bureaucracy still absorbs a considerable proportion of the defense budget. It is estimated that about 260 billion old zlotys will be spent to maintain the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense alone this year. For example, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces employs about 1,300 personnel, primarily generals and senior officers. About 8,500,000 [as published] soldiers and officers serve in the MON [Ministry of National Defense] Group of Support Units which performs service functions.

Upon subtracting other outlays, for example, on health care in the military and on military academies, it turns out that less than 6.2 trillion old zlotys remains for the acquisition of materiel, investment, and research and development. This provides for purchasing only single copies of weapons that are critical to the defense system. This year, domestic industry will most likely receive orders for only three I-22 Iryda combat trainer planes produced in Mielec, 15 PZL-130 Orlik advanced trainer planes produced in Warsaw, seven W-3 Sokol helicopters produced in Swidnik, between 20 and 30 PT-

91 Twardy tanks produced in Labedy (at 35-40 billion old zlotys per copy), 30 GROM-1 missile artillery launchers produced in Skarzysko (between 300 and 400 million zlotys per set), nine ZUR-23-2S air defense systems produced in Tarnow (2.5 to 3 billion old zlotys per set), and one type 660 guided missile vessel. The army will most likely purchase several NUR radar stations manufactured by Radwar in Warsaw; they cost a few dozen billion old zlotys each. In addition to considerable quantities of spare parts for weapons of mostly Russian make, we will purchase abroad, for example, 18 modern Carl Gustaw bazookas in Sweden and a German set of submarine storage batteries.

Except for most of the quite good assault rifles made in Radom, the army must replace virtually all elements of the soldiers' gear. Uniforms, belts, boots, headgear, jackets, and so on are being replaced. An overwhelming majority of soldiers use steel helmets which already are an anachronism in modern armies and gas masks of obsolete designs. Just one helmet made of composite materials means expenditures on the order of 3 million zlotys. A state-of-the-art gas mask produced in Konieczki costs about as much. About 1.5 trillion old zlotys should be found in order to issue these accessories solely to soldiers "carrying guns," without taking reserves into account.

Gas masks, uniforms, and helmets are merely the so-called marginal needs of the army. The supply of modern armored fighting vehicles, antitank missiles, fighter and ground attack planes, helicopters, etc. is a much more important matter. At present, a tender is underway with regard to the purchase of wheeled armored fighting vehicles. Mowag of Switzerland offering vehicles of the Piranha 8x8 type and the French Panhard have the greatest chance of winning. Steyer of Austria which manufactures the Pandur vehicles is also in contention. The finalization of this contract will certainly be the transaction of the century, also on a European scale. Within a short period of time, Poland will need a few hundred new combat vehicles; one vehicle costs at least $150,000. The company to come out on top in the competition will most likely have to produce the vehicles jointly with one of the Polish armament enterprises. This has given rise to hopes at a few plants threatened by closures, primarily at the Stalowa Huta Steel Mill which manufactures very fortuitous vehicles of the MTLB design and at the STAR in Starachowice. The Sobieslaw Zasada company is also interested in the latter option.

The rivalry is even greater in securing a contract to deliver modern antitank missiles, or perhaps produce them in Poland. The army needs between a few thousand and a dozen or so thousand such weapons systems; one system costs between $25,000 and $100,000. Bofors of Sweden which offered the very effective Bill missile came the closest to success. The Swedes were interested in cooperation with Mesko in Skarzysko which produces very good GROM air defense missiles. The situation got to be complicated when the French Aerospatiale joined in the competition offering the Milan missiles praised all over the world. Rafael of Israel also offered to cooperate with Polish industry in developing a state-of-the-art antitank missile. The Russians offered us their quite modern Mech missile which is inexpensive, to boot. The American producers of the state-of-the-art Hellfire missile are also of interest.

The procurement policy for weapons and other military materiel is pursued in practice by the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces which determines the needs and avenues for research and development efforts. It also sets procurement priorities. The Armed Forces develop procurement and research forecasts 1 to 15 years in advance. Since the beginning of this year, the army is obligated to comply with procedures set forth in the law on public sector orders while making its orders. However, tenders are generally not arranged in the case of domestically manufactured special materiel because in most of them only one counterpart would participate. The same is the case with deliveries of imported spare parts for weapons from the former USSR. The army places orders with three specialized foreign trade establishments: Cenzin, PEZETEL, and the NAT company.

The so-called modernity ratio of the weapons of the Polish army ranges from 5 to 25 percent. In NATO armies, it comes to at least 30-50 percent. In addition, a shortage of parts and consumable materials causes the army to discard the still quite good copies of weapons at an accelerated rate. The mass retirement of a considerable proportion of obsolete and technically depreciated basic weapons and other materiel will begin between 1996 and 2000. Despite somewhat more optimistic projections than those made for years, funds for additional procurement will mostly be lacking. In the absence of a profound and rapid restructuring, the Polish army will become...considerably weaker than it is at present. However, the issue of restructuring the army is a topic far transcending the framework of this article. We will revisit it soon.

National Defense Expenditures in 1995 Against the Background of Expenditures for Other Sectors of Collective Consumption

Item	Draft 1995 State Budget	
	Amount* in Old Zlotys (Billion Zlotys)	As a Percentage of the GDP
Expenditures of the state budget	911,451	34.6
—National defense	51,603	2.0
—Science	14,280	0.5
—Education and child rearing	93,293	3.5
—College education	21,066	0.8
—Culture and art	6,591	0.3
—Health care	123,413	4.7
—Social welfare	59,480	2.3
—State administration	27,708	1.1
—Administration of justice and the procuracy	15,498	0.6
—Public security	32,447	1.2
—Social security	201,571	7.7

* Included in individual sectors are funds from the special-purpose reserves of the state budget (among others, for raising wages and derived payments)

Comparative Analysis of the Levels of 1993 Defense Budgets in Selected States

States	Total Defense Budget (in Millions of Dollars)	Defense Budget per:		Defense Budget as Percentage of the GDP
		Resident (in Dollars)	Soldier (in Dollars)	
Belgium	2.90	288	46,032	1.31
France	35.80	619	87,402	2.66
Germany	31.80	398	86,578	1.76
Italy	16.50	284	51,195	1.32
Netherlands	7.30	476	102,962	2.22
Spain	6.50	164	31,477	1.12
Great Britain	34.20	588	134,487	3.11
Belarus	0.52	50	5,622	3.25
Bulgaria	0.63	74	6,142	3.04
Czech Republic	0.77	74	8,238	2.94
Hungary	0.70	67	9,426	1.97
Sweden	5.20	592	81,250	2.15

		Defense Budget per:		
Ukraine	3.90	75	7,544	7.20
Poland	2.10	54	7,405	2.35

Data from Military Balance 1993-1994

Drnovsek: Perry Visit 'Strengthened' Links

AU0310174095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Report by Uros Lipuscek]

[FBIS Translated Text] The topic of discussion by the Slovene business association in New York, in which, apart from Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek, the representatives of some 15 Slovene companies also participated, was a strategy of our economic presence in the United States.

Prime Minister Drnovsek said that political and economic cooperation with the United States was of very great strategic importance for Slovenia. Lately, the cooperation with the United States has been developing rapidly, especially in the political sphere. Particularly important in this sense was a recent visit by the U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry to Slovenia, because, the prime minister said, it strengthened our strategic links with the United States. This also warrants a greater economic cooperation. Trade is growing; however, it is burdened by some problems, such as exchange rate fluctuations. The prime minister promised that the country would take care of the formal bases for such cooperation, that is, that it would sign the appropriate bilateral agreements with the United States to facilitate livelier cooperation.

The representatives of the companies were of the opinion that Slovene industry was not sufficiently represented on this, the biggest international market, which among developed countries is still the most open one. Trade is growing, but it faces many problems. The first problem is too heavy a burden placed on the Slovene economy, which is in the opinion of Slovene textile enterprises here 40 percent higher than the burden in other countries, especially Asian ones, which are our main competitors. The second problem is the declining dollar as the costs of production are growing faster than the exchange rate, and the third problem is a high cost of capital. This latter was particularly stressed by the representatives of the furniture industry, which has been present on the U.S. market for over 20 years. Undercapitalization of this sector of industry threatens the collapse of exports on the U.S. market. Some 90 percent of their capital is loaned, which is pushing them to the brink of survival. Their contribution was a real call for help to the country to save them with additional capitalization. Prime Minister Drnovsek was not overtly generous in this sense and he warned them that they must limit such expectations, that is, that they must primarily seek solutions in the business interest, that is, in the interest pooling of capital.

After the talks Prime Minister Drnovsek visited the new premises of the LBS Bank, a branch of Ljubljanska Banka, on the corner of Fifth Avenue and a crystal shop of Rogaska on Madison Avenue. The business premises of the Ljubljanska Banka as well as the shop of Rogaska are also in the opinion of the U.S. partners two best proofs of the increasingly successful breakthrough of the Slovene economy on the U.S. market.

Article Views Spain's Role in Italy Dispute

AU0210144295 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 27 Sep 95 pp 28-29

[Article by Joze Biscak: "No Way Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is true that Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler did not write to the European Parliament, however, he did write to Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana Madariaga, chairman of the ministerial council. Solana probably forwarded the (infamous) letter, dated 7 September, that contained Slovenia's negative stance on the latest initiatives of Italy and the European Union to some European parliamentarians. The letter also came in the hands of the Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli who, at the session of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Representatives of the Italian Parliament on 13 September, announced the freezing of relations with its eastern neighbor.

Slovenia's integration into the European Union will again feature on the agenda of the European 15 on 2 October. They will discuss the associate membership agreement. Because relations with Italy and the European Union have deteriorated over the past two months, we cannot expect the so-called initial signature between Slovenia and the European Union, primarily because of the Italian objections. We would need a miracle to achieve this.

Two wrong moves by Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek and Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler have led Slovene foreign policy down a dead-end street. First, they promised to change the Constitution, although nobody demanded that we do so; second, they opened the negotiating "package" with Italy, thus, separating the issue of the Slovene minority in Italy from the issue of the restitution of the esuli's [refugees'] property. So what actually happened to make Italy and the European Union pose new conditions for Slovenia?

What Was Stefan Cigoj Doing in Rome?

Diplomat Stefan Cigoj, whose candidacy for the ambassador to Italy was withdrawn by the government at the last moment, replaced our plenipotentiary Matjaz Jancar in the talks with Italian Foreign Ministry plenipotentiary De Franchis in Rome on 27 July. They discussed the separation of the esuli and minority issues and the (non)controversial Rome Treaty. Something evidently happened at that meeting that caused Slovenia's dissatisfaction and, at the same time, gave the Italians an idea. The Italians later claimed that the plenipotentiaries had reached a formal agreement. An unofficial source reports that Cigoj and De Franchis discussed a possibility that the return of several hundred houses of the Italian exiles be regulated by an expansion of the Rome Treaty, which would not mean the annulment of the international agreements.

It is interesting that Trieste Mayor Riccardo Illy proposed something similar to President Milan Kucan, according to the Trieste papers. Stefan Cigoj is considered to be the president's man, and, for that reason, his talks with the Italian plenipotentiary came as no surprise. Hence the dissatisfaction in the Slovene Government.

On the basis of the talks of plenipotentiaries in July, Italian Foreign Minister Agnelli evidently proposed to her Spanish colleague Javier Solana that he sends "a compromise" proposal to Slovenia, as the latter was allegedly willing to yield. The Italians must have had sufficiently firm arguments for this request or else the Spaniards, who have always criticized our western neighbors for their intrigues on the European political scene, would not have acted in blind faith.

Spanish Letter to Zoran Thaler

Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, thus, wrote a very polite letter to his colleague, Zoran Thaler, saying that Spain, as the chairman of the European 15, was striving very hard for the signing of an agreement between Slovenia and the European Union. He informed Thaler that Alberto Navarro, director general for European affairs with the Spanish Foreign Ministry, would visit Ljubljana and pointed out to him that, as the EU chairman, Spain has the right to propose a compromise by which all sides involved—Slovenia, the European Union, and Italy—would be satisfied.

Solana proposed two things. First, at the end of a four-year transitional period following the ratification of the association agreement, Slovenia would safeguard the complete freedom of purchase of real estate for EU citizens. Second, Slovenia would amend Article 99 of the proposed law on property and other actual rights, so that those EU citizens who can prove that they have been resident in Slovenia for three years without uninterruption could gain the right to purchase real estate and acquire housing rights.

Solana told his Slovene colleague that, if we agreed to both demands and the signing of a bilateral agreement with Italy, which was supposedly not an absolute necessity, then he saw no reason why the 15 would not take a favorably position toward our state in Brussels.

Slovenia Cornered in Negotiations

Agreeing to such a letter, which evidently has it roots in the unprincipled policy of Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek—after the replacement of Lojze Peterle last year everybody expected a radical change in the foreign policy, however, Drnovsek got it all wrong with Thaler—would (in the present circumstances) mean a catastrophe for Slovenia. Namely, this spring, with the initialing of an agreement, the country on the sunny side of the Alps [Slovenia] pledged to immediately grant the right to purchase real estate to domestic companies owned by foreigners (which is permitted by the prevailing legislation) while branches of foreign enterprises and foreign independent businessmen would be able to purchase the same after a six-year transitional period. In "the compromise" proposal, Solana demanded from Slovenia not only the right to purchase real estate for business activity, but also the possibility that foreigners purchase holiday homes, apartment blocks, in brief, anything in Slovenia that their heart would desire.

This means that they demanded a complete liberalization of the purchase and sale of real estate for EU citizens in four years. In addition to all this, we would sign a bilateral agreement with Italy, which means that Italy would, for the time being, satisfy its appetites if Slovenia were to agree to the proposal on the expansion of the Rome Treaty. As, evidently, neither the first nor the second is going to happen, there will be no signature by the European Union either. The Slovene side, cornered by these new demands, rejected the letter, and, in Alpbach, Dr. Janez Drnovsek criticized the European Union sharply. The European Union informed the Slovene Government at the beginning of September that the country had hurt the chairman, Spain, greatly with its rejection.

Golob Repairing Thaler's and Drnovsek's Mistakes

As there was a threat of a dispute with the EU chairman, especially because Zoran Thaler adamantly rejected a visit by the Spanish ambassador, by which the Spanish were justifiably insulted, State Secretary Ignac Golob visited Spanish State Secretary Carlos Westendorp on 7 September. A formal purpose of the visit was to hand (the ominous) Thaler's letter to Minister Solana, however, in reality, an experienced diplomat of Ignac Golob's class (he is mentioned as a possible candidate for ambassador to Italy) travelled to Spain to iron out a dispute between the countries that was cooked by the imprudent foreign minister and Prime Minister Dr. Drnovsek with his speech in Alpbach.

Although the minutes, signed by Alain Brian Bergant, are worded in very mild language, full of polite niceties from both sides, the talks in question, as it can be heard, were rather "hard." Ignac Golob told the Spanish collocutor that Slovenia's integration into the European Union was a priority task and that "we appreciate the Spanish initiative for a speedier signing of the European agreement," however, our country could not agree to the new requests of Italy and the European Union, because it had "in good faith and honestly, fulfilled all the conditions for the signing of the European associate membership agreement."

Rejected Spanish Initiative

"We are not willing to study a new list of additional conditions, because the mandate for the negotiations has been exhausted and because these were not demanded from other members that have already signed this agreement. It is not normal that new conditions be launched at irregular intervals. We do not wish to pay a colossal price for something that some EU associate members got for free. We simply do not want to pay the price for being treated differently than others. We qualify better for the membership and we have a bitter after-taste because we did not expect this from the democratic Europe. We seek a correct, just, and honest treatment," Golob told Westendorp, and added that Slovenia was surprised by the EU threats that it would treat Slovenia the same as Croatia. The Spaniard got very agitated over this and said that this was never the position of his country.

Ignac Golob replied: "We do not want the Spaniards or anyone else in the European Union to hold the pen in our hand while we write amendments to our real estate legislation," and voiced surprise that the Spanish ambassador had put it so adamantly that Slovenia either accepted Solana's proposal or nothing would come out of the EU associate membership agreement. Golob warned that Spain "rearranged uncritically the formulations hastily put together by the Italian bureaucracy." Westendorp replied to this that the Solana's letter that Thaler had received was not a letter, but only a draft, and was not signed. All this was supposed to be previously coordinated with the Italians. However, a verbal agreement between Slovenia and Italy alone would not be sufficient for Italy, and "we do not wish to report back to the council of ministers that we cannot reach a consensus." Carlos Westendorp also warned Ignac Golob that neither Germany nor France could help us and that it would be perfectly understandable if Spain and the next chairman, Ireland, would not be able to do so either.

Blockade of Slovenia

The Italians, who have long ago convinced their European partners to withdraw the signing of the Slovene association membership agreement until they have finished with the young state at the bilateral level, evidently achieved what they wanted. The European 15 will not risk bad blood with Italy over Slovenia. Since the (non)controversial Aquileia, when Lojze Peterle, despite everything, achieved progress in the negotiations with Italy, the relations between the countries have only deteriorated. The lifting of the Italian veto at the beginning of March was merely a tactical move, only the Slovene foreign minister does not want to admit it yet.

Kacin Withdraws Call To Dismiss Army Commander

AU0310174795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Jelko Kacin in a public statement today replied to an initiative by Prime Minister Drnovsek that he, as the defense minister, should withdraw a proposal for the replacement of the Slovene Army General Staff commander.

Minister Kacin says that an expert decision which he made after a thorough consideration was received by harmful and unnecessary politicizing in the public, although the proposal contained neither personal nor political motives. For that reason, Minister Kacin writes, he acknowledges the initiative of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to attempt to resolve the emerged conflict with his cooperation. In accordance with his legal authorities, the defense minister decided to order the General Staff commander to remove or overcome the causes owing to which the procedure for the replacement had been initiated.

In light of the statement, which we have conveyed in full, we attempted to obtain additional statements by Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and Albin Gutman, commander of the Slovene Army General Staff. However, none of them wished to make any additional statements.

Defense Doctrine, Combat Readiness Viewed

95BA0331A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 5 Aug 95 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Slovenia Will Definitely Not Get Involved in the Hot Situation in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In spite of its small size, the Army is professional and capable of rapid maneuvers.*

The defense doctrine provides that the Slovene Army would have to prevent an aggressor from even entering our air space or territory.

Ljubljana, 4 Aug—The latest exacerbation of the war in Croatia is once again raising the issue of the military threat to Slovenia. With respect to the possible spread of that conflict, the issue of the Slovene defense doctrine and the Army's combat readiness is also being raised. Slovenia intends, in the future as well, to avoid any sort of involvement in the conflicts in the Balkans.

The Slovene Defense Ministry does use radars to monitor what is happening in connection with overflights toward Bosnia and back. It is somewhat less informed about events in the air space above Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, because the location of the radar is not optimal. It is set up in an area that is more appropriate for the possible approach of air targets in the direction of the west than from the direction of the southeast.

The Ljubljana peak where the radar is deployed was already used by the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] to monitor NATO's movements above northern Italy. In the near future Slovenia will reportedly also obtain a long-range radar with which it could better monitor events in the crisis areas.

The ministry is very carefully and precisely monitoring everything that happens both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It prepares daily reports on this and provides them every day to the top officials in the state leadership. So far it has always turned out that the information it has available is very realistic. The Defense Ministry says that it has sufficient grounds to assess the situation in the same way as before.

It sees the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as a center of conflict not just in the coming months, but also for a longer period. The crisis may certainly settle down, but in the short term, as was demonstrated in Croatia, it can always break out again. For the time being it seems that that area should be treated as an area of conflict in the long term.

In connection with this, the Republic of Slovenia's strategic interest will also remain unchanged in the future: Slovenia must not become involved in any of these conflicts, and must do everything possible to avoid any sort of involvement. We must be aware that no one will fight for us, if we do not do it ourselves, and that no one will protect our interests, unless we do it ourselves.

"Of course, the construction of our own defense system is also an integral part of protecting our interests, and for these reasons I have been insisting throughout my term," said Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, among other things, "that we adopt a military defense doctrine as soon as possible, as a clear long-term orientation in developing our defense system. For four years after the formation of its own armed forces, Slovenia was virtually without a doctrine or any realistic threat assessments. In the shadow of political struggles and the 'privatization' of the Army, people forgot about the state's defense readiness, which is not at a satisfactory level."

The weak point is primarily the coastal defense system, and air defense and the development of artillery units also require upgrades. Specifically, strengthening the military defense system requires primarily the development of armored-mechanized brigades, which were also in action this morning in Croatia.

The military defense doctrine is based on the resolution on the concept of national security for the Republic of Slovenia and the facts contributed by specific conditions on the Slovene battlefield, and the experiences contributed by Slovene military history. When we talk about history, it is also necessary to study thoroughly what happened on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia at the time of the conflict with the JNA, and of course all the previous conflicts. The territory of today's Slovene state is obviously much smaller than the territory of the former joint federation, and thus that territory cannot be effectively defended with the same theoretical model.

Whereas previously we could afford to have Territorial Defense, as part of the armed forces, wear out an aggressor over a long period and then force him to abandon the territory upon realizing his error, we can no longer afford this. If we allow a potential aggressor to occupy several kilometers of our territory, then we have thereby given him a good initial negotiating position, so that then there would be endless negotiations for several years before the international public, and we would never manage to get that territory back. The Slovene Army has to react before the beginning, or at the very beginning, of the conflict, and prevent the aggressor from entering our air space or territory, according to the Defense Ministry's view of the defense doctrine.

Our Army's reaction time must therefore be substantially different from before. The decisionmaking mechanisms must be different and more efficient. Also for that reason, we have to be capable of moving units from one part of Slovenia to another in a very short time. We could not afford the kind of forces that would cost us a great deal and would not be manageable because of their bulk.

We have to have a military structure that will allow very rapid intervention and movements in several hours, halting a possible attack or penetration, and immediately counterattacking to stop such aggression at the very start. This is a different theoretical model from the one that was present in our area a while ago, primarily with respect to the military aspects of defense. Things begin earlier in politics, international relations, and conflict prevention. If things went so far that the use of military force would be necessary, then it would be used in a different way.

If we look at the other side of the story, in order to reduce the danger of a conflict to an acceptable level, we have to have armed forces that also really confirm that theoretical model in practice, and make it clear to potential aggressors that the Slovene Army, in spite of its small size, is professional and capable of following such a breakthrough with rapid maneuvers.

Our territory and our resources are so limited that we have to be very efficient in developing the Slovene Army. Otherwise, we will need extremely extensive logistical support for the Army. That is why military defense is linked to civil defense, and that is why we are developing a separate system for protection and rescue, which is assuming specific obligations in this context as well. It is precisely this that the authors of the doctrine view as a special quality of the Slovene defense system.

[Box, p 2]

Military doctrine, by definition, is a comprehensive system of positions adopted regarding the military aspects of defense, which are the basis for the organization, training, and use of the Slovene Army and military defense as a whole. It is intended first of all and primarily for the Slovene Army, Slovene Army officers who must be familiar with it, and at the same time also for all state bodies and individuals who participate in preparing and carrying out military defense. Our military defense, in terms of its structure, is not equivalent to any other military defense.

Federal

Holbrooke: Talks 'Productive and Useful'

LD0310185795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1808 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Oct (TANJUG)—Following five-hours of talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. negotiator for former Yugoslavia, said today that the talks were once more productive and useful.

Holbrooke said that significant results were achieved during the talks in eastern Slavonia. For this reason, the U.S. team will travel to Zagreb this evening to consider the results of the talks between the Serbs from eastern Slavonia and Croatian representatives, which were also attended by U.S. Ambassador [to Croatia] Peter Galbraith and UN envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg, Holbrooke concluded.

Assembly Session Held 'Behind Closed Doors'

AU0410122695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 4 Oct 95

[Report by Zoran Vaskovic from the Federal Assembly—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] A joint session of the Chamber of Citizens and Chamber of Republics has started in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Assembly. Our correspondent Zoran Vaskovic has the details.

[Vaskovic] The session has indeed started, but let me stress right away that it will be held behind closed doors. This decision was made by deputies at the very beginning of the session, some 20 minutes ago. Chairman Radoman Bozovic acquainted deputies with the proposals of several deputy caucuses who wanted the session held behind closed doors. The reason is the sensitive nature of the subject. In a vote, 87 deputies from the Chamber of Citizens supported the proposals, as did 22 deputies from the Chamber of Republics, after which a 10-minute recess was called. We believe that the session has since resumed.

To summarize, the session will be held behind closed doors. Let me remind you that the opening address will be delivered by Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic. A debate will follow.

That would be all from the Federal Assembly; we hope that correspondents will this afternoon get an official statement on the work of both Assembly chambers.

Bogdanovic on Russia's Lifting of Sanctions

LD0310171795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1642 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 3 (TANJUG)—Deputy speaker of the upper house of the Yugoslav Parliament Radmilo Bogdanovic said Tuesday that Russia's unilateral lifting of sanctions would help give an economic impetus to the future development of Yugoslavia.

In talks with a delegation of the Russian Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament) headed by Aleksey Mitrofanov Bogdanovic said that Yugoslavia was in a very difficult economic situation, the information service of the Yugoslav Parliament said.

Yugoslavia has been under international sanctions since May 1992 because of its alleged involvment in the Bosnian civil war. It is also taking care of some 800,000 refugees from the war-torn areas of the former Yugoslavia.

The State Duma adopted a law on the unilateral lifting of anti-Yugoslavia sanctinos, but President Boris Yeltsin refused to sign the act in mid-September.

Article: Industries Ready for Russian Market

95BA0343B Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Aug 95 pp 19-20

[Article by M. Barjaktarevic: "Waiting for a Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Russia's lifting sanctions opens up the possibility of covering the textile industry's requirements for basic raw materials by an average of 50 percent. The Russian market can absorb the entire production of Serbia's footwear industry. The sources from which export production will be financed.*

The announced possibility of Russia's unilateral lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia inspired the need to analyze, at least partially, the significance of this action from the standpoint of forthcoming import and export deals, and the intensification of the almost dead production in the textile and leather-processing industries, especially because the former Yugoslavia, in this economic sector, had extremely valuable business with what is also now the former USSR. Because most of the business was handled, and will be in the future, only this time in foreign trade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Russia, through the specialized foreign trade enterprise Centrotekstil, we asked Vladimir Vuksic, director of the final production division in the Directorate for Leather and Footwear, and Radivoje Stegic, deputy director of the Textiles Directorate, for an interview.

"From Centrotekstil's standpoint, and that also coincides with my personal position, the lifting of the sanctions at the same time will mean a big turn toward Russia, not only as a place for sales, but also the purchase of a wide range of goods. In that context, textiles and leather are in different positions. The Russian market is significant for the textile industry because it opens up promising opportunities for imports of raw materials, while the leather-processing industry sees its interest as exporting footwear. Consequently, although it cannot completely replace other sources, Russia, in principle, is a good raw materials base for our textile industry," Stegic claimed. The first item is wool. Admittedly, its quality is not identical to that of Australian wool, but it can employ 40 percent of the capacity of the spinning and weaving industries, and ensure full employment for factories whose activity is not exclusively the production of fine fabrics, but also, for instance, homespun cloth and carpets. The second big item is natural and synthetic fabrics (polyamide, polyester, and viscous) and raw materials for producing them. In this area, the Russian market can cover as much as 70 percent of our requirements, or between 3,000 and 4,000 metric tons. Finally, there is cotton. It is not the Russians who produce cotton, but rather the former republics of the former USSR: Uzbekistan and Turkestan, which will, however, by no means be any obstacle, in view of the fact that they have maintained mutual economic ties with Russia. The former Yugoslavia obtained 30,000 tons from these sources, and consumed a total of approximately 100,000 tons. Now, the total needs of Serbia and Montenegro amount to 10,000 tons, and Russia is furthermore a producer of semifinished cotton products.

All in all, the Russian market can satisfy at least 50 percent of our requirements for textile raw materials. It is necessary, however, to pay for all these imports somehow, and now, according to Stegic, life itself will make the arrangements, because it is evident that in the Russian market, at least as far as exports are concerned, there is primarily a need for products from the footwear industry. The ratio is 80:20 in favor of footwear, because in textiles, there are actually only four groups of goods that are of interest for exports: women's and men's suits, and upper and lower knitwear.

Changed Market Environment

Vuksic and Stegic nevertheless emphasize that it is an illusion to expect that the lifting of the sanctions will automatically allow us large exports, viewed in terms of the world market, for at least two reasons. The first is the unresolved issue of financing production. Next, textiles are in a slight international crisis; the supply is considerably higher than demand, and the competition is extremely fierce. As far as the Russian market specifically is concerned, however, the fact is that Russia is industrializing at an accelerated pace, and there are very many domestic and foreign investments. Now their production is appearing on the market, and it is no longer projected by plans, but rather by the market, and it is also becoming a strong competitor. In short, according to Stegic, "If we as a country and Centrotekstil as an enterprise succeed in covering those import items through exports of our goods, then we have already done an excellent job, even though one cannot even think about any sort of surplus from the standpoint of the leather industry. In that regard, Russia really is a very promising country. We have to look at that primarily in the context of what can be simultaneously bought and sold in one country, and conclude trade arrangements more simply. Centrotekstil is therefore in an extremely favorable position, because both import and export business is conducted within it. It is enough for us to sell as much as we need to buy. Anything over that is pure profit."

"Ultimately, both imports and exports will depend on the possibility of financing production," Vuksic emphasized. "In a pessimistic variant, if there were no fresh funds, then the results would be very modest, because the volume of essential investments in production is extremely large in comparison with the value of the final products, and much of the material in the leather and footwear industries is mainly derived from foreign exchange purchases. In any case, the source of the financial resources will not be in industry or in the firms like ours. Will it be banks, the state through banks, or international credits (the latter source is very unlikely at this moment, and there are no indications at all along those lines)?" Vuksic is also expressing fear about the fact that the last few years have taken their toll in equipment and technology. "There have been no investments in factories, or in the best case not enough, and so that will have an unfavorable impact upon the facilities' operation. For its part, Centrotekstil is fully staffed, and that is the most essential thing in this business. It also has a headquarters in Moscow and several other offices in Russia's major cities. At the same time, it is working with almost all the factories. Although so far we have not started export deals with private firms, that possibility also exists, because in the meantime several solid enterprises have grown up. Our information is that there are about 15 strong leather and footwear factories in Serbia. On the other hand, as far as the absorption capacity of the Russian market is concerned, it is enormous, and can swallow our entire production without any problem. Nevertheless, we also have to take into account," Vuksic emphasized, "the fact that we will not be the only ones. It is no longer anywhere as easy to work there as it was when we shipped goods through the commodity lists, and one customer took all the goods. Now, on the contrary, everything is much closer to the model of Western Europe than the old Russian system. Consequently, everything will be much more complicated and difficult. Our longstanding tradition as a solid exporter to the Russian market, the climatic conditions, and our experience in producing high-quality and durable winter footwear, which the bulk of our export program will mostly be based on, are in our favor."

Serbia

Milosevic, Russia's Ivanov Discuss Peace Process

LD0410120495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1151 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Oct (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received Igor Ivanov, first deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, in Belgrade today.

Their talks are focused on Russia's possible contribution to the peace process which is at a crucial stage after agreements in Geneva and New York were reached.

Ivanov is to head a Russian delegation at a Contact Group meeting to be held in Rome on Friday.

New DSS Member on Serbian Opposition Weaknesses

95BA0365A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 5-18 Aug 95 pp 17-19

[Interview with Zoran Horvan, former SPO deputy in the Serbian Assembly, now a member of the Democratic Party of Serbia, by Predrag Popovic; place and date not given: "I Was Destructive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Recent transfers prior to this year's trading deadline prove that the process of clearly defining the Yugoslav political scene is still at its beginning. In addition to Radomir Urosevic, Zoran Horvan, former republic deputy of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], also recently joined the ranks of Kostunica's Democrats. Since he left the SPO, Horvan has ended his brief political trip from his own Party of Reason, via the Conservative Party of Reason, in the DSS [Democratic Party of Serbia]. Aside from the conditions of that transfer, it is also interesting to learn what Zoran Horvan's motives might have been in reentering the political contest.*

[Popovic] Why have you once again become actively involved in politics?

[Horvan] I never had a moment's doubt that I would become active in politics again. I do not know whether this is an infection that is hard to get rid of once you enter political waters, but I knew that I would be involved as soon as I saw that relations on our political scene had hardened, especially as far as options and personnel are concerned. Of course, guided by the dictum: "Bitten by a snake, frightened by a lizard," my criteria have become stricter and more demanding. For that matter, the same is true of many others who made emotional determinations at the time when the political parties were being created. In returning to politics, I had to make a rational judgement about who to join, which force I should help, and which force I could realistically expect help from in our common struggle for change. So, I made an analysis, I weighed things, I measured them, and I found that at this point it was the Democratic Party of Serbia.

[Popovic] We will come back to the DSS. Tell me to what extent your decision was motivated by practical matters. It is a fact that political life does make it possible to meet people, there is promotion through the media, and in the end there is money to be made.

[Horvan] Which party is offering money?

[Popovic] Involvement in all the parties offers a direct or indirect possibility of making money.

[Horvan] I agree. However, although it may perhaps sound unconvincing, that is not my motive. What motivated me to come back is the fact that the opposition lacks direction. Its cutting edge has been blunted, and each of us who has any potential must become involved and must not look on passively at what is happening. I am not calculating, but enthusiastic and anxious to see a victory of reality, a triumph of arguments. What that might bring me, we will talk about when it happens. It would be in bad taste and demagogic for me to talk about personal benefits which I would like to obtain by engaging in politics. My motive is much higher and more serious: I want the party to which I belong to think things through and be aggressive in bringing about a change in the atmosphere and the numerical relationship between government and opposition deputies in both parliaments.

"Engaging in Politics Is a Sacrifice"

[Popovic] Have you managed to satisfy any of your lower motives through your political involvement up to now? How much have you gained and how much have you lost through politics?

[Horvan] Political involvement has brought me nothing but loss. Involvement in politics means giving all of yourself, and there is no reckoning the price of that sacrifice. At least that is how I see it. In any case, political involvement today differs greatly from what it was at the beginning of the nineties. Engaging in politics means shaping life for other people. If this is not done with love, from the heart, but by calculation, if you are a political hack rather than a politician, then the result will be what has now been created on our political scene by the opposition and government, equally. People's confidence in politicians must be restored, they have to be shown that the old rule of politicians saying one thing, thinking another, and doing a third does not apply. It is, of course, difficult to adhere to principles which have favorable results for the broad strata of the population, and at the same time guarantee yourself financial benefit, improvement of status, or some other benefit. Under these circumstances, those things are not complementary.

[Popovic] Nevertheless, you have collected all the gifts which politics offers.

[Horvan] What, for example?

[Popovic] For example: You have risen in status. From postmaster in Resnik, you became a people's deputy.

[Horvan] That is true, but also quite logical. Without engaging in politics, it is true that I could not have become a people's deputy. At the same time, I think that in Serbia today there are many postmasters who are more honorable and honest than many deputies.

[Popovic] Along the way, you have started a business.

[Horvan] Engaging in politics did not make it possible for me to start my business. You, a journalist, could also start a business. If you are referring to my real estate agency, it no longer exists. I never thought about whether or not political involvement had a significant effect upon business success. If it does, I cannot boast of having reaped what we might call profit.

[Popovic] What happened to the agency?

[Horvan] I closed it. I have started a wholesale business with a business partner. We leased a store, and we are involved in trade. So far, it is going a bit better than with real estate.

[Popovic] When you opened that real estate agency, I remember remarks to the effect: You see, that is what genes do! The reference was, of course, to your Jewish origin.

[Horvan] If we are to judge by a predisposition toward trade, then the genes in the Serbian people are obviously identical to the genes of Israel. I do not know a single Serb who is today engaged in anything more creative than trade. In opening a real estate agency, I was leaning into a wave which offered great promise. Because, unlike many competitors, I did not do anything outside the law, it is understandable that I failed. I had to acknowledge capitulation. Any blemish in my business life would tomorrow become a blot that would be hard to ever wash out, so I did not dare to, and did not wish to, take a risk. Genes have nothing to do with it. I really have nothing against anyone placing me in some other ethnic category and structure than the one to which I belong—Serbian. If anyone likes that or finds entertainment in it, let him go ahead. I know quite well that I am what we might call a half-breed. My mother is a Serb. I was born in Kraljevo, but I grew up in Belgrade, so that I have certainly kept something in my genes, but I think that in my case it is not very strongly pronounced when it comes to my livelihood.

[Popovic] Even in the Assembly, your political opponents recalled your ethnic origin when they called you a traitor, a political wheeler and dealer.

[Horvan] I understand people who do not have the trump cards they need against those they do not like, so then they try to belittle them by telling them that they are ugly. Which is why I think that it is best and most effective to pass over such things in silence. The answer is contained in belittlement of the provocation itself.

[Popovic] Aside from improvement of status and financial gain, which you deny, politics has also provided you promotion through the media.

[Horvan] When I became involved in all this, I had no idea what role I would be given, nor how I would play it. A combination of various circumstances are involved in the kind of exposure one is given. My popularity, along with many other more important things, is provisional. I am not some conceited popular music star who wants people to recognize him on the street. I still have the patience to stop and listen to all those who stop me and recite their problems. For those simple human reasons I like popularity, but I have behind me a great deal of experience with life, so that there is no room for vanity of that kind. I find it a bit unpleasant to have such a question put to me, because there is a danger of my appeal to modesty being interpreted as outright demagogy. But I have never considered myself any kind of superman. On the contrary, I am only a man who has had occasion to summarize and say what people are thinking as they sit in their own homes. One difference between me and them is that I have had that opportunity, and they have not, which does not mean that they could not do it better than I. That reflection detracts from the values with which politics entices people.

[Popovic] Finally, you have also gained interesting acquaintances. Was Milan Panic a guest at your marriage not so long ago to Mrs. Mirjana Zegarac, which also represents a certain change, you will acknowledge?

[Horvan] Where do you want me to start? With my personal life, or my acquaintance with Milan Panic?

[Popovic] Life is more important than Panic.

[Horvan] Right. As far as the change in my personal life is concerned, I say once again that a man in my position cannot guarantee the truthfulness of his assertions except by what he says, and so I guarantee that those changes have nothing to do with my political involvement. Everything that has happened to me constitutes a set of circumstances which could happen to anyone. What is more, Milan Panic did not attend my wedding. Since he departed for America, we have been in contact by telephone and nothing more than that.

[Popovic] Now that we have analyzed your past experience, political and otherwise, tell me why you decided to join the Democratic Party of Serbia and not some other party?

[Horvan] In analyzing relations on our political scene, I judged that the Democratic Party of Serbia is the only worthwhile choice. I do not want to use big words, but I think that no one can consider himself a patriot or at least a useful member of this society, of this people, if he looks on passively at everything that is happening to us. I could not remain indifferent toward everything I see and experience. I want to talk about my rights and obligations, and I want to fight for them. I want to point out the distorted picture of the Socialist Party, which was created by none other than the opposition. I want to bring that to people's attention.

[Popovic] To what distortion of the picture are you referring?

[Horvan] The impression has been created that the Socialist Party, headed by Milosevic, is extremely strong and stable. I do not find that to be the case. One gets that impression on the basis of the weakness, lack of forethought, and hastiness of the moves made by the opposition. When, on the one hand, you have something that lacks conception, clear purpose, and content, everything else, however trivial it might be, if it has at least a bit of rationale, seems strong, extraintelligent, and untouchable. The opposition has become entangled in the web of its own shortcomings and is unable to extricate itself. Ignorance, vanity, and the greedy desire to share as soon as possible in the pie (power) when there is some question as to whether it will ever even get to the table, along with many other weaknesses, have distorted pictures about the real relations on our political scene. Under those circumstances, it was not difficult for me to single out the Democratic Party of Serbia as the only really stable segment, the only reliable force which knows what it wants. When Mr. Vojislav Kostunica adopted some of my suggestions, I decided once and for all to step back once again into the adventure of political struggle.

Are the People a Consumer Product?

[Popovic] What did you suggest to Kostunica?

[Horvan] I suggested to him that consistency, political maturity, and knowledge should be enriched with more outspoken and aggressive statements. The people have to be snatched out of their lethargy, out of the indifference they have fallen into, by an approach that has more bite to it. The people cannot be deceived with those cheap tricks. Anyone who offers them a real choice, who convinces them of his good intentions and abilities to carry out those intentions, can count on the confidence of the voters. I hope that the team of the Democratic Party of Serbia has that in its character. This party has many reasonable, rational, and intelligent people who know what they want. These are all the reasons why I decided to join the DSS. I think that will be a good decision for both me and the party.

[Popovic] The seriousness, consistency, and other fine characteristics of the DSS were well known even before, but in the election Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party again fared much better. Are you certain that you did not make a mistake in choosing a winning combination?

[Horvan] I did not make a mistake! I am certain that I did not make a mistake. There is a great deal of evidence to back up my confidence. When one looks back, you can clearly see who garnered the cheap political points with various promises, and who really wanted to protect the interests of the voters. Today, it is clear who is the calculator and who—again I use a big word—has more shining goals. Some political parties, which I will not name because you have already done so, spend a great deal of money on the election campaign, but they derive no particular effect. I am deeply convinced that it does not take a great deal of money to achieve a solid success. I am certain that true success will come only to the party that goes to the people constantly, both before and after the election, not just during the campaign. You have to go to the people and give of yourself. You have to go to a town, however large or small, even twice a month, if there is anyone to listen to you and if we have anything to say. We have to prove to people that we are really thinking about them, that we really want to help them. We must not treat the people as a consumer product which has its one-time use value at the time of the election.

[Popovic] The last election was not great for the DSS.

[Horvan] The tranquillity radiated by Vojislav Kostunica did not yield the desired results. If I might put it metaphorically, it takes blood. It takes more strength, persuasiveness, and persistence.

[Popovic] Is that what you told Kostunica?

[Horvan] Yes, I carefully analyzed the way in which the DSS should present itself.

[Popovic] Does he share your view of things?

[Horvan] We arrived at the same conclusion that for that job we need to form a team that will be able to carry out the plan in practice. In the DSS, thank God, there are plenty of people who can join that team. I hope Zoran Djindjic will not reproach me—or, actually, let him reproach me—but aside from him there is not a single person in the Democratic Party who could travel through Serbia and motivate people with greater or lesser persuasiveness. The DSS does have such people. Forgive me my lack of modesty, I know that my speeches, because of the sincerity and arguments with which I speak, have always generated support from those who have heard me. With the motto "We are stronger together," I believe that the DSS team has very good prospects for bringing about many constructive changes on our political scene. I am also aware that there will always be those who will perceive my crossover to this party as a kind of flight, indeed even betrayal. However, I must mention that the DSS was established two-and-one-half years after the Serbian Renewal Movement. Back in that time, when I was an active member of the SPO, the DSS was very close to me. At this point, I am very impressed that the DSS represents the continuity with that which I began to follow long ago and which, unfortunately, was not the aim of those I was with in that party for a long time.

[Popovic] Because you yourself say that the DSS has many quality people, if you are not on the campaign slate, will you leave that party?

[Horvan] I am very glad that you asked me that question. If I am not on the campaign slate, I will remain in the party and use this as proof that what I am doing I am truly doing from my heart, without any calculation. I am a pronounced opponent of players who never come out of the game. I am aware that in the DSS there are many young and able people who can perform the duties of a deputy in a truly quality manner. And I am here to serve the party, and I will attempt to help as much as I can with my experience.

[Popovic] When you were not included on the slate of DEPOS [Serbian Democratic Movement], you demonstratively abandoned the SPO. Why would you behave differently now?

[Horvan] When you look only at the last reaction, when you examine the consequences, but not the causes, you get the wrong impression, and, as we see, that is your case here. The fact that I did not get into the Assembly is not the reason why I left the Serbian Renewal Movement. That was only a drop in the bucket. At that time, I was guided by the motto that the team that is scoring goals should not change. In the situation when the SPO was not very strong in its personnel, and when, nevertheless, there was a group of experienced people, I judged that experiments could cost the party dearly. When the party's leadership nevertheless decided on those exhibitionist experiments, there was nothing left for me to do but what I did. The result, as I see by your words, was disastrous for me. Even you got the impression that a spoiled politician became angry when he did not get candy.

[Popovic] Is that not the case?

[Horvan] When you look at things that way, you are not only wrong, you are committing an injustice resulting from the fact that you have been too quick to forget everything that happened.

[Popovic] What did happen?

[Horvan] Many things happened in my former party which required that we prove ourselves first as men and then also as members of the party. I fanatically gave my entire being to the Serbian Renewal Movement. Without waiting for payback, I left that party in my debt. All I expected was for it to continue to count on me. When the party renounced my services, there was nothing for me to do but to withdraw.

All My Parties

[Popovic] Refresh my memory, tell me which problems led you to leave the SPO?

[Horvan] I think that it is hard for a man to talk about a political party, just as it is hard to talk about a marriage that is breaking up. Things that happen in the house cannot be presented in public with full objectivity, and so it is best not to present them. After a number of occurrences, which I am not going to enumerate here, I no longer felt comfortable in the party which I considered to be my second family. There were situations I did not agree with, but I naively believed that I was in an environment where I could express my disagreement aloud . I expected that my words of warning would be taken as an expression of desire to change things for the better, but that was not the case. Others perceived that as quibbling on my part and as an attack on certain people. When the problem came to a head, I simply left. I expect you to understand why I do not want to talk about that. Finally, the SPO made me a politician, and I am thankful to it for everything I learned there.

[Popovic] Since the break you have not contacted Vuk Draskovic or anyone in the top leadership of the party?

[Horvan] No, never.

[Popovic] Have you contacted Rakitic and his group?

[Horvan] No, I have had no contact with them whatsoever.

[Popovic] Why not? Their views are close to yours.

[Horvan] I am not certain that their views are very close to the views of the DSS. If they were, they would become members of the DSS, they would not create their own party. Again, that does not mean that I do not desire contact with them. The fact that there has been no contact does not mean that I am so vain that I am waiting for them to call me, but would not go myself if I felt the need. The fact that I have remained off to one side, neither in the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] nor in Rakitic's party, does not mean that I considered myself the smartest, and my road the only correct one. I simply was not motivated to approach them. In any case, I feel that separating and dropping out of the group that is the most rational and, most essentially, most consistent, amounts to no more than destruction.

[Popovic] You are thereby acknowledging that you yourself worked to destroy the opposition at one point?

[Horvan] I was destructive in that I did not immediately join the DSS, i.e., I was passive. If passivity is destruction, I accept the criticism.

[Popovic] I was referring not to passivity, but to involvement with the Party of Reason.

[Horvan] I am glad that you reminded me of that. The fact that I did not continue the job of creating that party is evidence that I became aware of the right way to do things. I have been accused of being excessively vain, and I responded in the best way by dissolving the Party of Reason. I acknowledge that was weakening the opposition, and, if you like, destruction. As soon as I realized that, I ceased to be interested in the projects, and the same is true of the project with the Conservative Party. For a time I harbored great ambitions concerning the Party of Reason. Now I have withdrawn. As to the vanity we have spoken about, my attitude on whether I will or will not be a deputy is sufficient indication. In any case, if I enter the Assembly, I will let no opportunity slip by to remind the deputies of the SPS, however many they may be, of what they are doing. I am certain that they include an immense number of people who know that two and two are four. Knowing that, if the interest of the SPS proves to be different, they are ready to raise their hands to say that two and two are five or seven, or however much the party says. That has to be very painful. Although they do this meticulously, it cannot be pleasant for them. That is why we must constantly remind them of that pain. Let them realize that others see it. It is for their own good. We dare not allow them to become accustomed to that painful feeling, to become callous.

New Democracy Leader on Assembly Work, Life

95BA0365B Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 5-18 Aug 95 pp 23-25

[Interview with Nebojsa Lekovic, vice president of New Democracy, by Gordana Jovanovic; place and date not given: "Stopping the Circus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Use your own head—you decide" is the slogan of New Democracy [ND] and is often the reason why all six deputies in the republic parliament make diametrically opposing speeches, but it is also the reason why the opposition has launched an avalanche of charges of "treason" and "collaboration" against it. All of this makes that party, which was born five years ago in Valjevo, quite special on the political scene here, and it certainly is given "specific gravity" by its participation in Mr. Mirko Marjanovic's Socialist government, where it has three ministerial portfolios.*

In the session of the Serbian Assembly that ended recently, and had great trouble doing so, although there was a fight over pensions, hours seem to have been spent on altogether different topics. One of the most fascinating debates off the agenda was on the topic of "What Is Fascism?" between Nebojsa Lekovic, vice president of New Democracy, and Aleksandar Vucic, general secretary of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party]. Lekovic accused the Radicals of making statements similar to those of Hitler, while Vucic responded by saying that the vice president of New Democracy did not know the real definition of fascism, that is, he had not read it in "T nova Ruzica" ("Thorny Rose"). This was one of the rare responses given by Nebojsa Lekovic, a 31-year-old law school graduate from Kragujevac and the vice president of New Democracy since March 1993, who was also a deputy in the last convocation of the Assembly, elected on the DEPOS [Serbian Democratic Movement] slate. Before he became involved in politics, from 1980-90, he was a student official, that is, president of students of two-year and four-year law schools and security schools of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. "New Democracy is my first and last party, it is my natural environment. I was drawn by its European orientation and movements for the cities in *which we live," Nebojsa Lekovic would say about the reasons for his political involvement.*

[Jovanovic] We have noticed that since the last session of the Assembly you have been speaking frequently, which was not the case before, replying to the Radical deputies. How do you account for that odium toward the SRS ("fascists" and the like)?

[Lekovic] I go to the speaker's rostrum only when I have something to say. I need not, I have no need to court anyone, not the boss, or clients, or my mother-in-law (mother). As far as the Radicals go, I have no odium toward them at all. However, the behavior of some of the SRS deputies deserves every condemnation. By turning the parliament into a flea market, they have simply made every constructive debate meaningless. It is high time that these gentlemen brought the level of their political discourse into line with the level of their people. The people are not crude, and they do not like people who are. And then Mr. Seselj has put his party among the fascist parties with his statements and behavior. There is only one other man in history who operated on the basis of "100 for one," and I think that more extensive clarifications of fascism are not even necessary.

Mihajlo Kovac Actually Stopped the TV Transmission

[Jovanovic] What was the role of Zarko Jokanovic as chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Assembly on the night of 2-3 June of this year?

[Lekovic] The role of Zarko Jokanovic as chairman of the most important committee in the Assembly was that he respected the Rules, which means the motion of Mr. Dragan Tomic, president of the National Assembly. Nothing more nor less. But I must mention here that when the new Rules were being presented and adopted in the Assembly the New Democracy deputies voted that the National Assembly, not the Committee for Administrative Affairs, should establish or withdraw immunity for people's deputies. Only 40 deputies, including the New Democracy deputies, voted in favor of that motion. However, as legalists we respect the Rules, just as we respect all laws that have been adopted, but against which we have voted in the Assembly.

[Jovanovic] Which means, immunity was legally taken away from Deputies Nikolic and Stojmenovic as you see it?

[Lekovic] Everything was done in keeping with the Rules.

[Jovanovic] What is your comment on halting the television transmission from the Assembly?

[Lekovic] First, the Assembly transmissions were not stopped, because in advance of every session of the parliament the deputies vote whether or not to turn the cameras on. Nevertheless, as I see it, stopping the transmission is actually stopping the circus. After all that has happened in the Assembly in recent days, I am certain that stopping the TV transmission was the first step toward restoring dignity to the parliament. For that matter, all that was applied here was the interpretation given in the first convocation of the multiparty Assembly of Serbia by Mihajlo Kovac, who at that time was a deputy of the Democratic Party, which still implies that the Assembly will vote whether there is a transmission or not, that is logical.

Civil War

[Jovanovic] But that is the reason why the opposition left the parliament.

[Lekovic] Does that not seem like *deja vu* to you? They will be back, you can be sure of that.

[Jovanovic] How do you evaluate the work of the present Assembly in view of the fact that it sometimes takes several months of work to adopt one law?

[Lekovic] I had hoped that the adoption of the new Rules would make the Assembly more efficient. However, the violation of the Rules, which a majority of the deputies are abusing, drags out the length of the Assembly's sessions beyond reckoning. The reason the Assembly spends several months on one point on the agenda should be sought in the fact that a majority of the deputies are using the rostrum of the Assembly as a party platform. There is proof of that in the statement made by one party leader, saying that for him the rostrum of the Assembly is like the TV program "Honestly" for the party.

[Jovanovic] Why were harsh words exchanged between ND and the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] after your party became a separate parliamentary group?

[Lekovic] New Democracy is an independent political organization which made up the backbone of DEPOS with the Serbian Renewal Movement. You know, we did not do anything without the knowledge of our partner in the election campaign. Many more harsh words were expressed by uninformed people in the SPO than were addressed to them by New Democracy. But, as Albert Camus says: "Hostility is not ended by hostility, but by friendship," that is precisely the greatness of New Democracy.

[Jovanovic] Some people calculate that your split was only fictitious and that the SPO is also participating in the government through New Democracy. Is that true?

[Lekovic] We do have very proper relations with the SPO and DEPOS in the Federal Assembly. No, I do not think that we have moved apart. New Democracy simply has its own road, and the voters will decide whether it is the right one or not in the next election. We have committed ourselves to the role of a bridge, and we will be exceedingly happy if we have managed to bring the left and right sides together on positions of peace, that is, if we have managed to contribute to the minimum consensus so that this state can function. I think it is realistic to say that New Democracy has relieved the tension by becoming part of the government and has prevented a civil war in Serbia. But in no case is the Serbian Renewal Movement participating in the government through New Democracy.

Responsible and Correct but Not "Honest"

[Jovanovic] You are accused of being a "special interest group," or "the party of small businessmen," of ND being engaged in illegal business with the blessing of the government, of recently taking over complete control of the purchasing of raspberries, of having an immense fleet of vehicles, and so on. What is your comment on that?

[Lekovic] We do not expect our political opponents to like us and praise us. Those who are turning the National Assembly into Hyde Park can use it to present all kinds of lies and slander with impunity. That is a matter of their political and personal civility. The bigger problem is that that practice is being carried over into the media. But this does not disturb us at all, because we know that the truth is always stronger than lies, and no one can prove the lies about New Democracy which you have mentioned. If anyone states them outside the parliament, believe me they will have to prove them in court. Aside from malicious political mudslinging, we perceive these false accusations as regret for missed opportunities on the part of those who are slandering us, that they are not where we are.

[Jovanovic] It is noticeable that the voting of your deputies in Serbia is almost identical to the voting of the majority deputy group in the parliament. Of what does your opposition activity consist then?

[Lekovic] It is logical for us to vote in favor of the majority of motions, because we are participating in Mr. Mirko Marjanovic's government. However, we are attempting to correct most of the motions before they enter Assembly procedure. New Democracy does not reject any proposals *a priori* according to whether they come from the left side or the right side. We make a determination based exclusively upon the quality of those proposals, regardless of who the sponsor is. It is not being an oppositionist when you oppose even the good proposals that come from the party in power. The opposition must be a corrective of power, rather that just spitting on everything.

[Jovanovic] From the standpoint of marketing and management, ND has quite a few similarities with Mr. Zoran Djindjic's party. Why do you not agree in that case?

[Lekovic] You have rightly noted similarities in the professional activity and image shaping of New Democracy and the Democratic Party. But there is also a difference between us that appears to be small, but is essential. We behave and operate responsibly and correctly, but not "honestly." For that matter, we know who has the most to say about being honest.

Loyal Citizens of Serbia

[Jovanovic] Your leaders participated in the JUL [Yugoslav Unified Left] conference on the Balkan Federation held recently. Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, president of ND, said that ND has been a member of the JUL for five years now. Are there points of contact?

[Lekovic] Dusan Mihajlovic said that in jest, because New Democracy was formed five years ago, on 10 July, the birth date of our giant Nikola Tesla. There are points of contact between our two parties, and they are primarily the consistent fight for peace and for removal of the sanctions. We continue to remain open to cooperation with all democratically oriented parties, provided, of course, they have an interest in cooperating with us.

[Jovanovic] You say that ND is one of the founders of DEPOS. So where, then, are your intellectuals from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Association of Serbian Writers?

[Lekovic] It is true, and we constantly emphasize it, that we established DEPOS along with certain other parties, but as to why the intellectuals who spoke out in 1992 are not there, you will have to ask them or come to a meeting of the New Democracy Council.

[Jovanovic] At one of your glamorous cocktail parties, the presence of Azem Vlasi was noted. In what capacity was he there, and what are the views of ND toward Kosovo and the Albanian alternative?

[Lekovic] New Democracy favors dialogue with everyone who can contribute to relieving tensions in Kosovo and Metohija. But there is no dilemma over one thing: The question of Kosovo has to be resolved in the context of Kosovo being in Serbia. As far as Mr. Azem Vlasi is concerned, he is a man who recognizes the legal institutions of this country, and as a lawyer he participates very often in Serbian jurisprudence. The view of ND toward the Kosovo political alternative is very realistic, just as it is an indisputable realistic fact that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia.

[Jovanovic] Rodoljub Draskovic, vice president of ND, is no longer appearing in public. What happened to his idea of ND for Vojvodina, because you promoted certain "experienced figures" like Jovan Komsic and Mile Isakov as its leaders?

[Lekovic] I hope you have no intention of conducting New Democracy's personnel policy and current policy. The idea of New Democracy for Vojvodina is no longer an idea, but serious reality. I personally would decline assessments of whether particular people are worn out. That will be decided by the voters, not by my wishes or yours. I hope that these gentlemen, Dr. Komsic and Mr. Isakov, who has an M.A., have denied your allegations about their being worn out. I advise you to follow the efforts of New Democracy for Vojvodina.

[Jovanovic] How do you look upon the indictments of the court in The Hague against Karadzic, Mladic, and Martic?

[Lekovic] First and foremost is that there be peace in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the unnecessary killing and destruction of property come to an end. With all due respect for the court in The Hague, the highest court is that of history. The international community is doing a disservice to those it is backing. It would be much better for the world to use its institutions, especially the Contact Group, to set in motion a strong new peace initiative, at the same time treating all three belligerents equally. That kind of true fresh initiative based upon new views would certainly bring the bloody civil war to a rapid conclusion. However, the main precondition for cessation of those insane conflicts is removal of the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Jovanovic] Do you think that in the next election ND will meet the parliamentary quota, and how much real interest is there in joining ND? Why have you recently been emphasizing well-known names in sports and popular music, like Nenad Stekic or Dina Colic?

[Lekovic] In the last year New Democracy has participated in all elections to vacancies of opstina deputies in Serbia, and everywhere it has received more than 5 percent of the vote, which is what is required to become a parliamentary party. In the Kraljevo elections, ND won a convincing victory. You can easily verify the interest there is in joining New Democracy by attending the party's meetings, but Mrs. Dina Colic and Mr. Nenad Stekic are actually the best proof. In the next republic and federal elections, not only do we expect to meet the parliamentary quota, we expect the result will definitively place us as the third political power in Serbia. These optimistic expectations are realistic, and we base them on the fact that New Democracy will offer the voters the most serious election offer in the center.

Competition

[Jovanovic] And which will be the first two parties in the next election according to your prediction?

[Lekovic] I think that the Socialist Party of Serbia will keep first place in the number of deputy seats. They are, of course, a left-wing party. The second strongest party, representing the right wing, is certainly the SPO. The third place will, of course, be taken by ND, which completely covers the space of the center. The other parliamentary parties that are represented today in the Assembly will, in my opinion, fare much worse than in the last election in 1993, and some of them probably will not even meet the parliamentary quota of 5 percent of the electorate. Everyone, you know, has the right to tell his story, but the voters will, of course, have the last word in the election.

Kosovo

Rugova Hopes For Settlement Through U.S.

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[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian on 30 September carries on pages one and three a 1,000-word report by Behxhet Haliti on a news conference given by Ibrahim Rugova, "president of the Republic of Kosovo," in Pristina on 29 September, under the headline, "An Agreement on Kosova Will Be Reached Within the Framework of the U.S. Initiative."

The report states, "Dr. Rugova said that we welcome the U.S. initiative for peace and for a political settlement in the former Yugoslavia, especially the personal role of President Clinton and the diplomatic action of Mr. Holbrooke. This initiative has now won broad support from European countries and the international community, and, if we can say so, is taking its first positive steps.

"President Rugova thanked the U.S. Senate and especially Senator Bob Dole of the Republican majority for voting $6 million of aid to Kosova, and also expressed the hope that this aid will become a reality with the approval of the U.S. President."

The report continues, "Analyzing the current situation in Kosova, President Rugova sought an urgent end to the settlement of Serbian colonists from Croatia in

Kosova. They are still being brought to Kosova in smaller numbers, are finding work in enterprises from which Albanians were dismissed, and are also being promised land and other resources. These colonists are being settled in Kosova against their own will and against international principles, because they are being settled in an area that is itself in danger."

The report also describes Rugova's replies to correspondents' questions:

"ATA's correspondent asked President Rugova whether an agreement on Kosova is expected in the wake of the first agreements in the Balkans, and what it will look like. Dr. Rugova said that he believed that an agreement on Kosova will be achieved within the framework of the international and U.S. initiative, which will settle the problems in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans step by step. The main thing is to halt the war, the bloodshed, and the tragedy in Bosnia and to prevent the spread of the conflict, which would destabilize not only the Balkans, but the whole of Europe. An agreement on Kosova will appear on the basis of the political will of the people of Kosova, expressed in the referendum, which has now become well known to the world.

"Asked by the correspondent of Albanian Radio-Television whether Rugova had recently received an invitation to visit a foreign country and whether it is true that there are signals from the Americans that President Rugova and President Milosevic should soon sit down together at the discussion table, Rugova replied, 'As for the question of contacts, we are in continual contact with the world, also through visits that are paid here. We too will also make some visits soon to certain Western countries. As for the dialogue with the Serbian side, the international community, the United States, the countries of Europe, and the Geneva Conference are exerting continual pressure for us to start talks. We will see, and we hope that this road for settling the question of Kosova will start to unfold.'

"The correspondent of the Zagreb paper VJESNIK asked President Rugova to comment on the Law on Genocide in Albania. He replied that the law is not against any party in Albania. The Albanian parliament approved it with the goal of contributing to and strengthening democracy in Albania, and I do not see any danger arising out of it, because Albania is now moving in the direction of democracy."

Kosovo Party Official Visits Albanian PS

96P20001A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 30 Aug 95 p 1

[Article by ZERI I POPULLIT correspondent: "At the Headquarters of the Socialist Party—Deputy Chairmen Namik Dokle and Ilir Meta Meet With Dr. Rifat Blaku, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Socialist Party [PS] Deputy Chairmen Namik Dokle and Ilir Meta received the deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova, Dr. Rifat Blaku, in an official meeting. Blaku said: "Despite the few opportunities which we have had, we believe that our contacts with the PS and with other Albanian political forces have been very fruitful. We feel that the contacts between the PS and Mr. Rugova are an important step in achieving a single political opinion on the ethnic issue. For us, there are no large parties or small parties in the government or in position when it is a question of this matter."

The conversants told the friend from Kosova: "It is important that this idea be understood by all. This is why the need for a single national platform is stated as a key problem in the PS program. This is a commitment in our program and we are not deviating from this commitment. Those who still do not understand this or have fallen into the trap of the malevolent slanders against the PS will understand this tomorrow. The PS is open to other meetings and contacts with all the political forces of Kosova because good understanding and cooperation are the best way to solve the Albanian problem."

Then the deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Party, in his capacity as chairman of the Commission for Refugees and Emigration in the Kosova parliament, reported on the situation which is being created as a result of the dispatching of Serb refugees to Kosova. The two parties unanimously expressed the opinion that this is an attempt to realize the longstanding dreams of the Serb chauvinists and that this must be opposed with political courage by all the Albanian forces. The political aim of the chiefs in Belgrade becomes more and more clear when it is known that Kosova is the most populated region and is three times as poor as the regions of Serbia. Therefore, Albanian policy must be an active bulwark to counteract this antiAlbanian activity.

Many other important political issues were treated in a spirit of brotherhood and full understanding and the need to continue contacts between the two parties was emphasized.

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